forces, closely invested Patras, the garrison of which being already straightened for provisions, would, it was expected, shortly capitulate.

In the mean time, the sultan had employed the winter in extensive preparations for striking a decisive blow; his chief reliance, however, being upon the energy of Mohammed Ali, pacha of Egypt. Pursuant to its favorite policy, of destroying one rebel by means of another, the Porte summoned him, in the moment of despair, to aid in the conquest of Greece. This too potent subject, already master of Egypt and Arabia, had now added Candia to his dominions, and was allured to fresh exertions by the prospect of gaining the Morea. Through that country, he would enter Europe, and obtain immense accession of strength and resources. Possessing a powerful navy, and an army of soldiers disciplined and equipped on the European model, he enjoyed incalculable advantages over the undisciplined and unorganized troops of regenerate Grecce. Ibrahim Pacha, his son-in-law, who commanded his forces in the Morea, was advised by the French officers, employed to instruct the Egyptian army; and reposed full confidence in colonel Sève, who actually exercised command, having embraced the Mahometan faith, and assumed the name of

Soliman Bey. Their influence communicated to the proceedings of Ibrahim, all the regularity of civilized warfare. The Egyptian fleet wintered in the harbor of Suda, in Candia. Ibrahim arrived at Rhodes, January 1st, 1825, where 5000 disciplined soldiers awaited. him, with which he returned to Candia, to complete his armament there, and then sail for the Morea.

At Constantinople, on the other hand, arrangements were made to second Ibrahim, by correspondent movements in Western Greece. To conciliate the Albanians, Omer Pacha was transferred to Salonika; and the Roumeli Valisi was appointed to supply his place in the pachalic of Yannina and Delvinatsi, to which, if he succeeded in subduing them, Roumelia, with Messolunghi and Anatolia, was to be added. He immediately commenced raising troops at Larissa, intending to pass over from thence to his new government, and after levying soldiers there, to descend, with all his forces, upon Messolunghi.

Anticipating his destination, Nota Bozzaris, accompanied by generals Suka and Milios, set forward with a sufficient force, to occupy the passes of Makrinovo, the ancient Olympus, through which it was expected he would attempt to enter Greece. Izonga was also stationed at Karbassura, and Iskos

appointed to have direction of the whole. The Turks proceeded with unwonted despatch. Early in March, the Roumeli Valisi reached Yannina, and the 20th of the same month, arrived at Arta, with 15,000 men, from whence he marched on to Makrinovo. He unexpectedly found the passes open; for the Greeks quitted their posts and crossed over the Achelous, without a single battle; thus leaving all the country north of the river, exposed to the ravages of the Turks.

No sooner was all this known at Messolunghi, than a deputation was sent to the generals, desiring them to recross the Achelous, and to seize upon the passes this side of Makrinovo. Izonga immediately set out for Ligovitzi; but found himself anticipated by the enemy, and was under the necessity of falling back upon Lesini. Here a short conflict ensued, and the Roumeliots becoming aware of their inability to arrest the farther progress of the Turks, repassed the river, and retreated to Messolunghi. The approach of the enemy being daily expected there, the government hastily took the necessary steps, to place the town and the garrison in proper order for defence. To Nota Bozzaris, Suka, Milios and others, was committed the care of Anatolia, with the charge of keeping up a constant

communication with Messolunghi. The Turks made their first appearance before this place, April 27th ; and before Antolia, a few days previous. Some slight skirmishes immediately took place, but no engagement of much consequence; the enemy being chiefly occupied in commencing their lines, and throwing up entrenchments.

We must now suspend our account of the operations here; to bring down the history of events in another quarter of Greece. The patriots continued the blockade of Patras, the progress of which was observed with keen attention, because its fall was every moment expected; and the naval forces which cruised before it, were indispensably necessary to check the armament of the Egyptians, and prevent Ibrahim's transports from leaving Crete. Intelligence repeatedly reached the government, of the activity with which the pacha hastened his preparations. At length, advices arrived of the approaching departure of his fleet from Candia. The garrison of Patras was now ripe for surrender; and the Greeks, anxious not to withdraw their blockading squadron until the last moment, unfortunately deferred it too long. Almost on the same day that they sailed from Patras, to intercept the Egyptians, the squadron of the latter anchored off Modon, February

24th, and disembarked 6,000 well disciplined soldiers, who immediately encamped around Modon, while the ships returned to Suda for additional troops.

It soon became apparent, that Navarino and the adjacent country, were destined to be the immediate seat of the war. Accordingly, the attempt on Patras was wholly abandoned. Both parties, however, remained inactive, until March 12th, 1825, when Ibrahim Pacha having received a reinforcement,pitched his camp before Navarino, with an army of 14,000 soldiers. This town, standing upon the site of the ancient Pylos, was an object of importance to the Turks, not only from its geographical position, but as being one of the best ports in the Morea. The harbor was protected by the island of Sphacteria, which completely commanded the entrance to Navarino, and the fortress there, as well as that of old Navarino, at the other extremity of the port. Fortifications, erected by the Venetians when they had possession of the Morea, enabled the Greeks to undertake the defence of the place, with strong hopes of success. The government made spirited efforts to meet the Egyptians. A garrison of 2,000 soldiers, commanded by the Bulgarian Hadgi Christo, and Joannes, the youngest son of Petro Bey, the Mainote, threw themselves into the

fortress. Major Collegno, a Piedmontese exile of great bravery and merit, was appointed to superintend the fortifications. From all parts of the Morea, provisions were sent in sufficient quantities to sustain a long siege. And while Conduriotti and prince Mavrocordato prepared to march from Napoli with fresh troops; large bodies of Roumeliots, commanded by Giavella, Karatasso, Constantine Bozzaris, and Karaiscaki, took positions in the rear of the besiegers.

In this condition, things remained for several weeks. Petty contests took place almost daily, which lessened the numbers on each side; but did not end in compelling either the Greeks or Egyptians, to change the positions they had taken. But, on the 19th of April, a serious engagement occurred. The president Conduriotti, with prince Mavrocordato, had now arrived at the camp. Ibrahim posted himself east of Navarino, and erected a small battery south of the fortifications, whence he kept up an incessant cannonade. Along his rear, the Greeks extended their line, almost in a circle, with the intention of cutting off his communication with Modon. Hadgi Christo, Hadgi Stephano, and Constantine Bozzaris, commanded the left extremity; Giavella and Karatasso, the right; and a body of Moreots occupied the centre,command

in the morning, Ibrahim marched his forces to the attack, in three divisions. Hadgi Christo at one point, and Giavella at another, sustained the assault with unshrinking courage; but Skurtza's Moreots fled precipitately, leaving Bozzaris to withstand the enemy alone. His chosen soldiers were soon cut to pieces, only himself and twentyseven of his followers escaping with life. Two of the bravest capitani, Xidi and Zapheiropuolo, were made prisoners; and four other distinguished leaders perished in the battle.

Elated with their success, the Egyptians attempted an assault upon the walls; but the garrison repulsed them, sallied, and took possession of the newly constructed battery, spiked all the cannon, and safely retired again within the walls. The enemy immediately brought up fresh cannon, and recommenced a constant discharge of shot and

shells, but without gaining any material advantage.

Even in the greatest extremity of their dangers, the Greeks could not abstain from perpetual and ruinous dissensions. In passing through the Morea to Navarino, the Roumeliots had treated the Moreot peasantry, with much contempt and violence. Since their arrival at the camp, there had never been any cordial co-operation between the troops of the two districts; and the pusillanimity of the Moreots in the late engagement, to which Bozzaris justly ascribed his defeat, served to widen the breach. At length, on the arrival of the Turks before Messolunghi, the Roumeliots openly declared their determination to march immediately to the protection of their own homes, and leave Navarino to be defended by the garrison and the troops of the Morea. Led by their respective generals, Giavella, Karaiscaki, and Bozzaris, they set out accordingly; and the Moreots took arms, with great spirit, to supply their place. The two rebels, Zaimi and Londo, returned from Kalamos, whither they had fled for refuge, submitted to the government, and diligently went about raising troops in their native district of Kalabrita.

Nothing further, of much moment, transpired, until the 6th of

May, when the Egyptians endeavored to land a body of troops at Old Navarino. But, after a smart action, which continued all day, the enemy were compelled to retire, without effecting their purpose. Their fleet fell back in the direction of Modon; and only eight ships of the Greek squadron remained within the harbor of Navarino, the rest beating off at some distance from the shore. Early on the morning of Sunday, the succeeding day, the enemy's fleet was observed to be moving upon the island of Sphacteria. Soon after noon, they had advanced near to the island; whilst a dead calm prevented the Greek fleet from seasonably entering the harbor. Meanwhile, no time had been lost in hastily arranging matters for the defence of Sphacteria. A small battery of three guns, with a garrison of two hundred soldiers, directed by Stavro Sohini, a gallant young Hydriot, and by general Anagnostara, commanded the only landing place on the island. To these were added a party of sailors, from the ships, under the brave and cele brated Hydriot, captain Anastasius Psamado; prince Mavrocordato remaining on the island to direct the whole, aided by count Santa Rosa, a Piedmontese nobleman, who, banished from his own country for his devotion to the principles of li

berty, perished on this day, a martyr to the same holy cause.

The pacha divided his ships into two squadrons; one being stationed at the entrance of the harbor, to shut up the eight ships within, and the other remaining off the island, to oppose the Greek fleet, should they come up to the succor of their countrymen. On the island, the gallant little band could now see the Egyptian boats filling with Arabs, to the sound of the drum. They landed 1500 men, who completely overpowered the garrison by numbers, and cut them to pieces indiscriminately, without the exception of a single man. Sohini and Anagnostara fell among the very last, after a most desperate, but fruitless, resistance. The little parties, stationed at other points of the island, now fled in confusion. All the ships in the harbor precipitately got under weigh, except Psamado's brig, which remained to rescue the surviving Hydriots ;the Egyptian fleet dividing, and leaving them a free passage.

Psamado's crew sent their boats on shore, and prince Mavrocordato escaped on board; but when the boats again reached the shore, the fugitives crowded into them so eagerly, that they sunk. Just then, Psamado approached with a handful of followers, weak from loss of blood, and waved his cap to his