of August preceding the expiration of the presidential term, in their respective districts, to vote for two persons as president and vice-president of the United States. The persons receiving in each district the greatest number of votes for those offices, were to be certified by the governor of the state to the president of the senate, and each of the state senators, as being entitled to the vote of that district. The year of the election, congress were to assemble on the second Monday of October; and the first day of the session, the votes were to be counted in the present manner. If no person should receive a majority of the whole number of votes; a second election was to be ordered in the first week of December, to decide between the two candidates having the highest number of votes: the result of which election was to be certified in the same manner; and the person having the greatest number was to be elected. If a tie should take place on the second ballot; then the house of representatives was to decide in the present mode. This proposition was accompanied with a long and argumentative report, setting forth the advantages of the contemplated amendments. These were, the greater simplicity of the first election, by taking away the intervening electoral body between the candidate and the people; the pre

vention of corruption; and the removing from the house of repre sentatives all probable necessity of electing a president. The greater part of the report, however, was taken up in answering the objec tions made to the amendment, arising from the confederated character of the union, and the delay of the second election. Great ability was displayed in drawing up the report; but the subject was not taken up in the senate, and was finally lost sight of in the more interesting topics, which were soon made the object of its attention:

Other amendments to the constitution were afterwards introduced in that body, and one of them, prohibiting the re-election of a President beyond two terms, was carried, by a vote of 32 to 7, almost without discussion. This amendment was not regarded as important; as the practice of declining a re-election, after the second term, had been so uniform, and sanctioned by such high examples, that it seemed to supercede the necessity of any provision on the subject. Some, however, were opposed to any limitation to the power of the people on this point, as nugatory ; and thought that amendments not called for by existing evils, if lightly adopted, would lead to a tampering with the constitution, destructive to the stability of that instrument.

The other amendment, introduced by Mr. Benton, was not called up for discussion; and according to the rule of the senate, expired with the other unfinished business of the session.

In the house of representatives, the subject met with a different fate. After several notices and conversations, relating to his amendment, Mr. M'Duffie, on the 15th of February, commenced the debate with an elaborate argument in favor of his resolution. Mr. M'Duffie objected to the present system, that it wanted uniformity, and permanency, and was, in fact, no fixed rule. The legislatures of 24 states made the rule, and altered it, each at its pleasure. While it continued in that unsettled state, it would be often productive of injustice. He instanced the Gerry-mandering of Massachusetts as one example which operated most unjustly, and caused great excitement throughout the country. It also placed in the hands of political leaders, great temptation to abolish the existing mode for another, more suitable to their views, and thus increased the instability of the present system. In his argument he examined the three methods presented for appointing electors, viz. 1st. The mode hitherto adopted by the state legislatures. 2d. By general ticket. 3d. By districts. The first method he considered unconstitutional; and

after supporting that opinion by the authority of the Federalist, he proceeded to state his objections to the general ticket system.

The most obvious objection was, that it destroyed the voice of the minority. He did not mean to contend, that the minority must not submit to the majority. They must submit; but they were not to be struck out, as numbers of no importance in political equations. As if New York were divided between two candidates, in the proportion of 19 to 17; her vote by districts would count, but two for the candidate having the largest number. Upon the general ticket system her vote would be unanimous. To this he objected. He was of opinion, that the majority should determine who should be president; but he was not willing to destroy all minorities. By the general ticket system, the power of the state was raised, to destroy the proper influence of the people.

It might also put the minority in the power of the majority; as if Pennsylvania was unanimous for one candidate, and New York nearly divided. By the voice of the people, Pennsylvania would give 28 votes for her favorite, and New York a divided vote, or nearly so, between him and his opponent; but with a general ticket, New York would give 36 votes for a candidate, who would be pre

electors.

Another palpable objection was, that it arrayed states against each other, and promoted geographical distinctions. It put down all opposition to this influence, and destroyed the authority of all wise and virtuous minorities, not under the influence of sectional feeling.

The main objection to this system, however, was, that it concentrated power in the hands of a few political leaders without responsibility. He did not blame large states for obtaining power, and he could not expect their citizens to act without a central power. The voice of the electors could not be concentrated without such a power; and that is the controlling power, which decides all. Political discipline is equally necessary, and equally formidable with military, in operating upon large masses. The consequence is, the establishment of the most odious aristocracy-of a political oligarchy of intriguers, invested with dictatorial power. The power of appointing is, in fact, in the hands of a few political jugglers, who, behind the curtain, move the wires; and who, affect ing to be the people themselves, govern them with absolute authority.

should be altogether abolished. But he would as soon hold out a despotic system under the cloak of an amendment, as the idea of making a general ticket uniform. The whole system had been established for a particular purpose. Such was the case in North Carolina and in Virginia. Suppose that in New York it should be suggested on the eve of an election; that the electoral vote should be concentrated, in order to counteract the influence of other states. The legisla ture meet and appoint electors. The people also meet, and insist upon their right, and actually choose an electoral college. You have two pretenders. Who would decide between them? A civil war, in such a case, could be scarcely avoided. On one side, they would appeal to the practice of the state legislatures: On the other, to the constitution. It could only be settled by an appeal to arms, to passion, discord and blood.

Does that injure the state? It is only a change. It does not give power to the general government, nor take it from the states. It only takes it from the legislature and gives it to the people. In one instance the states act through their legislatures; and in the other, through the people. It takes from the majority its tendency to abuse its power, and preserves to the minority its just influence. Instead of consolidating power here; the effect of the amendment was, to distribute it among 261 independent districts. The state governments he regarded as sentinels to guard the rights of the people; and the way to preserve the dignity of the local legislatures, was, not to bring them into the business of elections. This was to corrupt and contaminate them. They should stand unconnected, and guard the rights of their constitu

ents.

On this branch of the subject he would conclude, by suggesting to the representatives of the large states, that the small states would never give up their relative weight; until the large states surrender the power of combining their force by a general ticket. This must be the consideration of the compromise; and all the arguments against bringing the election to the house, are in favor of the district system. This is the most

important consideration of all; for unless the power of electing a president be taken from the house, in fifty years, we shall be as corrupt as any government upon earth.

The next amendment consists in referring the two highest candidates to the people, instead of sending the three highest to the house of representatives. The issue presented is between the people and congress; and in this amendment is contained the fundamental principle of the change. In this republic the great sustaining and pervading principle is, the responsibility of the public functionaries to the people. This sublime principle, which is analagous to the harmony of the material universe, may be termed the gravitation of our political system, distinguishing it from all the governments which have ever existed upon earth. It is exclusively ours. It is established in the very nature of our system, that in proportion to power conferred, must be responsibility required. They are antagonist principles, and its perfection consists in their equipoise. Unless they are brought to this equipoise; unless, as power is increased, responsibility is rendered more efficient, the system is destroyed as effectually as the equilibrium of the universe by the destruction of the centripetal and centrifugal powers. This end is attained by making the president

directly responsible to the people. The great problem is solved and two elements combined, which never before existed together; liberty and power.

The power of the president, he stated to be equal to that of the king of England; and so satisfied were the framers of the constitution that it would be exercised with integrity, that while they restricted the other branches of the government, they conferred almost unlimited power upon the president. He regarded this with some alarm.

To congress was given power to raise armies, appropriate money, &c.: but to the president all executive power. What is this? All the power vested in any other executive. He cannot, indeed, declare war ; and this is the only power which the king of England has, that the president has not; and this he never exercises upon his own unadvised opinion.

The president may, under the treaty making power, add empires to the country; and all that the house has to do, is to make appropriations to carry the treaty into effect.

and I will idolize it, for I love power."

It is essential to freedom itself; for no system can long maintain itself that has not all the active and defensive powers of sovereignty.

He agreed with the idea in the president's message, that liberty is power; and this principle was the one by which the despotisms of the world would be finally effaced. But this power must be accom> panied by responsibility. Extend it through our system, and it is formed for endless duration.

This he proposed to do by this amendment. The people were intelligent and virtuous, and to them might safely be confided the correction of the evils he apprehended from executive power.

The press had given them a means of intelligence not possessed by the republics of Greece and Rome, and the extension of the territories through which power was diffused, exempted them from the violence and tumult which destroyed those petty states.

He did not fear any violence from referring the election back to the people. We had just had an election, in which the popular candidate was not chosen, yet we witnessed no violence among the people. They submitted with the dig