and on the 26th of December, he sent to the senate a confidential message setting forth the objects of the Panama congress; his reason s for accepting the invitation to send commissioners; and nominating Richard C. Anderson, and John Sergeant as ministers on the part of the United States, and William B. Rochester, of New-York, as secretary to the mission.

This message, with the accompanying documents, was referred to the committee on foreign relations; where it remained until January 16th, when a report was made condemning the mission and ending with a resolution, declaring it to be inexpedient to send ministers to Panama.

The opposition to this mission, was justified on the following grounds. That it was a departure from the settled policy of the government, adopted by Washington, and conformed to by his successors to enter into alliances with other powers, which should entangle our foreign relations, or prevent the United States from acting with a sole view to their own interests; and no sufficient reason, it was urged, had been offered for this departure.

The uncertainty, too, of the powers of the commissioners; and of the subjects of their deliberations, was also urged as a motive for this government, acting for a people peculiarly jealous of undefined power, to abstain from becoming a party

to the congress. To guard against the evils feared from this source, the supervising power of the senate over any compacts made there, was not considered sufficient. After a treaty had been once made, it was difficult to reject it without giving offence to the other party; and much embarrassment is occasioned in giving explanations, to which the other party, who has sanctioned the treaty conceives he has a right. 'In this case, if the measures agreed upon in congress, should be such as the senate could not sanction, great inconvenience, it was feared, would result from its refusal, and probably, an entire alienation of the friendly feelings of the new republics.

To such objects of the mission as were stated by the president, or the ministers of the Spanish American republics, specific objections were made.

To that prominent subject which Mr. Monroe had alluded to in his message of 1823, viz: opposition to the interference of any other power, in the conflict between Spain and the new states; it was objected, that it would at once compromit our neutrality and involve us in a war for objects, which the people of the United States would not regard, as worth the expense and danger of the contest. The opposition to any farther colonization on this continent, was also set forth as an inadequate

motive for such a mission. If it was intended to prevent any violation of our own territories, no aid would be required from any other American state; and if to guaranty the integrity of the dominions of the other powers, it would be an agreement, to which the people of this country would refuse their consent.

The abolition of the slave trade, which the Colombian minister had enumerated among the subjects likely to come under examination; the committee stated had already been effected, so far as our laws could do it, and they did not "see the propriety of insulting other states by ascending the moral chair, and proclaiming mere abstract principles, of the rectitude of which, each nation enjoys the perfect right of deciding for itself."

Objections were also made, to any consideration of the basis, upon which the relations of Hayti should be placed. Of the propriety or impropriety of connexion with people, situated like the Haytians, every state should be permitted to judge for itself. At one time, and to one community, that connexion may be desirable, which under different circumstances, would be highly injuri

ous.

The United States should not, therefore, place themselves in a situation; where they could not regulate their relations with Hayti, according to their own views of their interests.

To an idea suggested by the Guatemalian minister, "that as Europe had formed a continental system, America ought also to form one," the committee objected that it was not in the power of the government of the United States to become a party to such a compact: nor was it in its power, to enter into any negotiation, for the purpose of settling either principles of internal policy; or mere abstract propositions, as parts of the public law.

So far, too, as these changes in national law were beneficial to this continent; the committee feared that they would be regarded by other civilized nations, as prejudicial to the interests of the old world, and that deplorable results might happen from their adoption : the committee also made objections to the subjects of discussion set forth by the president.

Any effort on the part of the United States, to establish the principles of free trade to the injury of the new republics, they said, would be contrary to that spirit of comity by which this government was actuated; and if their establishment would conduce to their benefit, the end could be attained, better in separate negotiations, than in a general congress. So, too, with regard to the adoption by consent, of the principles of maritime neutrality. These had already been adopted by some of the states, and

the others had not manifested any unwillingness, to enter into negotiations on those points: which the committee thought preferable to a discussion, in a general congress. Here, too, the umbrage which might be taken by the maritime powers of Europe, at the adoption of principles materially effecting their future interests, was stated as a reason for the United States to abstain, from taking part in the contemplated congress. With regard to the destiny of Cuba and Porto Rico, which it was intimated might become a subject of consideration; it was said, that the interests of the United States were so adverse to those of the belligerents, that they ought not to enter into the discussion of those topics; for if our ministers spoke at all, they must hazard giving offence, by expressing our determination, not to suffer those islands to change masters, and that our silence might be misconstrued.

That an invitation was not given at an earlier period to the United States, was brought forward as an adequate reason, for a refusal to be present at the congress, and the committee recommended a resolution, declaring it to be inexpedient to send ministers to Panama.

Shortly after this report was submitted, Mr. Van Buren offered a resolution, (January 30,) requesting a confidential communication, of the correspondence between the

American minister at Madrid, and the Spanish government, in relation to the independence of the Spanish American states. The correspondence asked for, was communicated "in confidence" on the 1st of Februry. The 15th of the same month, Mr. Van Buren submitted two resolutions, declaring that the senate ought to discuss the question of the Panama mission with open doors; unless the publication of the documents necessary to be referred to in debate, should be prejudicial to pending negotiations; and requesting the president to inform the senate, whether any objection existed to their publication, and to specify what parts, ought not to be published. These resolutions were carried by a vote of 23 to 20, and drew forth the following reply from the president:

"WASHINGTON, 16th Feb. 1826. "To the Senate of the United States:-In answer to the two resolutions of the senate, of the 15th instant, marked (executive,) and which I have received, I state, respectfully, that all the communications from me to the senate, relating to the congress at Panama, have been made, like all other communications upon executive business, in confidence, and most of them in compliance with a resolution of the senate requesting them confidentially. Believing that the established usage of free confidential com

munications, between the executive and the senate, ought, for the public interest, to be preserved unimpaired, I deem it my indispensable duty to leave to the senate itself the decision of a question, involving a departure, hitherto, so far as I am informed, without example, from that usage, and upon the motives for which, not being informed of them, I do not feel myself competent to decide.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS." When this message was received, resolutions were offered by Mr. Rowan, censuring the executive for declining to decide upon the propriety of proceeding in the debate with open doors; and refusing to proceed in the consideration of the mission, until his opinion as to the propriety of a public discussion was given. These were modified at the instance of Mr. Woodbury, so as to declare it to be the right of the senate to call upon the president for such information, as was requested by the resolutions of Mr. Van Buren, and that the same had not been furnished, in the message of the president; that the senate had the sole right to determine, what were, or should be its rules of proceeding, and that the president could not officially interfere with the same, without violating the constitutional privileges of that body; and that it was not competent for the president, to decline giving the in

formation called for, on the ground that he disapproved of the mode of proceeding, which the senate proposed to follow. These resolutions, after some discussion, were indefinitely postponed, by a vote of 24

to 20.

A resolution was then offered declaring, that although the senate did not find in the message of the president, in answer to the resolutions of the 15th the information requested; yet they found a strong objection on his part, to the publication of documents communicated in confidence; and although the senate had the right to publish the same without the assent of the president; yet they did not think the public interest required the exercise of that right, and therefore resolved that the discussion on the Panama mission,be held with closed doors.

This resolution, which receded from the ground taken in the resolutions of the 15th, so far as the expediency of public discussion was concerned, was carried by a vote of 27 to 16.

After these preliminary proceedings, the resolution reported by the committee on foreign relations, was taken into consideration; and on the 14th of March, it was negatived. Several ineffectual attempts to amend it were made; one by Mr. Benton, declaring it inexpedient to send commissioners to Panama,