To the Editors of the National Intelligencer.
WASHINGTON, Sept. 20, 1841.

Gentlemen-Doubts have been attempted to be cast upon
the correctness of Mr. Ewing's statement in relation to the
part taken by the President in getting up the Fiscal Cor-
poration Bill, by arguing that there was an impropriety in
making it which ought to deprive it of credit. There are
circumstances in this case distinguishing it from all others
that I recollect of the kind. It grows out of a matter of offi-
cial business, transacted by high public functionaries, and is
of public and general concern. The public and open con-
duct of one of these high functionaries is in direct opposition
to what the other had, by his express direction and authority,
affirmed as to his intentions and purposes.
There can,
I
humbly submit, be no serious question in such a case upon
the point of personal propriety, when the injured party seeks
to vindicate his honor by disclosing the truth. The obliga-
tions arising out of confidential relations, in private or public
affairs, are founded in mutual trust. He that disregards his
own confidential pledges and engagements cannot allege the
obligation of confidence, in the same transaction, against the
natural right of self-defence belonging to the injured party.
For anything that can ever be known to the contrary, it may
have been the object of the original pledge or engagement to
sacrifice those who trusted and were misled by it. For these
reasons, I do not hesitate to furnish for publication, the ac-
companying statement, which contains all the facts and cir-
cumstances within my knowledge, that occur to me as being
material, connected with the subject of difference. I do this
as an act of justice not only to Mr. Ewing, who requested it,
but to myself and the public.

with offices or agencies in the States, having the privilege, without their assent, to deal in exchanges between them, and in foreign bills. He promptly replied that he thought expe rience had shown the necessity of such a power in the gov ernment. I could not restrain the immediate expression of my gratification upon hearing this avowal. I said to the President at once, that what I had feared would lead to fatal dissensions among our friends, I now regarded as rather fortunate than otherwise, that his veto of the bill then before him would lead to the adoption of a much better one. I also congratulated him upon the happy circumstance of the delay which had taken place in his sending in his Veto Message. The heat and violence which might have been expected if the Veto had been sent in immediately upon the passage of the bill, would now be avoided. Time had been given for cool reflection, and as the Message did not exclude the idea of a bank in some form, no unpleasant consequences would be likely to follow. He expressed his great surprise that there should be so much excitement upon the subject; said that he had had his mind made up on the bill before him from the first, but had delayed his Message that there should be time for the excitement to wear off; that nothing could be more easy than to pass a bill which would answer all necessary purposes; that it could be done in three days. The next day, having occasion to see the President again, he requested me to furnish him with such information as the War Department afforded of the embarrassments attending the transfer and disbursement of the public revenue to distant points on the frontier, in Florida, &c. He at the same time requested me to draw up a brief statement of my views upon the subject, showing the practical advantages and necessity of such a fiscal institution as he had thought of proposing. Such information as I could hastily collect from the heads of the principal disbursing bureaus of the Depart ment I handed to him on the evening of the same day, knowing that time was of the utmost importance in the state in which the question then was. He received the statements I gave him with manifest indifference, and alarmed me by remarking that he began to doubt whether he would give his assent (as I understood him) to any bank.

I avail myself of this occasion to say that I have, at no time, regarded a difference of opinion between the President and myself in relation to a bank, however important the subject, as sufficient of itself to justify a resignation of the office which I lately held in the Executive Administration of the Government. Nor was it because the President thought proper to trifle with or mislead his Cabinct, as there is but too much reason to believe he intended to do, in the affair of the last Fiscal Bank Bill, that I resigned my place. There were other, and some of them pre-existing causes, for such a course, which many will regard as sufficient of themselves; and which could not have been overlooked. But it was possible to explain or remove them, and therefore they were not promptly acted upon. The last act of the President, how-think Mr. Dawson, of Georgia. We waited until they reever, was conclusive of the true character of all the other occurrences or circumstances which had previously awakened curiosity or excited distrust.

I shall, at my leisure, state the reasons more at large which impelled me to the course I have thought proper to adopt, and at the same time furnish a narrative of all the causes, so far as they fell under my observation, which have resulted in the separation of Mr. Tyler from the party which brought him into power, and the breaking up of the Whig Administration.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN BELL.

Messrs. GALES & SEATON,

Resignation of the Cabinet--Mr. Bell's Letter. I called to see the President on official business on the morning (Monday, 15th August,) before the first Veto Message was sent in. I found him reading the Message to the Secretary of the Treasury. He did me the honor to read the material passages to me. Upon reading that part of it which treats of the superior importance and value of the business done by the late Bank of the United States in furnishing exchanges between the different States and sections of the Union, I was so strongly impressed with the idea that he meant to intimate that he would have no objection to a bank which should be restricted to dealing in exchanges, that I interrupted him in the reading, and asked if I was to understand, by what he had just read, that he was prepared to give his assent to a bank in the District of Columbia, VOL. V.-28

The next day (Wednesday, 18th August) was the stated time for the weekly meeting of the Cabinet with the Presi dent. Mr. Webster, Mr. Ewing, and myself, went at ten o'clock in the morning, and were informed that the President was engaged with Messrs. Berrien, Sergeant, and I tired, and the President made his appearance about three quarters of an hour afterwards. Mr. Badger came in soon after the President joined us. Messrs. Crittenden and Gran ger did not attend. The conference which ensued was a long one-lasting two hours at least, according to my recollection. I cannot pretend to detail all that was said; neither can I undertake to give the language employed by the President upon every point, nor of the members of the Cabinet. I can only state the substance of what was said upon those points which most attracted my attention.

The President commenced by stating that he had been waited upon that morning by a committee of Members of Congress, who desired to know his views upon the subject of a bank-such a one as he could sanction. He had given them no satisfaction upon that subject, but had informed them that he would first consult with his constitutional advisers-his Cabinet-through whom he thought it most regular that his views should be communicated. He asked the opinion of his Cabinet upon the correctness of the ground he had taken; remarking at the same time that the habit of expressing his views to members of Congress upon subjects of so much interest, subjected him to great embarrassment and much misrepresentation. That question being disposed of, the President adverted briefly, but without much connexion, to the relation in which he stood to the bank question, and his disposition to go as far as he could to comply with the wishes of his friends. He spoke of the relation that existed between him and his Cabinet, and how necessary it was that he should have their support. Would they stand by him? He much preferred that the whole subject should be postponed until the next session; but if it was necessary

to act now, he thought a plan might be devised which, with their co-operation, might be carried through. He wondered why the Senate continued to postpone acting upon his Veto Message, which was yet to be disposed of. He supposed it might be to hold it as a rod over his head; and had some doubts whether it was proper that he should consider further upon the subject until the Senate had decided what they would do with the bill then before them. Some one present assured him that the postponement of the question pending in the Senate was intended to give time for reflection, and to prevent an intemperate debate.

privilege, he apprehended, was conferred upon the late bank from the belief that without it the stock of the bank could not be made profitable; and it was therefore considered as a necessary incident to an institution which was itself but the offspring of an incidental power. Experience, he thought, had shown clearly that such a privilege was no longer important or necessary. By confining the discounting privilege of the proposed bank to bills of exchange between this country and foreign States, and between the several States of the Union, this objection would not lie against it.

The President expressed his regret that he had not used the words "bank of discount and deposit" in his late message, so that the distinction he took might be clearly inferred from that message, and he could not then be charged with inconsistency. Mr. Badger said he thought nothing would have been gained by the use of the terms "bank of discount and deposit" in his message; for, as to the charge of inconsistency, it might, and probably would, be made against him for party effect, if he sanctioned the bill then proposed by him, inasmuch as dealing in or buying bills of exchange would be discounting, and to that extent make it a bank of discount.

When all the material points appeared to be disposed of, and the members of the Cabinet present had expressed their decided approbation of the plan the President had suggested, he said that, after all, he would not sanction a bank in the form just agreed upon, if he supposed that it would be made the groundwork or basis of a bank with all the powers of the late Bank of the United States. He never would give his sanction to the power of local discount. He feared that at the next or succeeding sessions of Congress, the Whigs would be bringing forward amendments engrafting this power upon any charter he might now approve; and he appealed to his Cabinet to know if they would stand by him, and use their influence in preventing any such movements while his Administration lasted. Mr. Webster and others gave him all proper assurances upon this point.

The President thought a capital of fifteen millions of dollars would be sufficient.

A name, he said, was important. What should it be? Fiscal Institute would do. It was objected to, and the name Fiscal Bank preferred by a member of the Cabinet. He replied that there was a great deal in a name, and he did not wish the word bank to appear in the bill.

The President then gave the outline of such a bank or fiscal institution as he thought he could sanction. It was to be in the District of Columbia, to have the privilege of issuing its own notes, receive moneys on deposit, and to deal in bills of exchange between the States, and between the United States and foreign States. But he wished to have the opinion of his Cabinet upon it. His own consistency and reputation must be looked to. He considered his Cabinet his friends, who must stand by and defend whatever he did upon the subject. He appealed particularly to Mr. Webster for his opinion upon the point of consistency; and whether there was not a clear distinction between the old Bank of the United States-a bank of discount and deposit-and the one he now thought of proposing; and whether the constitutional question was not different. He reminded us that, in all his former speeches and reports, he had taken the ground that Congress had no constitutional power to charter a bank which had the power of local discount. Mr. Webster pointed out the distinction between the two plans in a manner which appeared to be satisfactory to him. The substance of what he said was, as I understood him, as follows: He had a decided preference for a bank upon the plan then proposed over either of those which had been previously spoken of. He reminded the President that he had expressed his preference for a bank which should be restricted in its dealings to bills of exchange, when certain gentlemen from the city of New York were present several weeks before. He then thought, as he did now, that it would answer all useful purposes. One ground of his preference was, and it had great weight with him, that the plan did not contemplate the consent of the States as, in any way or at any time, necessary to its existence or efficiency. He thought the plan proposed at the commencement of the session, generally known as Mr. Ewing's bill, was incongruous and ob- The President then inquired if he was understood. He jectionable on this ground. His general course of thinking said there must be no misunderstanding of what he proposed on such subjects led him to prefer that, whatever power this to do. Addressing himself to Mr. Ewing, he asked him if Government asserted or was authorized to assert, should be he thought he understood his views fully. Mr. Ewing unexercised independently of State authority, and of the inter- dertook to recapitulate. He understood the President to ference of the States. He thought there could be no doubt have no objection to a bank in the District of Columbia, with of the constitutional power to charter such a bank as was offices of discount and deposit in the States, with their asthen proposed, according to the President's own modes of sent. The President interrupted him abruptly, by saying thinking on that subject, if he understood them. Certainly he did not understand him at all; he was not willing to sancthere was a clear distinction between such a bank and the tion any such bank. I understood his objection to be to the late Bank of the United States. The one now proposed was power of local discount. I supposed Mr. Ewing intended to to be limited in its operations to such objects as were clearly say that he understood the President had no constitutional within some of the general provisions of the Constitution, objections to such a bank. Mr. Ewing, however, without or such as were clearly necessary in the execution of others. explaining, went on to say, that he now understood the PreThe privilege of issuing its own notes, of dealing in ex-sident to have no objection to a bank in the District of Cochanges, and of receiving moneys on deposit, all appeared to lumbia, with the power to issue its own notes, receive money have immediate reference to or connexion with the power on deposit, with offices or agencies in the States having the given in the Constitution over commerce between the States, privilege, without their assent, of dealing in bills of exchange over the currency, and the necessary fiscal operations of the drawn in one State or Territory and made payable in another Government in the collection, safe-keeping and disburse- State or Territory of the Union, and in bills between the ment of the public revenue. These were all subjects of Na- United States and foreign States or Nations. tional, and not local or State concern. The distinctions between this plan and the late Bank of the United States lay in this : the privilege enjoyed by the old Bank, of dealing in local paper, or discounting notes having no circulation, as it might be, but between the ditèrent streets or commercial points of the same city, had no connexion with the trade or Commerce between the States and sections of the Union, nor with the teaser of the public money from one point to mother, and a dad, therein, na navisket connexion with any of the great matomať vað vors for which the bank was charter, covei, at de chained as an incident to any of the powers given to Cageme dy dhe Common. That

The President said he was then understood. He requested Mr. Webster particularly to communicate with the gentlemen who had waited upon him that morning and to let them know the conclusions to which they had come. He also requested Mr. Ewing to aid in getting the subject properly before Congress. He requested that they would take care not to commit him by what they said to members of Congress to any intention to dictate to Congress. They might express their confidence and belief that such a bill as had just been agreed upon would receive his sanction; but it should be as matter of inference from his Veto Message and his general views. He thought he might request that

The case of seamen and marines seems to present pecu-done to the locomotives. liar difficulties, and I regret the hard consequences to them of the decision I have been compelled to form. They cannot, when in service, receive more than their pay, because there is no discrimination by law between their compensation when on duty and when unemployed. Hence it seems to follow that no seaman or marine, while in service and receiving pay, can receive any payment at all on account of a pension.

I am of opinion that all pensioners are entitled to be paid

to act now, he thought a plan might be devised which, with their co-operation, might be carried through. He wondered why the Senate continued to postpone acting upon his Veto Message, which was yet to be disposed of. He supposed it might be to hold it as a rod over his head; and had some doubts whether it was proper that he should consider further upon the subject until the Senate had decided what they would do with the bill then before them. Some one present assured him that the postponement of the question pending in the Senate was intended to give time for reflection, and to prevent an intemperate debate.

privilege, he apprehended, was conferred upon the late bank from the belief that without it the stock of the bank could not be made profitable; and it was therefore considered as a necessary incident to an institution which was itself but the offspring of an incidental power. Experience, he thought, had shown clearly that such a privilege was no longer important or necessary. By confining the discounting privilege of the proposed bank to bills of exchange between this country and foreign States, and between the several States of the Union, this objection would not lie against it.

The President expressed his regret that he had not used the words "bank of discount and deposit" in his late message, so that the distinction he took might be clearly inferred from that message, and he could not then be charged with inconsistency. Mr. Badger said he thought nothing would have been gained by the use of the terms "bank of discount and deposit" in his message; for, as to the charge of inconsistency, it might, and probably would, be made against him for party effect, if he sanctioned the bill then proposed by him, inasmuch as dealing in or buying bills of exchange would be discounting, and to that extent make it a bank of discount.

When all the material points appeared to be disposed of, and the members of the Cabinet present had expressed their decided approbation of the plan the President had suggested, he said that, after all, he would not sanction a bank in the form just agreed upon, if he supposed that it would be made the groundwork or basis of a bank with all the powers of the late Bank of the United States. He never would give his sanction to the power of local discount. He feared that at the next or succeeding sessions of Congress, the Whigs would be bringing forward amendments engrafting this power upon any charter he might now approve; and he appealed to his Cabinet to know if they would stand by him, and use their influence in preventing any such movements while his Administration lasted. Mr. Webster and others gave him all proper assurances upon this point.

The President thought a capital of fifteen millions of dollars would be sufficient.

A name, he said, was important. What should it be? Fiscal Institute would do. It was objected to, and the name Fiscal Bank preferred by a member of the Cabinet. He replied that there was a great deal in a name, and he did not wish the word bank to appear in the bill.

The President then gave the outline of such a bank or fiscal institution as he thought he could sanction. It was to be in the District of Columbia, to have the privilege of issuing its own notes, receive moneys on deposit, and to deal in bills of exchange between the States, and between the United States and foreign States. But he wished to have the opinion of his Cabinet upon it. His own consistency and reputation must be looked to. He considered his Cabinet his friends, who must stand by and defend whatever he did upon the subject. He appealed particularly to Mr. Webster for his opinion upon the point of consistency; and whether there was not a clear distinction between the old Bank of the United States-a bank of discount and deposit-and the one he now thought of proposing; and whether the constitutional question was not different. He reminded us that, in all his former speeches and reports, he had taken the ground that Congress had no constitutional power to charter a bank which had the power of local discount. Mr. Webster pointed out the distinction between the two plans in a manner which appeared to be satisfactory to him. The substance of what he said was, as I understood him, as follows: He had a decided preference for a bank upon the plan then proposed over either of those which had been previously spoken of. He reminded the President that he had expressed his preference for a bank which should be restricted in its dealings to bills of exchange, when certain gentlemen from the city of New York were present several weeks before. He then thought, as he did now, that it would answer all useful purposes. One ground of his preference was, and it had great weight with him, that the plan did not contemplate the consent of the States as, in any way or at any time, necessary to its existence or efficiency. He thought the plan proposed at the commencement of the session, generally known as Mr. Ewing's bill, was incongruous and ob- The President then inquired if he was understood. He jectionable on this ground. His general course of thinking said there must be no misunderstanding of what he proposed on such subjects led him to prefer that, whatever power this to do. Addressing himself to Mr. Ewing, he asked him if Government asserted or was authorized to assert, should be he thought he understood his views fully. Mr. Ewing unexercised independently of State authority, and of the inter- dertook to recapitulate. He understood the President to ference of the States. He thought there could be no doubt have no objection to a bank in the District of Columbia, with of the constitutional power to charter such a bank as was offices of discount and deposit in the States, with their asthen proposed, according to the President's own modes of sent. The President interrupted him abruptly, by saying thinking on that subject, if he understood them. Certainly he did not understand him at all; he was not willing to sancthere was a clear distinction between such a bank and the tion any such bank. I understood his objection to be to the late Bank of the United States. The one now proposed was power of local discount. I supposed Mr. Ewing intended to to be limited in its operations to such objects as were clearly say that he understood the President had no constitutional within some of the general provisions of the Constitution, objections to such a bank. Mr. Ewing, however, without or such as were clearly necessary in the execution of others. explaining, went on to say, that he now understood the PreThe privilege of issuing its own notes, of dealing in ex-sident to have no objection to a bank in the District of Cochanges, and of receiving moneys on deposit, all appeared to lumbia, with the power to issue its own notes, receive money have immediate reference to or connexion with the power on deposit, with offices or agencies in the States having the given in the Constitution over commerce between the States, privilege, without their assent, of dealing in bills of exchange over the currency, and the necessary fiscal operations of the drawn in one State or Territory and made payable in another Government in the collection, safe-keeping and disburse- State or Territory of the Union, and in bills between the ment of the public revenue. These were all subjects of Na- United States and foreign States or Nations. tional, and not local or State concern. The distinctions between this plan and the late Bank of the United States lay in this the privilege enjoyed by the old Bank, of dealing in local paper, or discounting notes having no circulation, as it might be, but between the different streets or commercial points of the same city, had no connexion with the trade or commerce between the States and sections of the Union, nor with the transfer of the public money from one point to another; and it had, therefore, no necessary connexion with any of the great national objects for which the bank was chartered; nor could it be claimed as an incident to any of the powers given to Congress by the Constitution. That

The President said he was then understood. He requested Mr. Webster particularly to communicate with the gentlemen who had waited upon him that morning and to let them know the conclusions to which they had come. He also requested Mr. Ewing to aid in getting the subject properly before Congress. He requested that they would take care not to commit him by what they said to members of Congress to any intention to dictate to Congress. They might express their confidence and belief that such a bill as had just been agreed upon would receive his sanction; but it should be as matter of inference from his Veto Message and his general views. He thought he might request that

the measure should be put into the hands of some friend of
his own upon whom he could rely. Mr. Sergeant was named,
and he expressed himself satisfied that he should have charge
of it. He also expressed a wish to see the bill before it was
presented to the House, if it could be so managed.
I then said, addressing myself to Messrs. Webster and J. L. EDWARDS, Esq., Commissioner of Pensions.
Ewing, that no time was to be lost in communicating with
gentlemen of Congress; that there was danger that Mr.
Ewing's bill would be taken up and reported to the House
immediately after the bill sent back to the Senate with the
President's objections was disposed of.

up to the passage of the law; that is to say, up to the 16th
instant, just as they would have been paid, had the act never
been passed.
am, respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. E. BADGER.

As the members of the Cabinet rose to depart, or just be-
fore, the President requested Messrs. Webster and Ewing,
as they had turned their attention more particularly to the
subject, to furnish him with written arguments upon the
points they had been discussing. He wanted them to fortify
his own opinion, and to lay up for future reference.
JOHN BELL.

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1841.

Navy Pensions.

The Army and Navy Chronicle states that the second section of an act, passed at the late session of Congress, "to provide for the payment of navy pensions," make a material alteration in the naval pension system. The section being susceptible of different interpretations, it was referred to the Secretary of the Navy, for his decision, which was given on the 20th of August. As it is a question of much interest to all in the navy, we have procured a copy of Mr. Badger's decision for publication.

An officer on duty can hereafter receive no pension money; and when off duty can receive only so much as will make his whole income from the United States equivalent to the lowest rate of duty pay.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
August 20, 1841.

Sir-Your letter of the 19th inst, has been received. The second section of the act of Congress to which you have called my attention, is very obscurely worded; and I am by no means sure that I have been able to collect its true meaning.

The phrase "in service" seems to have been used instead of, and as equivalent to, "on duty" for in any other sense the whole section becomes unmeaning, as every officer, while he continues to belong to the navy, is in the service, though be may not be on duty. Giving this sense to the phrase, I am of opinion,

First, That no officer can receive, at the same time, pay as an officer on duty, and as a pensioner; and

46

Secondly, The officers who may be "waiting orders," or on leave," or "furlough," can receive only so much on account of their pensions as, added to their pay when so " on leave," &c., will amount to the pay of their grade when "on duty."

When, by the act of Congress of 1835, regulating the pay of the navy, officers are entitled to a higher rate of compensation when employed in a certain specified manner than when engaged in other duty, the rate of compensation of the latter is that which is referred to in this act, and is not to be exceeded by the aggregate of the pension and the pay while "waiting orders," &c. For instance:

A commander is entitled when attached to vessels for sea service, to $2,500 per annum, and on other duty, to $2,100. I am of opinion that such commander, when off duty, cannot receive more, including his pension, than $2,100 per annum; and so of every other grade.

The case of seamen and marines seems to present peculiar difficulties, and I regret the hard consequences to them of the decision I have been compelled to form. They cannot, when in service, receive more than their pay, because there is no discrimination by law between their compensation when on duty and when unemployed. Hence it seems to follow that no seaman or marine, while in service and receiving pay, can receive any payment at all on account of a pension.

I am of opinion that all pensioners are entitled to be paid

[Baltimore American.

Treasury Notes.

Treasury Department,

October 2, 1841.

}

the acts of Congress of 1837, 1838, 1839, 1840,
Amount of Treasury Notes issued under the provisions of

Redeemed of those issues

Leaving outstanding the sum of...
Issued under the act of Feb. 1841, viz.
Prior to March 4
Since March 4..

..........

$673,681 32 ..5,273,251 58

5,946,932 90
352,320 39

$26,681,337 50 24,902,925 61

$1,778,411 89

5,594,612 51

Redeemed of that issue...
Leaving outstanding,
Aggregate outstanding on the 1st instant... $7,373,024 40
W. FORWARD,
Secretary of the Treasury.

FRESHET.

We notice by our exchange papers in various parts of the State, that the recent severe rains on the seaboard extended with equal or greater force into the up country. At Columbus, we learn from the Enquirer, that the heavy fall of rain caused a sudden rise in the water courses in that vicinity, and several bridges and mill-dams were swept away.

At Forsyth, according to the Bantling, it rained from Wednesday night to Thursday afternoon, without a moment's intermission. All the water courses, as far as heard from, were swollen to an unusual height, and nearly all the bridges carried away.

At Washington, (Wilkes county,) the News says, the storm was more violent than ever experienced in that section. Great damage has been done to property on the streams, which rose two or three feet higher than was ever known before. Bridges were carried away in every direction, and scarcely a mill in the county is left uninjured. Great injury has also resulted to the crops. The fields upon the streams have been swept of whatever grew upon them, and the cotton which was open has everywhere been so much injured as to be worthless.

From the Macon Messenger we learn that the water rose in the Ocmulgee, within about 18 inches as high as it did at the great freshet in March last. Several bridges on the large creeks are carried off, and much fencing washed away. Much damage was done to the corn and cotton on the river lands, and in some cases, individuals have lost almost their entire crops.

Add to these, the accounts we have already published of the freshet in the Savannah river and at the south, and some idea may be formed of the extent of the damage done to the crops, &c.

We are happy to perceive that none of the railroads have sustained any damage, if we except the Georgia road, which was slightly injured, causing a serious accident, by which one of the passengers was killed and considerable damage done to the locomotives.

The present makes three freshets which have occurred in our rivers within sixteen months-all of them severe and doing an immense amount of damage.

Since the quarter of the Moon on the 21st instant, the wind here has been steady from south-west to north-west, with clear sky and pure atmosphere, and rather cool. Most excellent weather for the maturing and gathering of cotton, and rice, and which will in some sort compensate for the storms of the two weeks previous.-Savannah Rep.