the prisoner, and of course he could state that his opinion is an advisory one.

Here would be requests They would be fully dis

But how would that work? for instructions on both sides. cussed before the judge in the presence of the jury and the books and cases would be cited to the Court and after all the discussion the judge would lay down the law applicable to the case and the jury would almost inevitably follow him as to the law of the case. They would be relieved of groping in the dark over conflicting statements of counsel on either side as to what the law is. If there is a case of extraordinary character the jury would still be at liberty to find their verdict as a common law. But it seemed to the committee it would be wise to bring our whole practice in harmony with 45 other states. There are probably only two that have our own system. Then the whole matter would be simplified by putting it on the plane of common sense, and common sense ought to rule in every department of law in our State as it rules almost everywhere else.

The President: The amendment is simply a proposition to repeal Section 5 of Article 15 of the Constitution of this State, repealing that provision of the present constitution, which expressly makes the jury judge of the law as well as of fact in criminal cases.

Samuel S. Field: I move we postpone the further consideration of this until tomorrow morning's session. William Sheppard Bryan: I second the motion.

The question was put, and, on the vote being taken, it was decided in the affirmative and the consideration of the recommendation was accordingly postponed until Saturday, July 1, 1911, at 10 o'clock A. M.

George P. Thomas: I now move that we adjourn until this evening at 8 o'clock.

The question was put, and on the vote being taken the Association was declared adjourned until 8 o'clock P. M.

EVENING SESSION.

Pursuant to adjournment, the Association assembled at 8 o'clock P. M., the President being in the chair.

The President: The Treasurer desires me to announce that it is absolutely necessary for all those who desire to attend the banquet tomorrow night to get their cards.

The first paper on the programme this evening is by a gentleman who represented the United States Government in the first case ever presented to The Hague Tribunal, the Pious Fund, and who also was connected with other arbitration matters, including the Venezuela Arbitration. By reason of his extraordinary opportunities for knowledge of that most interesting tribunal, he has prepared a paper on the subject entitled "The Hague Court, Its Functions and History."

I have the honor now of introducing to you Jackson H. Ralston, Esq., of the District Bar, who will address you on the topic referred to.

THE HAGUE COURT.-ITS FUNCTIONS
AND HISTORY.

BY JACKSON H. RALSTON, of Hyattsville, Md.

When mankind became so civilized as to recognize the fact that no man was sufficiently wise, sufficiently impartial, to be judge in his own cause, and executioner of his own will as against his fellow, it was inevitable that with the progress of the ages, the rule acknowledged as to the individual would receive such extensions as to make it practical between nations. The step from the individual units to the aggregations, tho long, was not difficult, and, once the fundamental principle granted, its taking became inevitable. Nevertheless, it has come to pass that untold generations have come and gone without enforcement in

ternationally, of the rule we have cited, and this has been true, altho through all the ages there have been apparent gropings towards this truth and recognition of its justice.

That progress has been slow has been due to certain fundamental causes, not affecting the absolute justice of the creation of courts for the settlement of international differences. Some of these causes we shall incidentally refer to.

Historically, we find a considerable development of the idea of judgment by an impartial tribunal to have existed between the cities of ancient Greece. Their essential equality as states seems to have been recognized, and as of great importance bearing upon this question there was quite a clear conception of the equality of man, tho this equality was denied to such as were held in slavery. The sense, therefore, of international right and of private democracy favored the formation of intercity tribunals for the settlement of such differences as were likely to arise among the states of the peninsula.

Later, Rome rose to an unequalled summit of power. When this was reached, and in fact, long before, her ideas of equality among her citizens had become blunted and it was considered that as against other nations Rome commanded. She met no nation as an equal, and she therefore could not and did not, submit to the dictates of a disinterested tribunal. After the fall of Rome came the long period of social and national reconstruction and to the barbarism of the times peaceful suggestions were unwelcome. In only a slight degree were war-like tendencies checked by the submission of differences to the arbitrament of the Papacy, or at long intervals to that of other rulers. The head of the nation was ill disposed to bow to the dictates of a court composed of lesser human beings, or to recognize any superior, save Deity itself.

The Grand Design of Henry the Fourth presented a noble conception. The works of Emeric Crucé, now almost lost to sight, showed nearly three centuries ago an intelligent appreciation of what the future was to bring; the

foundations were laid in the epoch-making work of Grotius, while Vattel and a score of authors of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries helped on the development.

Almost co-incident came the fuller recognition of the rights of the individual and this, in my judgment, contributed more than any other one thing toward placing the world internationally upon a reasonable basis. The works of Voltaire and Rousseau, demonstrating, as they did, the essential folly of war, and at the same time emphasizing the equality of rights of human beings, brought into strong light the wrongfulness of armed conflict, and the infringement of the rights of the individual involved in driving him to slay others possessed of an equal right to live with himself, and who had inflicted no wrong upon him. The dignity of the sovereign was waning-the dignity of the man was growing. With the diffusion of truer ideas and loftier ideals, came as a perfectly natural sequence, the formation of the American Republic, and through its creation the establishment of one of the strongest and most efficient agencies for the peaceful solution of international disputes.

The modern era of arbitration dates from the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, signed in 1794, when the two countries agreed to refer to mixed commissions the settlement of British claims against the United States and of American claims against England. The commission covering the latter subject has been notable from that time to this because of the eminent character of its American membersWilliam Pinkney, Attorney-General of the United States, member of the House of Representatives and Senate from Maryland, and Christopher Gore, at different times Senator from and Governor of Massachusetts, celebrated as the law preceptor of Daniel Webster, while John Trumbull, the historical painter, acted as umpire. Many important questions, particularly of prize law, were passed upon by this commission, and its opinions offer a wealth of learning upon the subjects discussed in them.

From that time to this, and in constantly increasing numbers, mixed commissions and other special tribunals have

been freely employed to determine differences existing between nations and public sentiment in their favor has grown.

It is no part of my purpose to review the work of these tribunals, even of the most important ones, among which the Geneva Tribunal of Arbitration still stands pre-eminent. It is sufficient to say that the bases of international arbitration, growing out of the causes I have but slightly referred to, had grown broad and strong when, at the suggestion of the Emperor of Russia, a convention was called in 1899, primarily to consider some way of escaping the increasing burdens of armament, but the master work of which proved to be the establishment of what is known as The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration. The work of this court, hereafter to be discussed in detail, proved so important that when the Second Hague Conference was held in 1907 its scope and workings received enlargement and a tentative plan for the establishment of a truly permanent court was submitted for the consideration and perhaps ultimate adoption of the nations. To the First Hague Convention there were twenty-five adhering nations, but the idea had so far spread that to the second there were forty-four.

The Hague Convention of 1899, styled, as it was, "For the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes," provided under its first title, rules as to the offering of good offices and mediation, it being declared that the "exercise of this right can never be regarded by one or the other of the parties in conflict as an unfriendly act." This title was repeated practically word for word in the convention of 1907, and has been employed on several occasions with beneficial effects. The second title refers to the creation of international commissions of inquiry, its first article providing as follows:

"In differences of an international nature, involving neither honor nor vital interests, and arising from differences of opinion on points of fact, the signatory powers recommend that the parties who have not been able to come to an agreement by means of diplomacy should, so far as cir