cumstances allow, institute an international commission of inquiry to facilitate a solution of these differences by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation."

Pursuant to the provisions of this title, one international court of inquiry, as we shall hereafter see, has been held, with the result of giving time for the passions of two nations to subside and a satisfactory and peaceful result to be attained.

The next and most important title of The Hague Convention, repeated with some slight modifications in detail in the convention of 1907, relates to international arbitration and defines its object as being "the settlement of differences between nations by judges of their own choice and on the basis of respect for law." It affirms that "in questions of a legal nature, and specially in the interpretation or application of international conventions, arbitration is recognized by the signatory powers as the most effective and at the same time the most equitable means of settling disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle."

The convention provides for the establishment of what it denominates a Permanent Court of Arbitration, having its office at The Hague, where are deposited special protocols or treaties creating boards of arbitration, and also awards which may be granted by them.

The Permanent Court is created under the provisions of both conventions through the selection by each signatory power of four persons, at the most, of known competency in matters of international law, of the highest moral reputation ånd disposed to accept the duties, the persons so named to fill the office for a term of six years.

In the event of no other agreement as to the selection of judges for the particular dispute, it provides for the appointment of two arbitrators by each contestant, who are properly selected from the list of the Permanent Court, and who have the right to select a fifth, who is rather improperly termed the umpire, he being merely the presiding officer.

The parties were by the First Convention authorized to be represented by delegates or special agents, as well as counsel or advocates, the Second Convention dropping, however, the word "delegates."

It happened in the Pious Fund case and in the Venezuelan Preferential case that members of The Hague Court took part in the argument before the selected arbitrators, and on one occasion under protest, the result being that when the Second Hague Convention was signed a provision was inserted as follows:

"The members of the Permanent Court may not act as agents, counsel or advocates, except on behalf of the power which appointed them members of the court."

The place of meeting of the tribunals, unless otherwise fixed by the parties, is at The Hague. The general procedure of the Court of Arbitration will be better understood by the explanation which we shall now proceed to make, rather than by special quotations from the conventions themselves:

There are some ninety judges constituting the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The number of the court acting in any special tribunal has been either three or five-five, as we have stated, being the number fixed by the conventions in the absence of special agreement between the parties. Each of the nations in controversy has selected an equal number, and the arbitrators so chosen by both sides, coming together, have selected the odd man, this practice having been pursued in every instance save that of the Venezuelan Preferential case, where the three judges were named by a representative of a presumably impartial power, the Emperor of Russia.

Protocols to which the United States have been a party have provided, except in the North Atlantic Fisheries case, that no national of either party should sit upon the court, and this rule, altho departed from once by the United States, as I have already just indicated, is, we may believe, likely to become fixed in international practice, for the dis

advantages of having a national of one of the countries in dispute acting as an arbitrator in a mixed commission are, as every one who has had a practical experience knows, very great and prejudicial to the accomplishment of impartial and respectable results.

The protocol referring the cause to arbitration, and commonly called the "compromis," determines the exact question to be arbitrated, the scope of the arbitrator's powers and such matters of procedure as may not have been fully regulated by the provisions of The Hague Conventions, or as it is desired to change in the particular reference.

The universal first step is the service by either country upon the other of its case, as it is termed, which is a statement as succinct as possible, of the facts upon which the nation expects to claim the right to recover or to defend, as the case may be. It is to be added that some publicists seem to think that the "case" should also include the argument in favor of the position of the contending governments, but such is not the American idea or practice, the argument being reserved properly for a later period.

Following the service of the case comes the service of the counter-case, or counter-memorial, to which, if at any rate the protocol provides for it, there may be a replication. Ordinarily, however, the cause is at issue upon the service of the cases and counter-cases, which are generally delivered to the parties some time prior to the meeting of the court, and often at the same time delivered to the judges.

Upon the assembling of the court, the umpire having been selected by the action of the arbitrators named by the countries, the printed arguments are submitted and minor questions of procedure arranged for, including often the more important one of language, if this is not covered by the protocol itself. It is to be noted that many protocols have been silent as to the language of the court, and when so silent, French has been determined upon as the official language, altho the use of other languages has been permitted. For instance, in the Pious Fund case, the award was given in French, altho the arguments were conducted in both English

and French, while in the Venezuelan Preferential case, altho the protocols declared English to be the language of the court, French was regarded as equally acceptable.

The official representative of the contending nations in charge of the case for his country is the agent. Upon him devolves the duty of superintending the preparation of the case and of the argument, of making the preliminary arrangements with the court, of submitting all documents for its consideration, of making all motions and in the end of receiving, on behalf of his Government, the award of the tribunal. The agent may or may not also act as counsel. If he does so act, he takes such part as he esteems proper in the argument, while as agent determining the order of argument of his associates.

This leads us to the question as to the order of presentation to the court. The ordinary practice may be fairly illustrated by the Pious Fund case, wherein the court allowed the United States as the demanding country to be heard by as many counsel as it chose, Mexico to reply in like fashion, and in turn the United States and Mexico, in their order, to be heard by two counsel. The opening, therefore, rests with the claimant and the close with the defendant nation. In the Preferential case, where the issues were not so clearly cut as between the affirmative and negative, the agents and counsel were heard in the alphabetical order of the countries they represented, all being permitted to take part in the opening, and but one from each nation in the reply.

At the present time the hearings are ordinarily held in a comfortable but inconspicuous building at The Hague, and in a room which would seat reasonably well when the court was in session perhaps fifty people. Spectators are admitted quite freely in the absence of objection from the parties concerned.

With this necessarily brief statement, let us learn, if we may, more of the functions of the court by making a brief examination of the nine different cases which up to the present time have been passed upon by it.

PIOUS FUND CASE.

The first case to be referred to The Hague Court for determination was that of the Pious Fund of the Californias, presented by the United States against Mexico. A brief statement of the origin and nature of the claim will be useful.

As early as the year 1697 certain members of the Order of Jesus undertook the conversion of the Indians of the Californias, to this end collecting considerable sums of money and becoming the recipients of contributions reaching into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. This fund, in the course of years, became known as the "Pious Fund of the Californias," and from time to time, down to the year 1842, it was handled by the Jesuits, the King of Spain, the Franciscans, the Dominicans, a junta controlled by the Mexican Government, and last the Catholic Bishop of the two Californias. In 1842 the Mexican Government by successive decrees, resumed the control of the fund, incorporated its properties into the National Treasury, directed the sale of the real estate and acknowledged an indebtedness of six per cent. per annum on the total proceeds of sale, this acknowledgment being in favor of the purposes for which the fund was originally established.

After the cession of Upper California to the United States, Mexico failed to pay any part of this pledged income to its proper recipients in Upper California, and upon the formation of the Mixed Commission between the United States and Mexico, under the Treaty of 1868, a claim was made against Mexico, before the Commission, for a proper proportion of the income of the fund from the date of the ratification of the Treaty of Peace to the date of the demand. The result of this claim was that the American commissioner found in favor of the United States for twentyone years' interest, aggregating over Nine Hundred Thousand (900,000) Dollars, and the Mexican commissioner disagreeing, on submission to the umpire, Sir Edward Thornton, the views of the American commissioner were confirmed,