jurisdiction over the claims of this country, altho such claims were British in origin.

The United States protested against the award as disregarding the terms of the protocol, and, being essentially erroneous in law and fact, as invalid under the principles of international law. The result was that Venezuela finally agreed to arbitrate this and several other claims, but before the time for arbitration came to pass, the other claims were settled, leaving this as the only one in difference.

This case presented certain features suggestive of the Pious Fund case, and we therefore give the question submitted, as follows:

"The arbitral tribunal shall first decide whether the decision of Umpire Barge in this case, in view of all the circumstances and under the principles of international law, is not void, and whether it must be considered so conclusive as to preclude a re-examination of the case on its merits. If the arbitral tribunal decides that said decision must be considered final, the case will be considered by the United States of America as closed; but, on the other hand, if the arbitral tribunal decides that said decision of Umpire Barge should not be considered as final, said arbitral tribunal shall then hear, examine and determine the case and render its decision on the merits."

The arbitrators finally chosen included as umpire Mr. Lammasch, who had already figured in two arbitrations; Mr. Beernaert, who had been one of the Mexican representatives in the Pious Fund case, and Señor Gonzalo de Quesada, formerly Cuban Minister to the United States, but now Minister to Germany.

Some of the questions touched upon in the award offer special interest. The court treated both parties as admitting that excessive exercise of jurisdiction and essential error invalidated the award, but, proceeding, held that when an arbitral award embraced several independent claims, and consequently several decisions, the nullity of one was without influence on any of the others, more especially where, as in the case under examination, the integrity and good faith

of the arbitrator were not questioned. This made it necessary for the court to examine severally as to whether, for the reasons stated, any of the subjects passed upon by Mr. Barge were wrongfully decided, within the meaning of the protocol, and in this examination it was considered the duty of the United States affirmatively to establish the nullity of the decision upon the particular point examined.

The United States had strenuously contended that one determination having been found to be in excess of jurisdiction, the whole award was nullified.

Upon the largest single item in controversy, embracing nearly a million and a quarter dollars, which had been rejected by Dr. Barge, the court considered that his ruling, being based upon his appreciation of the force and interpretation of the documents, matters clearly within his competence, there was no ground for revision. The court did not regard itself at liberty to determine whether the claim at this point had been well or ill judged.

The next question decided by the tribunal concerned the practical interpretation given the words "justice and equity" contained in the protocol. These words were treated by the Venezuelan agent as making it impossible for Dr. Barge to have committed a departure from the protocol, because, as he contended, there were no limits to the submission. The tribunal held, however, that the protocol did not invest the arbitrators with discretionary powers, but obliged them to give their decision on a basis of absolute equity without regard to objections of a technical nature or to the provisions of local legislation, and the court further considered that "excessive exercise of power may consist not only in deciding a question not submitted to the arbitrators, but also in misinterpreting the express provisions of the agreement in respect of the way they are to reach their decisions, notably with regard to the legislation or the principles of law to be applied."

We have already referred to the Calvo clause contained in the Greli contract, the basis of the claim of the Orinoco Steamship Company case, and which provided that the

doubts and controversies arising relative to the interpretation and execution of the contract should be decided by Venezuelan courts, and should not give rise to international claims. Dr. Barge had rejected a certain portion of the Orinoco Steamship Company's claim on the theory that it was the duty of the company to apply to the Venezuelan courts as to such particular relief, and not to apply to an international tribunal. A like contention had been made to the Italian Venezuelan Commission of 1903, and passed upon in the Martini case, the umpire there holding that despite the clause he had full jurisdiction to proceed, he stating that "Venezuela and Italy have agreed that there shall be substituted for national forums, which, with or without contract between the parties, may have had jurisdiction over the subject matter, an international forum to whose determination they fully agree to bow. To say now that this claim must be rejected for lack of jurisdiction in the Mixed Commission would be equivalent to claiming that not all Italian claims were referred to it, but only such Italian claims as have not been contracted about previously, and in this manner and to this extent only the protocol could be maintained." It is interesting to note that The Hague tribunal, in the case now under consideration, held that "the maintenance of Venezuelan jurisdiction with regard to these claims would have been incompatible and irreconcilable with the arbitration which had been instituted." The effect, therefore, of this ruling was to hold that Dr. Barge's decision refusing to take jurisdiction over the matter as to which the two countries had given him jurisdiction was essentially erroneous, and the same subject matter could be re-examined by a subsequent tribunal.

The umpire of the American-Venezuelan Commission also refused to take jurisdiction over one subject matter presented to him, on the ground that it involved the recognition of a transfer of a concession, which transfer had not, as required by Venezuelan law, been notified to the Venezuelan Government. The Hague Tribunal held that this was not a question of the cession of the concession, but

of the cession of a debt and that the omission to notify the debtor of the cession of a debt was merely a failure to observe a provision of local legislation, not required by absolute equity, at least where the debtor possessed knowledge of the cession and had paid neither the assignor nor the assignee.

The tribunal made an allowance of costs and counsel fees, and granted interest at the rate of three per cent., the amount fixed by Venezuelan law in the absence of contract, and the rate adopted by all Americans who sat upon the Venezuelan Commissions of 1903.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC FISHERIES CASE.

We come now to a case which because of the length of the existence of the dispute, and the number of persons affected by it, may be regarded as the most important yet submitted to the tribunal of The Hague, altho so far as questions of principle are concerned, it was no more interesting or more grave than others of which we have spoken. The details of the dispute are so numerous and the questions, while not ordinarily of the first importance internationally, so many, and the arguments, pro and con, so diverse, that the case offers in itself ample material for a single paper fully as long as this I am now presenting to you. It is, therefore, impossible for me to treat it at this time except extremely superficially.

The Treaty of Peace of 1783 between the United States and England left open to Americans for the purpose of drying fish, the shores of Nova Scotia (including the present New Brunswick), the Magdalen Islands and Labrador and the south coast of New Foundland, while they were permitted to take fish in nearly all coastal waters. This treaty

was treated by England as abrogated by the war of 1812, and after much diplomatic discussion between the two countries, a new treaty was signed in London in 1818, intended more particularly to define the rights, or as it was styled the "liberty" American citizens should enjoy in the taking

and curing of fish in and off Labrador and certain coasts of New Foundland and elsewhere in the British dominions, securing American fishermen the right of entering bays and harbors for the purpose of shelter and repairing damage, purchasing wood and obtaining water, but subject to restrictions to prevent their taking, drying or curing fish in such bays or abusing the privileges reserved to them. The treaty was doubtless sufficiently satisfactory at the time, but differences arose as methods of fishing changed and the pursuit of different kinds of fish became more important, and also as the coasts of New Foundland became more occupied. The result of all this was growing irritation, caused to a degree by more and more stringent regulations being adopted by the Colonial authorities until finally came the reference of the whole matter to The Hague on January 27, 1909.

The case was there treated by a most eminent tribunal, including Dr. Lammasch, of Austria, as President, SavorninLohmann, of Holland, Doctor Drago, of the Argentine Republic, Justice George Gray and Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, as arbitrators.

The dispute was formulated into seven questions. The first related to the power of Canada and New Foundland under the form of municipal regulations to define the hours, days and seasons when fish might be taken on the treaty coasts, the method, means and employments to be used and other matters relating to fishermen. England claimed for her colonies and herself the fullest rights in these respects to the extent that such regulations might appear appropriate or necessary, desirable and equitable and fair as between local fishermen, and the Americans exercising the treaty liberty, and not so framed as to give an advantage to the former over the latter, while the United States contended that such regulations might not be framed unless appropriate and necessary for the protection and preservation of the common rights in such fisheries and the exercise thereof, unless reasonable in themselves and fair as between local fishermen and American fishers, and not giving local