ment and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. * * * * But the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it.

"I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed, that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and the mother country; but that we will oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other power, as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and most especially their transfer to any power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way. I should think it, therefore, advisable that the Executive should encourage the British government to a continuance in the dispositions expressed in these letters, by an assurance of his concurrence with them as far as his authority goes; and that, as it may lead to war, the declaration of which requires an act of Congress, the case shall be laid before them for consideration at their first meeting, and under the reasonable aspect in which it is seen by himself."

The following is in part the message of President Monroe sent to Congress December 2, 1823, containing what is now known as the Monroe doctrine, viz:

Monroe's Message.

"We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

Cleveland's Message.

In December, 1885, President Cleveland, in a message to Congress on the Venezuelan boundary controversy with Great Britain, reaffirms the doctrine in the following language:

"In the belief that the doctrine for which we contend was clear and definite. that it was founded upon substantial considerations and involved our safety and welfare, that it was fully applicable to our present conditions and to the state of the world's progress and that it was directly

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related to the pending controversy and without any conviction as to the final merits of the dispute, but anxious to learn in a satisfactory and conclusive manner whether Great Britain sought, under a claim of boundary, to extend her possessions on this continent without right, or whether she merely sought possession of territory fairly included within her lines of ownership, this Government proposed to the government of Great Britain a resort to arbitration as the proper means of settling the question to the end that a vexatious boundary dispute between the two contestants might be determined and our exact standing and relation in respect to the controversy might be made clear.

It will be seen from the correspondence herewith submitted that this proposten has been declined by the British government, upon grounds which in the cumstances seem to me to be far from satisfactory. It is deeply disappointing that such an appeal actuated by the most friendly feelings toward both nations directly concerned, addressed to the sense of justice and to the magnanimity of one of the great powers of the world and touching its relations to one comparatively weak and small, should have produced no better results.

"The course to be pursued by this Government, in view of the present condition, does not appear to admit of serious doubt. Having labored faithfully for many years to induce Great Britain to submit this dispute to impartial arbitration, and having been now finally apprised of her refusal to do so, nothing remains but to accept the situation, to recognize its plain requirements, and deal with it accordingly. Great Breritain's present proposition has never thus far been regarded as admissible by Venezuela, though

any adjustment of the boundary which that country advantage and may enter into of her own free will can objected to by the United States.

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"Assuming, however, that the attitude of Venezuela changed, the dispute has reached such a stage as to make bent upon the United States to take measures to determine certainty for its justification what is the true divisional line Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana. The inquiry to that of course, be conducted carefully and judicially and due weight given to all available evidence records and facts in support of at of both parties. "In order that such an examination should be prosecuted in a tervequate and satisfactory manner. I suggest that the Congress make an adter the appropriation for the expenses of a Commission, to be appointed by Executive, who shall make the necessary investigation and report upon the. matter with the least possible delay. When such report is made and accepted it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power as a willful aggression upon its rights and interests the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental izisdiction over any territory which, after investigation, we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela.

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"In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow.

"I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that, while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization, and strenuous and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath which are shielded, and defended a people's safety and greatness."

These are the utterances on the part of our Government which might result in war between us and foreign countries. Every member of the House of Representatives applauded the declaration made by the President that has been quoted. They stand ready now with their treasure, and, if need be, their blood to enforce the Monroe doctrine.

How strangely this contrasts with the plank in the Republican platform, proposing to pledge foreign governments that we will never restore silver, never try free coinage, never force the coinage of any more standard silver dollars until they give their consent. America has and will maintain as vigorous a domestic policy concerning its finances as a foreign policy concerning the government of this continent, and there is no power to surrender it. Those who think it can be done mistake the American people.

Harrison's Samoan Policy.

The administration of our foreign relations during Mr. Harrison's incumbency forms a record in which no true American can take a just pride. From the earliest days of our history as a nation the policy of non-entangling alliances and non-interference with the affairs of foreign powers has been accepted by all parties as essential, not only to the preservation of our system of government, but, as an example to other nations of the lofty principles which should animate and control the civilized people of the world in their relations toward each other.

To the maintenance of this principle and the fidelity with which it has been adhered to, in the face of great temptation, we are largely indebted for the preservation, the growth, and the grandeur of our institutions, and it will be a sad day for the American people when they abandon it for the "jingoism" which characterized the acts of the last Republican administration.

The treaty entered into by our Government with Germany and Great Britain in 1889 relative to the government of the Samoan Islands was such a palpable departure from the accepted policies that should control our relations with foreign powers as to merit the severest rebuke from all parties. In a recent report to the Senate (see Ex. doc. 93) Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, in discussing the provisions of this treaty, said:

"A period of almost five years having elapsed since the conclusion of the general act of Berlin, the present occasion is not inappropriate for a review

of its results. Such a review, however, would hardly be intelligible without some consideration of the events that preceded the treaty. In order that the subject may be fully comprehended, it will be necessary to present a general survey of our relations to Samoa, both before and since the conclusion of the general act, and to exhibit the policy we have pursued toward the islands, both in respect of its character and its results.

"This duty is especially important, since it is in our relations to Samoa that we have made the first departure from our traditional and well-established policy of avoiding entangling alliances with foreign powers in relation to objects remote from this hemisphere. Like all other human transactions, the wisdom of that departure must be tested by its fruits. If the departure was justified there must be some evidence of detriment suffered before its adoption, or of advantage since gained, to demonstrate the fact. If no such evidence can be found we are confronted with the serious responsibility of having, without sufficient grounds, imperiled a policy which is not only coeval with our Government, but to which may, in great measure, be ascribed the peace, the prosperity, and the moral influence of the United States. Every nation, and especially every strong nation, must sometimes be conscious of an impulse to rush into difficulties that do not concern it, except in a highly imaginary way. To restrain the indulgence of such a propensity is not only the part of wisdom, but a duty we owe to the world as an example of the strength, the moderation, and the beneficence of popular government."

That our citizens had no material interests in jeopardy in Samoa, and that the assumption, financial or otherwise, of any obligations upon the part of our Government to assist in supporting and sustaining any form of government there was wholly gratuitous and liable to involve us in needless complications no one can gainsay. By the treaty the three parties recognized the independence and neutrality of the islands and stipulated for the provisional recognition of Malietoa Laupepa as King, and provided for the establishment of a government, the chief feature of which was a Supreme Court, composed of one judge, to be nominated by the treaty powers, and styled Chief Justice of Samoa. The Chief Justice was clothed with both appellate and original jurisdiction and his decisions made final. His salary was fixed at $6,000 a year in gold, to be paid the first year in equal proportions by the treaty powers and afterward out of the revenues of the Samoan government, with a proviso that if any deficiency should occur the same should be made good by the treaty powers. After the Supreme Court, was provided a local government for the municipal district of Apia. Of this government the principal organ was a municipal council composed of six members and a President; the President to be selected through the instrumentality of the treaty powers and receive an annual compensation of $5,000, to be paid the first year, in equal shares, by the treaty powers, and afterward out of the Samoan revenues assigned to the use of the municipality. Many other provisions and stipulations are contained in the treaty, but these are sufficient to show the nature of the same and the obligations

that our Government entered into to restore a semi-barbarous King to his throne and to set up a government over a semi-civilized people in a distant and insignificant island in which we had no interest.

The complications in which we are likely to become involved by this extraordinary treaty are strikingly illustrated by the Secretary in his report. He says:

"As early as 1891 some of the natives, under the lead of Mataafa, began to betray rebellious symptoms of even a more pronounced character. In a dispatch of December 6, 1892, Mr. Blacklock, the consul of the United States at Apia, in reporting upon the condition of affairs that had prevailed in the islands for a year prior to that date, said:

"Ever since Mataafa's establishment at Malie he has endeavored to gather strength, and there is not the slightest doubt had he been successful in getting sufficient following he would have made war upon Malietoa; he has done everything in opposing the government except making war; he has defied its courts, obstructed its officials in the execution of their duties, harbored refugees from justice, succored and supported prisoners escaped from prison, and at the present moment is living in open defiance of the King and government and all the laws of the country, keeping up an armed force and plundering foreigners' plantations for subsistence. Time and again have white officials who went to Malie with warrants for the arrest of offenders been driven away by Mataafa's soldiers and warned against attempting any arrest under penalty of death.'

"This condition of things continued with increasing aggravation till July. 1893, when war actually broke out. The treaty powers were now compelled actively to intervene with their naval forces in order to keep Malietoa on the throne. In the end it became necessary to disperse the insurgents and to deport Mataafa and eleven other chiefs to another island, where they have since been kept at the joint expense of the three powers."

It appears, therefore, that we have by this treaty assumed not only a share of the expenses in maintaining the government provided by its provisions, but are obligated to aid in defending the same against the insurrections of its rebellious subjects. What interest we had in the people of Samoa, or what benefits were to accrue to us from the arrangement, we are left to conjecture, as none have ever become visible. Only recently the governments of Great Britain and Germany have been forced to send a naval force to Samoa to subdue the rebellious Mataafa and his followers. It is a matter of supreme satisfaction that our Government did not assume to carry out her part of the agreement, but has abandoned the same.