a state bank is not subject to state taxation. To so tax the stocks of the government is regarded as a tax upon the exercise of the powers conferred upon congress by this clause of the constitution. If such power was recognized in the states it might be carried to such extent as to, in effect, destroy this power in congress. People of New York v. Comm'rs of Taxes, 2 Wall. 200; Same v. Same, 2 Black, 620; Same v. Same, id. 635.

3. Same.-Securities of the United States are exempt from state taxation, and such immunity extends to the capital stock of a corporation if made up of such public funds. Provident Inst. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611; First Nat. Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky, 9 id. 353.

4. Franchises not exempt.-The franchises of a corporation, however, are not so exempt, although the corporation has made investments in such securities. Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594.

5. United States notes are exempt from taxation by or under state or municipal authority. Mitchell v. Board of County Commissioners, 91 U. S. 206; Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26.

6. Shares in national banks.- A state may tax shares of stockholders in national banks. Van Slyke v. Wisconsin, Bagnall v. Wisconsin, Book 20, L. C. P. Co.'s Ed. of U. S. Sup. Court Rep., 240; Lionberger v. Rouse, 9 Wall. 468; First Nat. Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky, 9 Wall. 353; Provident Inst. v. Massachusetts, 6 id. 611; Van Allen v. Assessors (Bank Tax Cases), 3 id. 573; New York v. Com'rs of Taxes, 4 id. 244; Bradley v. Illinois, id. 459; Tappan v. National Bank, 19 id. 490.

7. Same. The states have power to tax the shares of national banks in the hands of stockholders, whose capital is wholly invested in the stock and bonds of the United States. The state tax under the banking act of congress involves no question as to the pledged faith of the government. The tax is the condition of the new rights and privileges conferred upon these associations. And congress has so legislated in respect to them as to leave such shares subject to state taxation. Van Allen v. Assessors (Bank Tax Cases), 3 Wall. 573.

8. Same-Conditions on which may be taxed.- This right of taxation is subject, however, to the conditions, viz.: That the taxes shall be imposed, by and under state authority, at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere; and shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of the individual citizen of such state, nor exceed the rate imposed upon the shares of any of the banks organized under the authority of the state where such association is located. Id.; Bradley v. Illinois, 4 Wall. 459.

9. The bank, instead of the individual shareholders, may be required to pay such tax. Lionberger v. Rouse, 9 Wall. 468.

10. Federal stock is not subject to the general taxing power of a state. The tax on the stock is regarded as a tax on the power of the government to "borrow money on the credit of the United States." It makes no difference that the tax is on the aggregate of the tax-payer's property, and the stock is not taxed by name. People v. Commissioners of N. Y. City, 2 Black, 620; People v. Commissioners, 2 Wall. 200.

11. United States bonds or certificates of indebtedness issued by the general government directly to creditors are subject to taxation by the states. People ex rel. The Banks v. Hoffman, 7 Wall. 16.

12. United States securities are not subject to taxation by states. Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594; Hamilton Manuf. Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632; New York v. Comm'rs of Taxes, 2 Black, 620; Same v. Same, id. 635; Same v. Same, 2 Wall. 200; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborne v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738. 13. Bank capital in government bonds.- Where the capital of a bank is invested in government bonds it cannot be taxed by the states. But the shares of stock may be taxed as such in hands of stockholders. And held that the revenue law of Kentucky which imposes a tax on bank stock, and requires the officers of the bank to pay the tax so levied on the shares of stock, is a tax on the stockholders and not on the capital of the bank, and is valid. First Nat. Bank v. Kentucky, 9 Wall. 353. To the same effect is Lionberger v. Rouse, 9 Wall. 468.

Lion

14. And further.- Congress in imposing conditions on the power of the state to tax banks had reference alone to banks of circulation. berger v. Rouse, 9 Wall. 468.

15. A tax upon the bonds of the United States is a tax upon the power of congress to borrow money, and such tax, when imposed by a state of the Union, is invalid. The fact, however, that a corporation has invested its capital partly in United States bonds does not prevent the state from laying a tax upon the corporate franchises or business of such corporation. Home Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. People of State of N. Y., 134 U. S. 594.

16. No constitutional objection lies in the way of a legislative body prescribing any mode of measurement to determine the amount it will charge for the privilege it bestows. Id. See, also, Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594, and Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611; Hamilton Manuf. Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632.

17. Legal tender acts.-The legal tender acts are constitutional as applied both to contracts entered into before and after their passage. Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603, in so far as it conflicts with this doctrine, is overruled. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

18. Under the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and to issue circulating notes for the money borrowed, the authority of congress to define the quality and force of these notes as currency is as broad as the like power over metallic currency under the power to coin money and regulate the value thereof. Under the two powers, taken together, congress is authorized to establish a national currency, either in coin or in paper, and to make that currency lawful money for all purposes, as regards the national government or individuals, and this whether in time of war or peace. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421.

3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among 14s 192 the several States, and with the Indian tribes.

1. Commerce What constitutes - Traffic.- Commerce is traffic. But it is also something more; it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations and parts of nations, in all its branches. It comprehends navigation. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; United States v.

Bailey, 1 McLean, 234; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691.

merce.

2. Sale is the object of importation, and is an essential ingredient of comBrown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. 3. Intercourse.- Commerce means nothing more than intercourse among nations and the several states for the purpose of trade, be the object of the trade what it may. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. 371-378.

4. Includes manufactures and growth. It includes the products of the several states—as well that which is the product and manufacture as that which is the growth thereof. Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U. S. 275. 5. It extends to the persons who conduct it as well as to the instruments used. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299–316.

6. Commerce among the states is commerce with the states.It commences in one state and terminates in another, and may pass through one or many states in its operation. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.

7. Freights carried from points without a state to points within that state, or from points within the state to points without, is as much commerce among the several states, in so far as such state is concerned, as is freight taken up at points without such state and carried across it to points in other states. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230.

8. Insurance not commerce.- The business of insurance is not commerce; and a corporation of one state doing insurance in another is not engaged in commerce among the states. Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566.

9. Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce, and so is not subject to congressional regulation. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 450.

10. Regulation - Definition.-To regulate commerce is to prescribe the rule by which it is to be governed. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.

11. What is not a regulation.- A state law which prohibits the dredging for oysters with a scoop or drag, or any instrument other than tongs or rakes, within the limits of the state, and forfeiting to the state the vessel so engaged, is not a regulation of commerce, and is valid. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71.

12. Same.-A law of a state which requires insurance companies of other states to file bond and security, etc., before issuing policies in such state, is not a regulation of commerce, and is constitutional. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Doyle v. Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535.

13. Includes navigation.- The power to regulate includes the regulation of navigation, which comprehends the power to prescribe rules in conformity with which navigation must be carried on. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 315, 316.

14. The vessels, as well as the articles they bring, are subject to regulation. The Brig Wilson v. United States, 1 Brock. 423, 431.

15. It includes the power to regulate navigation with foreign nations and among the states, and is an exclusive power in congress, which may be exercised with or without positive regulations. The Barque Chusan, 2 Story, 455. 16. A bill providing for the recording of mortgage, hypothecation or conveyance of any vessel is a regulation of commerce and within the powers

of congress. White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wall. 646; Blanchard v. Brig Martha Washington, 1 Cliff. 463.

17. Navigable waters.- Black Bird creek was a small creek or marsh 146,387 in Delaware in which the tide ebbed and flowed, and which was at times navigated by small craft. A corporation, "The Black Bird Creek Marsh Company," was authorized by the legislature of Delaware to construct a dam across the creek, and did so. Held, in a suit where the question was raised, that the law was not repugnant to the constitution in that it regulated commerce, especially in view of the fact that congress had not enacted any legislation upon the subject with which the act of Delaware came in conflict. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245.

18. The power of controlling navigation is incidental to the power to regulate commerce, which the constitution confers upon congress; and, consequently, the power of congress over the vessel is co-extensive with that over the cargo. The Brig Wilson v. United States, 1 Brock. 423.

19. The declaration in the compact entered into when Alabama was admitted as a state "that all navigable waters within the said state shall forever remain public highways, free to the citizens of said state and of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost or toll therefor imposed by said state," is nothing more than a regulation of commerce, to that extent, among the several states. It conveys no more rights over the navigable waters of Alabama than the United States possesses over the same character of waters in the several states. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212.

20. The supreme court of the United States, by decree thereof, declared a bridge across the River Ohio an obstruction to navigation and directed its removal. Afterwards congress by an act declared the bridge to be a lawful structure, "anything in the laws of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding." Held, that while congress cannot annul a judgment of court upon private rights of parties, it can so annul a judgment founded on the unlawful interference with the enjoyment of a public right, which is subject to congressional regulation. In this case it is an exercise of the power to regulate commerce. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc. Bridge Co., 18 How. 421.

21. The act above referred to is not in conflict with the clause that " no preference shall be given to the ports of one state over those of another.” Id. 22. The Penobscot river is wholly within the state of Maine. The lower eight miles is crossed by several dams, and is not navigable. Above that there is imperfect navigation. Held, that a law of the state providing for the improvement of this upper navigation, and granting exclusive privileges thereto to the company improving the same, is not in conflict with this clause of the constitution. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568.

23. The River Ohio is a navigable stream, and as such is subject to the commercial powers of congress which have been exercised over it; and if a bridge is so erected across it as to obstruct navigation it is a nuisance, and an act of the legislature of Virginia authorizing its construction would afford no justification to the bridge company. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 518.

24. The power in congress to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose of all the navigable waters of the United States which

3

are accessible from a state other than that in which they lie. And it is for congress to determine when its full powers will be brought into activity and as to the regulations it will provide. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713.

25. The Ohio river is a navigable stream, and congress has the paramount power to regulate bridges over said stream which affect the navigation thereof. This power of congress over interstate commerce is free from state interference. Newport & Cin. Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U. S. 470.

26. If a river is not of itself a highway for commerce with other states or foreign countries, or does not form such highway by its connection with other waters, and is only navigable between different places within the state, then it is not a navigable water of the United States, and the act of congress for the enrollment and license of vessels does not apply. And the fact that the steamer was employed in transporting products of Wisconsin destined for other states, and in transporting the products of other states brought into Wisconsin, and destined to different places within its limits, does not affect the question under consideration, for congress has not prescribed any regulations governing such commerce, except so far as it is conducted in vessels on the navigable waters of the United States. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, referred to and distinguished. The Montello, 11 Wall. 411.

27. The compact between South Carolina and Georgia made in 1787, prior to the ratification of the constitution, whereby the northern branch of the Savannah river was fixed as a boundary line, with the agreement that it should be forever free to the citizens of both states, and exempt from hindrance, etc., attempted by one state against the citizens of the other, has no effect upon this provision of the constitution subsequently adopted. Congress has the same power over that river as over any of the other navigable waters of the nation. The right to regulate commerce includes the right to regulate navigation, and hence to regulate and improve navigable waters and ports thereon, and it may for that purpose close to navigation one of several channels in a navigable stream. South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4.

28. The Chicago river and its branches, notwithstanding the fact of its being wholly within the state of Illinois, must be deemed navigable waters of the United States, over which congress under this clause may exercise control to the extent necessary to preserve and improve the free navigation thereof. But in the absence of congressional legislation the courts will not interfere with reasonable state regulations over that river within the limits of the city of Chicago. Escanaba Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678.

29. Navigation being a branch of commerce, congress has the control of all navigable rivers between the states, or connecting with the ocean, so as to preserve and protect free navigation. As a corollary of this, congress has the paramount right to conclusively determine what shall be deemed, so far as commerce is concerned, an obstruction thereto. Miller v. Mayor of N. Y., 109 U. S. 385.

30. A bridge constructed in accordance with the legislation of both the state and federal governments must be deemed a lawful structure; and it cannot thereafter be treated as a public nuisance nor be subject to complaint before the courts. By "navigable waters of the United States " are meant