of lotteries, gift concerts, etc., is a valid exercise of the power conferred. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727; In re Jackson, 14 Blatchf. 245.

5. The power vested in congress by this clause, viz.: “To establish postoffices and post-roads," embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of the country. Under this provision congress has the authority to designate by law what shall be carried in the mail and what excluded. This power, however, cannot be so enforced as to interfere with the liberty of the press. Liberty of circulating is essential to that freedom. When, therefore, any printed matter is by law excluded from the mail, its transportation by other means cannot be forbidden by congress. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727.

6. This embraces the regulations of the entire postal service of the country and confers on congress the power to declare what may, and what shall not, be transported in the mails. But when any matter is excluded from the mails congress cannot forbid its transportation by other methods, so as to interfere with the freedom of the press. This freedom includes the right to circulate. Id.

8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.

1. Congress may provide for copyright on photographs as works of art and science, so far as they are representations of original intellectual conceptions of the author. Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53.

2. Whether congress can by act decide that a particular individual is the author or inventor of a certain writing or invention, so as to preclude judicial inquiry into such fact, quere. Evans v. Eaton, 3 Wheat. 454.

3. Congress has power to grant the extension of a patent which has been renewed under the act of 1836. Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 158. It is for congress to say when, for what length of time and under what circumstances a patent shall be granted. It has power to pass an act which operates retrospectively to give a patent for an invention already in use. Blanchard v. Sprague, 2 Story, 164; S. C. 3 Sumn. 535.

9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.

1. The courts of a territory are in a sense inferior tribunals created by congress. In legislating for the territory congress exercises the combined powers of general and state governments. American & Ocean Ins. Co. v. Three Hundred and Fifty-six Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 545.

2. The power to establish federal courts, and to endow them with jurisdiction to determine controversies between certain parties, affords no pretext for abrogating any established law of property, or for removing any obligation of her citizens to submit to the rule of the local sovereign. Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 433.

10. To define and punish felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.

1. The courts of the United States have jurisdiction under this clause and the act of congress of April 30, 1790, chapter 36, if the offense of murder or

robbery be committed (1) on board a foreign vessel by a citizen of the United States; (2) on board a vessel of the United States by a foreigner; (3) by a citizen or foreigner on board a piratical vessel. It makes no difference in such a case and under the same act whether the offense was committed on board a vessel or in the sea, as by throwing the deceased overboard and drowning him, or by shooting him when in the sea, although not thrown overboard. United States v. Holmes, 5 Wheat. 412.

2. No jurisdiction can be conferred by congress over felonies committed by the master of a vessel on a seaman while in the navigable rivers of a foreign nation. The words "high seas" do not include such waters. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76.

3. The act of March 3, 1819, chapter 76, section 5, referring to the law of nations for the definition of the crime of piracy, is a constitutional exercise of the power of congress to define and punish that crime. Robbery or forcible depredation upon the sea, animo furandi, is piracy by the law of nations and by act of congress. United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153; Same

v. Pirates, id. 184.

4. Congress has power to provide by law for the punishment of the offense of counterfeiting notes of foreign banks, or for having in possession a plate from which such counterfeit notes may be printed. It is an offense against the law of nations as defined in this section. United States v. Arjona, 120 U. S. 479.

5. Offense against all nations.- Piracy is an offense against all nations against the United States as well as others; and the constitution of the United States authorizes congress to define and punish piracy. A person charged with piracy by a foreign nation will not be arrested and held by the courts of the United States, or by them be given up to the authorities of such foreign government. Case of Jose Ferreira dos Santos, 2 Brock. C. C. 493.

6. Robbery on high seas, or forcible depredation, animo furandi, is piracy by the law of nations and act of congress. United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153; Same v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Same v. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. 209.

7. What are high seas.- The sea embraces all tide-waters on the coast of our country and the bays thereof. When once any boat or vessel is out of the limits of our ports or harbors, extra fauces terræ, vel portus, it is in legal as well as nautical sense at sea. The Schooner Harriett, 1 Story, 259; United States v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290.

11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.

1. Power of congress - Suppression of rebellion. - Congress has the same power to make war, levy taxes, etc., to suppress rebellion, as it has in case of war with foreign powers. Tyler v. Defrees, 11 Wall. 331.

2. Civil war exists, when.- A civil war is never proclaimed eo nomine. Its actual existence is a fact in our history, of which courts are bound to take notice. It may be said to exist whenever the regular course of justice is interrupted by armed resistance, so great as to overcome the local au

thorities, or when the local authorities refuse to suppress it. Prize Cases, 2 Black, 667.

3. Power exclusive in congress.-The whole powers of war are vested in the congress, and it is to the acts of that body alone that resort can be had to guide inquiry as to whether or not at any time war was in existence. The congress may authorize general hostilities, in which case the general laws of war would apply to questions affected thereby; or it may authorize partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as they apply to such situations, will be in force. The doctrine of Bas v. Tingy, 4 Dall. 37, recognized. Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 28.

4. Congress alone has the power to declare a foreign or national war. It cannot declare war against a state, or any number of states, by virtue of any clause in the constitution. The constitution confers on the president the whole executive power. He is bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If war is tendered either by a foreign invasion or domestic insurrection the president is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority. Prize Cases, 2 Black, 667.

5. What constitutes war.- Every contention by force between two nations, in external matters under the authority of their respective governments, is not only war, but public war. If it be declared in form, it is called solemn and of the perfect kind, because one whole nation is at war with another whole nation; and all the members of the nation declaring war are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every place and under every circumstance. . . . But hostilities may subsist between two nations more confined in their nature and extent, being limited to places, persons and things, and be more properly termed imperfect war, because not solemn, and because those who are authorized to commit hostilities act under special authority and can go no further than to the extent of their commission. Still, however, it is a public war, because it is an external condition of force between some of the members of the two nations, authorized by legitimate powers. Bas v. Tingy, 4 Dall. 37.

6. Incidental power to acquire territory.—The constitution confers on government the power to declare war and make treaties. Consequently the government possesses the power to acquire territory either by conquest or treaty. Insurance Companies v. Three Hundred and Fifty-six Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511.

7. Legal tender.- Making notes a legal tender is not an appropriate means for the execution of the power to declare or carry on war. Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603.

8. Condemnation of property.- All private property used or intended to be used in aid of an insurrection, with the knowledge or consent of the owner, is by this clause made the lawful subject of capture and judicial condemnation; not to punish the owner for crime but to weaken the insurrection. The provisions of the act of August 6, 1861 (ch. 60, 12 Stat. at Large, 319), was enacted in compliance with this provision, and a sale of real estate thereunder conveys the fee-simple to the purchaser. The act of July 17, 1862 (ch. 95, Stat. at Large, 589), referred to and distinguished from that under consideration. The object of the act of 1862 was to punish traitors by confiscating their property. Kirk v. Lynd, 106 U. S. 315, citing Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 308.

9. Declaration of war, what is.- War may be declared as well by acts of hostility as by formal declaration. Bas v. Tingy, "The Eliza," 4 Dall. 37; Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1.

10. Effect of - Does not confiscate enemy's property.- A mere declaration of war does not confiscate enemy's property or debts due to an enemy, nor does it so vest the property or debts in the government as to support judicial proceedings for confiscation of the property or debts, without the expression of the will of the government through its proper department to that effect. Under the constitution this power is in congress alone. Britton v. Butler, 9 Blatch. 456.

11. Public war, what is.—Every contention by force, between two nations, in external matters under authority of their respective governments, is a public war. Bas v. Tingy, "The Eliza," 4 Dall. 37; Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1.

12. Solemn war.- If it be declared in form it is called solemn war, and is of the perfect kind; because one whole nation is at war with another whole nation. Bas v. Tingy, “The Eliza,” 4 Dall. 37–40.

13. Rights of members of nation declaring war.- All the members of the nation declaring war are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every place and under every circumstance. In this they act under general authority, and all the rights and consequences of war attach to their condition. Id.

14. After a declaration of war an American citizen cannot lawfully send a vessel to the enemy's country to bring away his property. The Rapid, 1 Gall. 295; same case affirmed, 8 Cranch, 155; Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 586; Jecker v. Montgomery, 18 How. 110; The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377-405; Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 535; Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall. 557.

15. Implied powers.- The power to declare war carries with it as an incident thereto and inseparable therefrom the right to prosecute the war by all the means known to and recognized by civilized nations. This includes the power to confiscate the property of enemies, to provide funds for defraying expenses, and to this end to make and issue legal tender notes. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457; Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 305; Tyler v. Defrees, 11 Wall., 331; Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635; Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall 404; Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall. 604; Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 15 Wall. 195.

16. It carries with it as an incident the right to acquire territory by conquest. But congress has no power to declare war for the purpose of such acquisition. Sere v. Pitot, 6 Cranch, 332; American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters, 542; Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 611.

17. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress. The act of congress of June 11, 1864, entitled “An act in relation to limitation of actions in certain cases," when construed to be retrospective in its operation falls within this category. Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493-507.

18. Under this clause congress has the power to provide by law for carrying on war. This necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with the

command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2-139.

19. The government of the United States has power to permit limited commercial intercourse with an enemy in times of war, and to impose such conditions thereon as it sees fit. This power is an incident to the power to declare war and to carry it on successfully. Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 73. Quere, whether the president alone can exercise this power. Id.

20. The act of congress of July 13, 1861, which interdicted commercial intercourse with states in insurrection, but authorized the president to permit or license it in his discretion, for such time and by such persons as he might think conducive of the public interest, held valid. Id.

21. Rules for captures on land and water. This power extends to captures within the territorial limits of the United States as well as to captures outside such limits. Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch, 153.

22. These rights of capture can only be enforced after congress has acted upon the subject and by law authorized them. Id.

23. The United States, in the enforcement of their constitutional rights against armed insurrection, have all the powers of a sovereign, and of the most favored belligerent, and as such may, by capture, enforce their authority. What shall be the subject of capture as against the enemy is always within the control of every belligerent. It is the duty of the military forces in the field to seize and hold that which is apparently so subject, leaving the owner to make good his claim as against the capture in the appropriate tribunal. In that regard they occupy the same position on land as on water. Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. S. 187.

24. Effect of capture. Unless restrained by governmental regulations, the capture of movable property on land changes the ownership of it without adjudication. Id.

25. Liability of captors.-Neither the captors, nor the special agent of the treasury to whom they delivered the captured property, is liable to the owner thereof in an action for anything done within the scope of their powers. Id.

12. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.

1. The control of the general government over this subject is plenary and exclusive. It determines without question from any state authority how the armies shall be raised, whether by voluntary enlistment or forced draft, the age at which the soldier shall be received, and the period of service, the compensation to be allowed, and to what service assigned. It provides for the rules that shall govern the army, defines military offenses, and prescribes punishment, and no state can be permitted to interfere with the discharge of these national duties by habeas corpus or other proceedings. Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397.

2. The constitution has delegated to congress the power to "raise and support armies" and "to provide and maintain a navy;" and, independent of the express clause in the constitution, this must include the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into effect the foregoing powers." United States v. Bainbridge, 1 Mason, 71–79.