3. Congress has constitutional power to enlist minors in the navy or army without the consent of their parents. United States v. Bainbridge, 1 Mason, 71; Ex parte Wm. Brown, 5 Cranch, C. C. 554.

4. State courts cannot examine into the validity of enlistments in the army of the United States, or discharge persons so enlisted by habeas corpus for any cause. The jurisdiction of the United States courts in such cases is exclusive. Tarble's Case, 13 Wall 397; Matter of Farrand, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 146.

13. To provide and maintain a navy.

1. This authorizes the government to buy or build any number of steam or other ships of war, to man, arm and otherwise prepare them for war, and to dispatch them to any accessible part of the globe. Under this power the naval academy has been established. United States v. Rhodes, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 28-50; Same v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336-390.

2. The jurisdiction of this government cannot extend to a foreign war vessel whose government is at peace with the United States, while the same is within our ports and demeans itself in a friendly manner. The Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch, 116.

14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

Congress has power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenders, in the manner practiced by civilized nations. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65; In re Bogart, 2 Sawyer, 396.

15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

1. The law of congress passed in pursuance of this section confers on the president the power, and makes it his duty in case of insurrection, invasion, etc., to call out the militia. Held, that the authority to decide upon the exigencies contemplated in the constitution and the act of congress rests exclusively with the president. His decision is conclusive on all other persons. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19.

2. The power here conferred is to be exercised when some sudden emergency renders it necessary in order to preserve the public peace and to insure to the states a republican form of government. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 8. 3. An act of Pennsylvania providing that the officers and privates of the militia of that state neglecting or refusing to serve when called into service by the president shall be liable to penalties prescribed by congress, and providing for trial of such delinquents by state court-martial, etc., is not repugnant to the constitution of the United States. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1.

4. Congress may delegate the power to call out the militia to the president, and may make his decision as to the necessity of such call final. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 18; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19.

5. In calling out the militia the president's orders may be given to the chief executive of the state or to any militia officer he may think proper. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1-15.

6. Neglect or refusal to obey the order is an offense against the laws of the United States and subjects the offender to trial and punishment by courtmartial. Id.

16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

The power of congress over the militia is limited but by two reservations in favor of the states, viz.: the right of officering and that of training them. When distributed by the states, under their own officers, the general government have the right, if they choose to exercise it, of designating both the officers and privates who shall serve, and to call them forth and punish them for not coming. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1-36.

17. To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased, by the consent of the Legislature of the State, in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings; and

1. Over District of Columbia.- Within the District of Columbia, and the other places purchased and used for the purposes named in the constitution, the national and municipal powers of government of every description are united in the government of the Union. And these are the only cases in which all the powers of government are so united. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212.

2. Under this clause and the power conferred in it to exercise exclusive legislation over the seat of government, congress may constitute the District of Columbia a body corporate for municipal purposes, but can only authorize it to exercise municipal power. Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141.

3. Congress may authorize Washington city to assess the expense of repairing streets against the adjacent proprietors of lots. Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. 676.

4. Government lands within a state.- Where lands within a state are acquired by the government without the consent of the state, the possession of the United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in

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some other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor. The property in that case, unless used as a means to carry out the purposes of the government, is subject to the legislative authority of the state equally with the property of private persons. If, however, forts, arsenals or other public buildings are erected upon them for the uses of the general government, such buildings with their appurtenances as instrumentalities for the execution of its powers will be free from any such interference and jurisdiction of the state as would destroy or impair their effective use for the purposes designed. Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525; C., R. I. & P. R'y v. McGlinn, id. 542; United States v. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 66; United States v. Davis, 5 Mason, 364; United States v. Travers, 2 Wheel. C. C. 490. Lands thus held, however, are not subject to taxation by the state or municipalities. United States v. Weise, 2 Wall. Jr. 72.

5. Ratification by state necessary for full control.-The general government can only acquire control and jurisdiction over places within the limits of a state by ratification on part of the state. Simple purchase is not sufficient. United States v. Tierney, 1 Bond, 571; United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 66; Ex parte Hebard, 4 Dill. 384.

6. There must be acceptance by congress.- Neither will the assent of the state legislature be sufficient without the acceptance of the grant or cession by the general government. People v. Lent, 2 Wheel. C. C. 548.

7. In what character congress legislates. This power, like all others which are specified, is conferred on congress as the legislature of the Union. In no other character can it be exercised. In legislating for the district they necessarily preserve the character of the legislature of the Union. It is in that character alone that the constitution confers on them this power of exclusive legislation. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264-424.

8. Exclusive legislation carries with it exclusive jurisdiction. And where a murder is committed within a fort, so purchased with the consent of a state legislature, the circuit court has jurisdiction over the offense notwithstanding a reservation by the state, in the act of cession, that the state should execute within the fort the civil and criminal processes issuing under state authority. United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 91.

9. Power of taxation in.— The power here conferred includes the power to tax, and congress may levy a direct tax on the District of Columbia in proportion to the census directed to be taken by the constitution. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317.

10. Process of courts.- Courts established under this authority for the District of Columbia may issue all processes necessary to carry their orders into effect, and such process may be executed within any state. United States v. Williams, 4 Cranch, C. C. 393.

11. Local municipal assessments.- Under the power here conferred congress may authorize the municipal authorities of the city of Washington to provide for paving the streets of the city and to levy assessments on abutting property to pay for the same. Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. 676. 12. Citizenship.— An inhabitant of the District of Columbia who there has his permanent abode is not a citizen of a state. Cissel v. McDonald, 16 Blatch. 150.

13. District of Columbia.-The sovereign power of the District of Columbia is lodged in the government of the United States and not in the corporation of the District. But the District municipal corporation is a person and subject to suit as any other municipality, and cannot claim exemption from the provisions of a statute of limitations on the ground that it is a department of the government of the United States. Metropolitan R. R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1.

18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

1. Implied powers.-There is not in the constitution a grant of powers which does not draw after it others not expressed or vital to their exercise; not substantive and independent, but auxiliary and subordinate. The sole end and aim of our institutions is the safety and happiness of the citizen. The science of government is the science of experiment; but the maxim which necessarily overrides all others is that the public functionaries must be at liberty to exercise the powers the people have intrusted to them. That "the safety of the people is the supreme law" not only comports with, but is indispensable to, the exercise of those powers without which that safety cannot be guarded. Public necessity is the test of incidental powers where the end to be attained is legitimate and within the scope of the constitution. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 421.

2. This clause of the constitution is a direct authority for the exercise of all necessary, incidental or implied powers to enable congress to carry out the great provisions of the constitution. It is not a limitation upon its powers but an enlargement thereof. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358; United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560.

3. Implied powers not excluded. There is no phrase in the constitution, such as was in the articles of confederation, excluding incidental or implied powers. Even the tenth amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word "expressly," as found in the articles of confederation, and declares only that the powers "not delegated to the United States nor prohibited to the states are reserved to the states or to the people; " thus leaving the question whether the particular power which may become the subject of dispute has been delegated to the one government or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 406.

4. Implied powers requisite to the nature of the constitution.The nature of the constitution requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. It does not profess to enumerate the means by which the powers it confers may be executed. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407, 408; Prigg v. Commonwealth, 16 Pet. 539; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542;

S. C. 1 Woods, 308; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 534; Thompson v. Pac. R. R. Co., 9 Wall. 579; United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; Bank of Commerce v. Tax Commissioners, 2 Black, 620; United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 78; United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560; United States v. Fairchilds, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 74; United States v. Marks, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 541; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.

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5. The following, from Story's Commentaries on Constitution, referred to and approved: Whenever a question arises concerning the constitutionality of a particular power, the first question is whether the power is expressed in the constitution. If it be, the question is decided. If it be not expressed the next question is, is it properly an incident to an expressed power and necessary to its execution? If it be, then it may be exercised by congress. If not, congress cannot exercise it." United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629.

6. "The sound construction of this clause must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all the means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Marshall, C. J., in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316-421.

7. The act of congress approved June 11, 1864, respecting the statute of limitations where parties were beyond reach of service during the civil war, refers and applies as well to cases in the state courts as to cases in the federal courts; and said act is constitutional and valid. Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493.

8. Supremacy of general government.-The United States is a government with authority extending over the whole territory of the Union, acting upon the states, and upon the people of the states. While it is limited in the number of its powers, so far as its sovereignty extends it is supreme. No state government can exclude it from the exercise of any authority conferred upon it by the constitution, obstruct its authorized officers against its will, or withhold from it, for a moment, the cognizance of any subject which the constitution has committed to it. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257.

9. Rights and immunities protected.- A right or an immunity. whether created by the constitution or only guarantied by it, even without any express delegation of power, may be protected by congress. Prigg v. Comm., 16 Pet. 539; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214. Rights and immunities created by or dependent upon the constitution of the United States can be protected by congress, and the form and manner of the protection may be such as congress in the legitimate exercise of its discretion shall provide. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303.

10. Legislative construction and retrospective laws distinguished. In our system of government the law-making power is vested in congress, and the power to construe the laws in the course of their admin