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the place of trial to another county in the district, or to a different district from that in which the offense was committed or the indictment found, is not an ex post facto law though enacted subsequent to the finding of the indictment. Gut v. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35.

36. Retrospective laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts or partake of the character of ex post facto laws are not forbidden by the constitution. Milne v. Huber, 3 McLean, 217; Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 165; Johnston v. Vandyke, 6 McLean, 441.

37. Interpretation of language.—It will be given the meaning which was applied to it by the language and jurisprudence which the colonists brought with them from the mother country and established here. United States v. Harris, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 110, 114, 115; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 463; United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 160.

38. "Or law impairing the obligation of contracts"-Definition. The obligation of a contract in the constitutional sense is the means provided by law by which it can be enforced; by which the parties can be obliged to perform it. Whatever legislation lessens the efficacy of these means impairs the obligation. If it tend to postpone or retard the enforcement, the obligation is to that extent weakened and the law is in conflict with the constitutional inhibition. Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203.

39. Test, diminished value. One of the tests that a contract has been impaired is that its value has, by legislation, been diminished. It is not by the constitution to be impaired at all. This is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation, dipensing with any part of its force. Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 327.

40. Remedy; when change of does not impair contract.— The distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation, the remedy may be modified as the wisdom of the state may direct. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122-201.

41. A law, passed after the contract is made, which merely changes the remedy would be liable to no constitutional objection. A state may regulate at pleasure the mode of proceedings in its courts in relation to past contracts as well as future. It may shorten the period of limitation. It may make reasonable exemption laws. And although a remedy may be more tardy and difficult, yet it will not follow that the law is unconstitutional. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the state, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy or directly on the contract itself. In either case it is prohibited by the constitution. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311.

42. The legislative power as to change of remedy may be exercised when it does not affect injuriously rights which have been secured by the contract. Therefore, held, that a statute prescribing a mode of service upon a railroad company different from that provided for in its charter is not void because of impairment of the obligation of the contract. Cairo & Fulton R. R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U. S. 168. In delivering the opinion in the above cause Waite, C. J., says: "The regulations of the forms of administering justice

by the courts is an incident of sovereignty. The surrender of this power is never to be presumed.”

43. As to imprisonment for debt.- Confinement of the debtor may be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may be allowed as a means of inducing him to perform it. But the state may refuse to inflict this punishment, or withhold the means and leave the contract in force. Imprisonment is no part of the contract, and to release the prisoner does not impair its obligation. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 200, 201; Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370.

44. A law abolishing imprisonment for debt does not impair the obligation of contracts theretofore existing. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, and Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 359, cited and followed, and the general doctrine of the court declared to be, “in modes of proceeding and of forms to enforce the contract the legislature has the control, and may enlarge, limit or alter them, provided it does not deny a remedy, or so embarrass it with conditions or restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the right." Penniman's Case, 103 U. S. 714.

45. Discharge by bankruptcy.-A bankrupt law of a state which discharges both the person of the debtor and his future acquisitions of property is not a "law impairing the obligation of contracts," so far as respects debts contracted after the passage of such law. But a certificate of discharge under such law cannot be pleaded against a citizen of another state, in the courts of the United States, or of any other state than that where the discharge was obtained. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, adhered to. Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 348; S. C. 6 Pet. 635; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295. See Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489.

46. A statute providing that a previous contract of indebtment may be extinguished by process and discharge in bankruptcy would be void. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535.

47. Form of remedy.—It is competent for the state to change the form of the remedy, or to modify it otherwise as it may see fit, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535.

48. Mode of proceeding.-"The rule seems to be that in modes of proceeding and of forms to enforce the contract the legislature has the control, and may enlarge, limit or alter them, provided that it does not deny a remedy, or so embarrass it with restrictions and conditions as seriously to impair the value of the right." Mr. Justice Hunt in Tennessee v. Sneed, £6 U. S. 69.

49. Limitation on tax sales.-The statute of Iowa limiting the time in which suits shall be brought for the recovery of lands sold for taxes does not conflict with this section. Barrett v. Holmes, 102 U. S. 651.

50. Limitations, statutes of.-A statute of limitation, when applied to existing contracts, is not invalid, provided a reasonable time is given, after the law takes effect, in which to commence an action, before the bar of the statute takes effect. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628.

51. A statute limiting the time in which suits shall be brought on causes of action in force prior to its passage to a shorter period than when the contract was made does not impair the obligation of the contracts on which

such causes of action are based, provided a reasonable time, taking all things into consideration, be given by the new law before such actions are barred. Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668.

52. Where a reasonable time must elapse after the enactment of a statute of limitations before the bar is complete, effect must be given to the statute even as against debts in existence at the time of its enactment. Lewis v. Broadwell, 3 McLean, 569; Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280; Hawkins v. Barney, 5 Pet. 457; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596; Samples v. Bank, 1 Woods, 523; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 634. 53. A state statute of limitations which reduces materially the time of bringing actions, though passed after the contract on which suit is brought was made, is not void if a reasonable time is left for the enforcement of the contract by suit before the statute bars that right. Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U. S. 633.

54. Where municipal bonds had been issued to be negotiated in a foreign market, a statute of limitations passed thereafter, limiting the time to one year, held to be unreasonable and to impair the obligation of the contract. Pereles v. Watertown, 6 Biss. 79.

55. The only ground on which a change of remedy existing when a contract was made is permissible without impairment of the contract is that a new and adequate and efficacious remedy be substituted for that which is superseded. Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278.

56. A constitution and statute of a state which provides that tacit mortgages shall cease to have effect against third persons unless recorded within a stated reasonable time does not impair the obligation of the contract in such cases even as to minors; it is in the nature of a statute of limitations. Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514.

57. Statute of frauds.- A statute of frauds embracing a pre-existing contract, not before required to be in writing, would be void. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535–552.

58. Exemption law. A law exempting a reasonable amount of necessary property from sale on execution is valid even as to pre-existing debts; but where the amount so exempted is unreasonably large and the contract is thereby impaired, the law will be held invalid. Mr. Justice Hunt in Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 610. Mr. Justice Clifford, same case, p. 608. The court, in this last case, adopts the language of Mr. Chief Justice Taney in Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How., 811, where he says a state may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary implements of agriculture, or the tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household furniture, shall, like wearing apparel, not be liable to execution on judgments. Regulations of this description have always been considered in every civilized community as properly belonging to the remedy, to be executed or not by every sovereignty according to its own views of policy and humanity.

59. Stay, appraisement and redemption laws.— A law, passed subsequent to the execution of a mortgage, which delays the extinguishment of the equitable estate of the mortgagor for twelve months after sale, and which prevents any sale unless the property brings two-thirds its appraised value, is invalid. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608.

60. A statute of Alabama authorizing a redemption of mortgaged prop- 1631erty in two years after the sale, under a decree by bona fide creditors of the mortgagor, is void as to sales made under a mortgage executed prior to the date of the enactment. Howard v. Bugbee, 24 How. 461.

61. Rules of evidence.- A provision in the constitution of Georgia of 1868, which so changes the rule of evidence as to throw the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that bills sued on have never been used in aid of the rebellion, if only the defendant swears he has reason to believe they were so used, is unconstitutional. Marsh v. Burroughs, 1 Woods, 463.

62. A statute of Georgia which required that in all suits brought for debts the court should be satisfied that the contract of indebtedness had been legally returned for taxes, and the taxes paid thereon before the plaintiff could recover on it, held unconstitutional as applied to debts contracted prior to the enactment. Lathrop v. Brown, 1 Woods, 474.

63. Right of repeal.- Where a state has by law given its creditors a right to sue it in its own courts, such law does not form a contract between the state and them, and such right may at any time be withdrawn by repeal without the violation of any contract obligation. If judgment were rendered against the state while such law were in force, the power of the court over the state would then end. The courts are in such case powerless to enforce their judgment, and everything after the judgment would depend on the will of the state. M. & C. R. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337; S. & N. Ala. R. R. v. Alabama, 101 U. S. 832.

64. Name in which suit must be brought.- A statute of Alabama directing that notes executed to a bank shall be sued in the name of the cashier of such bank affects only the remedy, and as to notes executed before its enactment such law is valid. Crawford v. Branch Bank of Mobile, 7 How. 279.

65. Form of action - Same.

The legislature may change the forms of action or method of enforcing a contract at its discretion, provided it leaves a competent tribunal and adequate remedy for enforcing it. Id. See, also, Railroad Co. v. Hecht, 95 U. S. 168; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69; Memphis v. United States, 97 U. S. 293.

66. Same.- A statutory liability is as much subject to remedial legislation as is a liability created by private contract, provided the remedy does not enter into and form a part of the obligation created by such statute. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628.

67. Usury laws - Act repealing.— A law repealing a usury law which is made retrospective so as to apply to debts already contracted at usurious rates of interest does not, as to such debts, impair the obligation of contract. Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 144.

68. Judgment, enforcement of-Inquiry whether sounding in contract or tort.- Where it was sought to enforce a judgment against a municipal corporation by mandamus to the taxing officers thereof, and where the constitution adopted subsequent to the rendition of such judgment limited the authority of the municipality in the levy of such tax, it was proper for the court to inquire whether such judgment had been rendered in an action sounding in contract or tort. If the former, the constitutional limitation would be invalid as applied to the payment of such judg

ment; if the latter, no such invalidity could be imputed to the provision. Louisiana v. Police Jury, 111 U. S. 716.

69. A judgment rendered in an action of tort is not a contract within the meaning of this clause of the constitution, and is not protected thereby. And the provision of the constitution of West Virginia that the property of a citizen shall not be sold on a judgment for an act done during the late civil war does not violate the obligation of a contract, where such judgment was founded on a tort committed as an act of public war. Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405.

70. Recording acts. It is within the undoubted power of state legislatures to pass a recording act by which the elder grantee shall be postponed to a younger if the prior deed is not recorded within a limited time; and the power is the same whether the deed is dated before or after the recording act. It does not in any manner impair the obligation of a contract. Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280.

71. Same.—The same rule applies to limitation laws. Id.

72. Remedy; laws affecting held void.-A state law passed subsequently to the execution of a mortgage, which declares that the equitable estate of the mortgagor shall not be extinguished for twelve months after a sale under a decree in chancery, and which prevents any sale unless twothirds of the amount of the valuation of the property as fixed by appraisers be bid therefor, impairs the obligation of a contract made prior to the passage of the statute, and as to such contracts is void. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Gantly's Lessee v. Ewing, 3 How. 707.

73. A state law authorizing redemption from sale under foreclosure of mortgage is, as applied to mortgages in existence prior to its passage, void under this section of the constitution. Affirming Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316. Howard v. Bugbee, 24 How. 461.

74. The clause in the constitution of Georgia of 1868 denying to the courts jurisdiction to try and give judgment for a debt where the consideration was the price of a slave or of the hire thereof is, as to such debts as were contracted prior to its adoption, founded on such consideration, void under this section. A contract can no more be impaired by a constitutional provision than by a legislative one. White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646. See, also, Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654.

75. A statute of North Carolina provided that in civil actions "for debts contracted during the late war, in which the nature of the obligation is not set forth, nor the value of the property for which such debt was created is stated, it shall be admissible for either party to show on the trial, by affidavit or otherwise, what was the consideration of the contract, and that the jury, in making up their verdict, shall take into consideration and determine the value of said contract in present currency in the particular locality in which it is to be performed, and render their verdict accordingly." This statute, as construed by the court, allowed the jury to place their own judgment upon the value of the contract in suit, and did not require them to take the value stipulated by the parties. As thus construed, said law impairs the obligation of contracts, and is void. Wilmington & W. R. R. v. King, 91 U. S. 3.