insertion, it would afford no ground for complaint at an omission, especially an omission of the paragraph we have discussed. The answer was true in letter and spirit, and in no degree warranted the inference that the blanks contained the disputed clause. The petitioner executed those blanks without any ground whatever for assuming that they contained anything which they did not, even if Milliken had been right in what he says he supposed to be the import of the notice of April 25.

Finally, there is not a particle of evidence that the contract was not drawn just as the United States, through its representative, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, intended that it should be, and for this reason again reformation must be denied. It is true that Milliken testifies that the Secretary of the Treasury admitted to him that the contract with the American Imprinting Company was in violation of the contract with the petitioner. But it is left doubtful, at least, whether the Secretary knew anything about what contract was intended to be made. The act of March 3, 1899, c. 424, 30 Stat. 1090, 1091, authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to procure certain stamps by contract, to be awarded under such terms, restrictions, and regulations as might be prescribed by the former with the approval of the latter. But that it not sufficient to warrant an assumption that the Secretary gave directions or had knowledge as to the intended. form of the contract. Moreover, so far as appears, the Secretary did not suggest or admit that there was any mistake in the form of the instrument. It would seem that Milliken exhibited to him the notice of April 25 as containing the Government's agreement, and that the Secretary fell in with Milliken's interpretation of the paper, but refused to do anything until the Commissioner of Internal Revenue returned. For all the reasons which we have stated, we are of opinion that the United States is entitled to a decree as matter of law. Decree reversed.

VOL. CCII-12

Statement of the Case.

202 U. S.

In re LINCOLN, PETITIONER.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

No. 21, Original. Submitted April 23, 1906.–Decided May 14, 1906.

Where petitioner's term of imprisonment has expired, but under the sentence he is still subject to confinement until a fine of $100 and costs has been paid, and nothing in the record shows whether such fine has been collected on execution as authorized by the sentence, but if not collected or collectible the petitioner can shortly be discharged on taking the poor debtor's oath, the case is practically a moot one, upon which the time of this court should not be spent.

Conceding the full jurisdiction of this court in habeas corpus, and although

the writ has been granted, in view of the special circumstances therein involved, in a case similar in some respects to the one at bar, it is a question in every case whether the exercise of that jurisdiction is appropriate. The ordinary procedure for correction of errors in criminal cases by writ of error should be pursued unless special circumstances call for a departure therefrom; and so held in regard to a petition for habeas corpus of one convicted in a District Court of the United States for selling liquor to Indians in Indian country who could and should have proceeded by writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals.

THE petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the District of Nebraska on an indictment charging that he did wrongfully and unlawfully introduce into Indian country, to wit, into and upon the Winnebago Indian Reservation, a reservation set apart for the exclusive use and benefit of certain tribes of the Winnebago Indians, certain spirituous, vinous, malt and other intoxicating liquors.

Upon this conviction he was sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and the costs of prosecution and to be imprisoned in the jail of Douglas County, Nebraska, for the term of sixty days and until said fine and costs were paid. The imprisonment commenced on February 19, 1906. Without pursuing his remedy by writ of error the petitioner on April 2, 1906, filed in this court his application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the United States has no police power or jurisdiction over the Winnebago Reservation, and that the law under which the

indictment was drawn is unconstitutional and void in so far as it applies to the said Winnebago Reservation, and that the United States District Court was wholly without jurisdiction in the premises. The indictment was found under the act of Congress of January 30, 1897. 29 Stat. 506. April 30, 1906, the case was submitted on petition, return and a stipulation of facts.

Mr. Thomas L. Sloan and Mr. Williamson S. Summers for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The sixty days named as the term of imprisonment had expired before the case was submitted, and indeed had almost expired before the application was made for the writ. There is nothing to show whether the fine and costs have been collected upon execution, as the sentence authorizes. If not so collected and if they cannot be collected, then, though possibly still in jail, he can shortly be discharged on taking the poor debtor's oath. Rev. Stat. § 1042. This section authorizes a discharge after a confinement of thirty days on account of the non-payment of fine and costs. So that within ninety days from February 19, the time the sentence took effect, the petitioner can secure his discharge either by paying the fine and costs or by taking the poor debtor's oath, as above stated.

In Ex parte Baez, 177 U. S. 378, which was an application for a writ of habeas corpus, it appeared that before a return to the writ could be made, or other action taken, the restraint of which the petitioner complained would terminate, and it was held that the application for the writ should be denied. Indeed the case at bar in principle is not unlike Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651; New Orleans Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 160 U. S. 170; Kimball v. Kimball, 174 U. S. 158, and Jones v. Montague,

194 U. S. 147, in each of which intermediate the ruling below and the time for decision here events had happened which prevented the granting of the relief sought, and the appeals or writs of error were dismissed on the ground that this court did not spend its time in deciding a moot case.

While the full jurisdiction of this court in habeas corpus may be conceded, there is in every case a question whether the exercise of such jurisdiction is appropriate. In Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, Royall, who was held under state process for trial on an indictment charging an offense against the laws of the State, filed his petition in habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of the United States praying release from that custody. The Circuit Court refused to order his discharge, and from its ruling he appealed, and at the same time filed an original petition in this court. Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 254. The question was fully considered and it was held that while the Federal courts, Circuit and Supreme, had jurisdiction in the premises, there was a discretion whether in any case a writ should be issued, Mr. Justice Harlan speaking for the court, saying (p. 251):

"That discretion should be exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution. When the petitioner is in custody by state authority for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof; or where, being a subject or citizen of a foreign State, and domiciled therein, he is in custody, under like authority, for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign State, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations; in such and like cases of urgency, involving the authority and operations of the Gen

eral Government, or the obligations of this country to, or its relations with, foreign nations, the courts of the United States have frequently interposed by writs of habeas corpus and discharged prisoners who were held in custody under state authority."

And again, after commenting on the relations of state and national courts (p. 252):

"That these salutary principles may have full operation, and in harmony with what we suppose was the intention of Congress in the enactments in question, this court holds that where a person is in custody, under process from a state court of original jurisdiction, for an alleged offense against the laws of such State, and it is claimed that he is restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Circuit. Court has a discretion whether it will discharge him, upon habeas corpus, in advance of his trial in the court in which he is indicted; that discretion, however, to be subordinated to any special circumstances requiring immediate action. When the state court shall have finally acted upon the case, the Circuit Court has still a discretion whether, under all the circumstances then existing, the accused, if convicted, shall be put to his writ of error from the highest court of the State, or whether it will proceed, by writ of habeas corpus, summarily to determine whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States."

The propositions thus laid down have been upheld by repeated decisions of this court. Ex parte Fonda, 117 U. S. 516; In re Duncan, 139 U. S. 449; In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278; Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183; In re Frederich, Petitioner, 149 U. S. 70; New York v. Eno, 155 U. S. 89; Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U. S. 100; Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272; Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231; Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293; Iasigi v. Van De Carr, 166 U. S. 391; In re Eckart, Petitioner, 166 U. S. 481; Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 104; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 515; Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S. 184; Davis v. Burke, 179 U. S. 399; Gusman v. Mar