rero, 180 U. S. 81; Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U. S. 499; Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U. S. 138.

In In re Loney, 134 U. S. 372; In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, and Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459, writs of habeas corpus were sustained, but in each of these cases the act charged against the petitioner was one for which he was amenable alone to the laws of the United States, or he was exercising some authority under those laws, and so they all come within the exceptions noted in Ex parte Royall, supra.

While the same reasons do not apply when the petitioner is in custody by virtue of the process of a Federal court, yet a writ of habeas corpus is not to be made use of as a writ of error (Crossley v. California, 168 U. S. 640; Whitney, Warden, &c., v. Dick, ante, p. 132), the ordinary procedure for the correction of errors in criminal cases is by writ of error, and that method should be pursued unless there be special circumstances calling for a departure therefrom. Ex parte Mirzan, 119 U. S. 584; In re Huntington, 137 U. S. 63; In re Lancaster, 137 U. S. 393; In re Chapman, 156 U. S. 211; Riggins v. United States, 199 U. S. 547. Several of these cases, it is true, were applications for habeas corpus prior to final decisions in the lower courts, and the refusal of the writs was based partly, at least, upon the proposition that the orderly administration of justice would be better subserved by declining to exercise our jurisdiction until the conclusion of the proceedings below. In Ex parte Mirzan, however, this court declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus after a conviction, holding that it might be issued by the proper Circuit Court, and that application should be made to that court except in cases where there were some special circumstances making immediate action by this court necessary or expedient. In the case at bar if there was any error in the proceedings of the trial court it could have been corrected by writ of error from the Court of Appeals, and no reason is given why that remedy should not have been pursued, except the request of the district judge who decided the

case. Reference is made to a decision of the Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, In re Boyd, 49 Fed. Rep. 48, but that only announced the doctrine of some of the cases cited above, that ordinarily prior to final judgment a writ of habeas corpus ought not to be issued.

It is true that we issued a writ of habeas corpus in a case in some respects like the present, Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488, and it is relied upon by petitioner as authority for this application, but it was shown in that case that there was a direct conflict between the state and local Federal courts in the precise point of law involved, each asserting jurisdiction over the same offense; that the Court of Appeals had already decided the question adversely to the contention of petitioner, so that a writ of error from that court would have accomplished nothing; and further, that the matter involved opened up inquiry into questions of great significance affecting the respective jurisdictions of the Nation and the States over large numbers of Indians. There were special reasons, therefore, for our issuing a writ of habeas corpus and investigating the matter in that case. But it does not follow from the action then taken that it is necessary or proper for this court to issue a habeas corpus in every case involving the question of the legality of a sale of liquor to Indians or the bringing of liquor into the Indian country. It is enough that the cases be disposed of in the orderly and customary mode of procedure. It may be assumed that the trial courts will follow the rulings of this court, and if there be in any case a departure therefrom the proper appellate court will correct the error. To permit every petty criminal case to be brought directly to this court upon habeas corpus, on the ground of an alleged misconception or disregard of our decisions, would be a grievous misuse of our time, which should be devoted to a consideration of the more important legal and constitutional questions which are constantly arising and calling for our determination.

For these reasons

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Statement of the Case.

202 U.S.

UNITED STATES v. CORNELL STEAMBOAT COMPANY.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 239. Argued April 20, 1906.-Decided May 14, 1906.

While a claim for salvage of Government property based on services rendered without request of any officer of the Government does not arise upon any contract, express or implied, it is properly one for unliquidated damages in a case not sounding in tort, in respect to which the claimant would be entitled to redress in the admiralty court if the United States were suable, and, under the Tucker Act, the Court of Claims, or the proper District Court where the claim is for less than $1,000, has jurisdiction of a suit therefor.

The successful salving of undelivered merchandise on which duties have been paid, but which the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized by §§ 2984, 3689, Rev. Stat., to refund if the goods were lost, entitles the salvors to recover from the Government a reasonable salvage, equal to that recovered on the private property saved at the same time, on the amount of duties which the Government would have been under obligation to refund had the merchandise been lost. In such a case it will be assumed that the duties will be refunded, and the claim therefor will be regarded as a liability, although § 2984 is permissive and not mandatory in form.

Although courts of admiralty have no general equity jurisdiction, and cannot afford equitable relief in a direct proceeding for that purpose, they may apply equitable principles to subjects within their jurisdiction.

THIS was a petition under what is known as the Tucker Act, defining the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, to recover salvage upon the duties on 1,883 bags of sugar, cargo of the lighter Bangor.

The facts agreed upon and found by the court are substantially as follows:

The Steamboat Company, a New York corporation, and owner of the steam tug R. G. Townsend, at great risk and peril to the tug, saved a certain lot of 1,883 bags of sugar on board of a lighter called the Bangor, in the waters of the port

202 U. S.

Argument for the United States.

of New York, which was in danger of being destroyed by fire. The sugar had been imported from a foreign country, was subject to duty under the laws of the United States, and at the time of the fire had not been delivered to the consignees, and was still in the possession and control of the customs officers. The duties on this sugar amounting to $6,000 had been paid to the Government.

Petitioner filed a libel in the District Court against the cargo to recover salvage compensation for services rendered in saving the sugar. The case resulted in a decree awarding the petitioner salvage, amounting to ten per cent of the value of the property saved, viz., $1,274.03. 108 Fed. Rep. 277. In fixing this sum the District Court considered the invoice value of the sugar only, excluding salvage upon the duties saved to the United States by the salving services.

Upon these facts the District Court awarded the appellant ten per cent upon the amount of the duties saved to the United States, namely, $600, with clerk's fees, $3.60. 130 Fed. Rep. 480. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment, 137 Fed. Rep. 455, whereupon the United States applied for this writ of certiorari.

Mr. J. C. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney General, for the United States:

The District Court has no jurisdiction.

Unless granted by the Tucker Act the trial court was without authority to afford relief. Obviously the present controversy, if provided for at all, must be one arising out of contract, expressed or implied, or from damages, in respect to which respondent would be entitled to redress against the United States in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if suable as a private individual.

There was no contract, expressed or implied, between the Government and the respondent and no such thing is alleged in the petition. The services to the cargo were purely voluntary. The claim is not one in respect of which respondent

Argument for the United States.

202 U.S.

would be entitled to redress in a court of law, equity, or admiralty against a private individual. No recovery, either at law or in equity, is possible for purely voluntary services.

A proceeding in admiralty in personam against a private individual for salvage allowance is not permissible unless the service was performed "at his request and for his benefit," or unless in some way a proceeding in rem against the thing salved has become impossible-as, e. g., by clandestine removal or destruction after delivery to the owner. Benefit, however great, from salving a cargo cannot support a claim in personam for the services rendered. Admiralty Rule 19; The Sabine, 101 U. S. 384, 389.

It follows that if the Government were subject to suit as an individual, respondent's claim for saving the cargo in question could not be enforced by a proceeding in personam against it.

Section 2984, Revised Statutes, specifies the sole method assented to by the Government for securing refund of duties paid upon merchandise afterwards destroyed. The courts have no jurisdiction of an original proceeding to enforce such a claim-whatever might be their power in a case where the Secretary should refuse to perform his duty.

The claim set up in the present proceeding must be regarded as under the revenue laws. Such claims are not within the jurisdiction of the courts, since those laws constitute a distinct and exclusive system of collection and redress. Nichols v. United States, 7 Wall. 122, 131; D. M. Ferry & Co. v. United States, 85 Fed. Rep. 550. See also State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 614; Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U. S. 324; Treat v. Staples, 1 Holmes, 5; S. C., 24 Fed. Cas. 14,162.

Upon the facts, respondent's claim is without merit. What respondent did was, purely voluntary and such services, however meritorious or beneficial, create no obligation enforceable against the beneficiary either in law or equity.

The maritime law, for the purposes of public policy, and for the advantage of trade and commerce, imposes in cases of