Argument for Complainant. 202 U.S. between the same nations using practically the same language; treaty of September 3, 1783, between England and Spain; treaty of St. Ildefonso, October 1, 1800, between France and Spain, and finally the cession of Louisiana to the United States by France, April 30, 1803. The deep water channel was in fact recognized by the Congress of the United States in its legislation and in the treaties referring to this section of the country, as the proper boundary, and according to which it divided it up. Act of March 28, 1804; act of February 20, 1811, using the same language employed in the treaties, "the middle of the river" Iberville. The first extension of the territory of Mississippi south of 31° of north latitude was by act of May 14, 1812, over one month after the creation of the State of Louisiana and at that time the territory affected was not in the possession of the United States. See act of February 13, 1813. But the State of Mississippi was not created until 1817 when for the first time is mentioned the islands within six leagues of the shore. The deep water sailing channel is the proper boundary line between the two States recognized by all rules of international law. "Coast" is the seaboard of a country and includes bordering islands. 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 171; The Anna, C. Rob. 373. Mr. Justice Story in Thomas v. Hatch, 3 Sumn. 178, defined "shore" to be the space between the margin of the water at a low stage, and the banks to be what it contains in its greatest flow; Lord Hale defined it as synonymous with flat; Mr. Justice Parker does the same in 6 Massachusetts, 436, 439, and Chief Justice Marshall described the shore of a river as bordering on the water's edge. Alabama v. Georgia, 23 How. 513. "Thalweg" a term now universally used by international lawwriters to define water boundaries between States and Nations, is a German word composed of two separate words, "thal," a valley, and "weg," way, meaning the middle or the deepest or most navigable channel. An English equivalent may be "fairway" or "midway" or "main channel." 202 U. S. Argument for Complainant. Where a navigable river forms the boundary of coterminous States, the middle of the channel—the filum aquæ or thalweg— is generally taken as the line of their separation. 1 Halleck's Int. Law, Baker's ed. p. 145, citing Gundling, Jus Nat., p. 248; Wolfius, Jus Gentium, §§ 106-109; Stypmannus, Jus Marit., etc., cap. V, n. 476-552; Merlin, Repertoire, voc. "alluvium"; Rayneval, Droit de la Nature, tome I, p. 307; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. I, tit. II, §57; Rayneval, Inst. du Droit Nat., liv. II, ch. XI; Pothier, Œuvres de, tome X, pp. 87,88; Voet, ad Pandects, tome I, pp. 606, 607; Heineccius, Recitaciones, lib. II, tit. I, §§ 356-369; Las Siete Partidas, pt. III, tit. XXVIII, L. 31; Gomez, Elementos, lib. II, tit. IV, §3; Febrero Mexicana, tome I, p. 161; Sala Mexicana, tome II, p. 62; Justinian, Inst., lib. II, tit. I, Nos. 20-24; De Camp's Manuel des Prop. Riv., passim; Chardon, Droit a' Alluvion, passim; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac. Pac., lib. VII, ch. III, § 17; Ortolan Domaine International, Nos. 85-93; Heffter, Droit International, No. 69, note; Gunther, Europ. Volkerrecht, tit. II, p. 57; Pestel, Commentarii de Repub. Batav. No. 268; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. XXVIII; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. I, tit. I, ch. IV; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. I, cap. III; Pando, Derecho Internacional, p. 99; Almeda, Derecho Publico, tome I, p. 199; Cushing, Opinions U. S. Att'ys Gen'l, vol. VIII, p. 175; Crittenden, Opinions U. S. Att'ys Gen'l, vol. V, pp. 264, 412; Puffendorf, De Jur. Nat. et Gent., lib. IV, ch. V, §8; Wolfius, Jus Gentium, §§ 108, 109; Proudhon et Dumay, Domaine Public, tome IV, ch. LVI, sec. 7. See also Baker's Int. Law, p. 68; Bowen's Int. Law, p. 10; Creasy, Int. Law, p. 221, citing Halleck, p. 138, Twiss, p. 201; Grotius, Lib. II, ch. III, sec. 18; Klubn, sec. 133; Twiss, Law of Nations, citing Grotius, lib. II, ch. III, §8; Puffendorf, lib. IV, ch. V, §8; Hall, Int. Law, citing Grotius, lib. II, ch. III, § 18, Wolfius, Jus Gentium, §§ 106, 107, Vattel, liv. LIV, ch. XXII, § 266, De Martens, Precis, No. 39, the Twee Gebroeders, 3, Rob. 339, 340; Bluntschli, §§ 297, 298, 301; Twiss, I, §§ 143, 144; Droit des Gens, Rivier, sec. 14; Droit des Gens, Argument for Complainant. 202 U.S. De Martens, vol. 1, No. 39; Droit International, Fodéré, § 657; Devoe Mfg. Co., 108 U. S. 401; Moore, Int. Arb., vol. 1, p. 229, where the decision of the San Juan water boundary dispute is found; the boundaries of the various bordering States on the Danube, State Papers, 1878, 1879, vol. 70, p. 514 et seq.; the Detroit river boundary, Gannett's Boundaries, 3d ed. the Alaskan boundary case, Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 544. Louisiana's title to the disputed territory is confirmed by prescription, usucaption, acquiescence, and specific acknowledgment by the State of Mississippi. p. 12; The surveys of this territory were made by the United States Government about the year 1842 and all lands to the channel were credited to Louisiana. Under the Swamp Land Acts of 1849 and 1850 all lands selected by Louisiana south of the channel were approved by the Government and portions of them were subsequently sold by Louisiana to individuals at different times down to 1894. The disputed territory has always been subject to the sovereignty of Louisiana and has yielded taxes to her exclusively according to the assessments laid by her officers. All of the Departments of the Government in interpreting the acts of Congress have accredited the disputed territory to 'Louisiana. The State of Mississippi has recognized the disputed territory as being the property of the State of Louisiana, and her present boundary pretension is but a matter of recent creation after long years of recognition of, and acquiescence in, Louisiana's ownership and sovereignty. It was only after the oyster fishermen of Mississippi by their wasteful system of fishing had either fished up or destroyed all of the Mississippi oysters of any value that these fishermen began to invade Louisiana waters in search of them. Until recent years the Louisiana fisheries were open to all, but are now closed to all except her citizens. It was the exercise of this right that incurred Mississippi's displeasure and brought about this suit. That State made no claim to the territory under the 202 U.S. Argument for Defendant. Swamp Acts and it was granted to Louisiana by the Government. In 1839 a survey of the Mississippi coast was made pursuant to an act of its legislature. This survey and the report accompanying the same show the deep water channel and credit the territory south of it to Louisiana. The official maps made and supplied by the State to county officers pursuant to the acts of 1866 and 1871 are to the same effect. See also map published by the board of immigration and agriculture of Mississippi under act of 1882. The doctrine of ownership by prescription is fully sustained by the writers on international law and by the decisions. Pradier Fodéré, tome II, p, 337, citing and reviewing all the authorities; the Delagoa Bay dispute, State Papers, vol. 66, 1874, 1875, p. 554; the Great Britain-Venezuela dispute, Moore's Int. Arb. vol. 5, p. 5017; Keyser v. Coe, 9 Blatch. 32; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 4 How. 638; Missouri v. Kentucky, 11 Wall. 403; Kentucky v. Indiana, 136 U. S. 511; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 522. Mr. Hannis Taylor, Mr. J. N. Flowers and Mr. Monroe McClurg, with whom Mr. William Williams, Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, was on the brief, for defendant: The action of Congress from 1812 to 1819 in carving out of the Louisiana Purchase and the Mississippi Territory the States of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, giving each a portion of the sea front shows the execution of a common design. The different acts so far as they may be in apparent conflict, must be construed together. 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed. 620; Alexander v. Alexandria, 5 Cranch, 8; Patterson v. Winn, 14 Pet. 366; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 563; Converse v. United States, 21 How. 463; United States v. Walker, 22 How. 299; Ryan v. Carter, 93 U. S. 78; Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U. S. 220. In connection with the foregoing the court must apply the equally important rule that, where a particular construction of Argument for Defendant. 202 U. S. a statute will occasion great inconvenience or produce inequality and injustice, that view is to be avoided if another and more reasonable interpretation is present in the statute. Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 37; Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646, 680; Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 553; Blake v. National Banks, 23 Wall. 307, 320; United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 77. All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law, in such cases, should prevail over its letter. United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482. In order to understand the controlling reason underlying the three acts in question considered as one connected whole, there must be taken into consideration the physical conformation and relative extent of the sea front, which they attempted to apportion, as equally as possible, among the States of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. It is well settled that courts will take judicial notice of the prominent geographical facts and features of the country. The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362; The Montello, 11 Wall. 411. A court will also take judicial notice of the positions of islands off the coast of a State. State v. Wagner, 61 Maine, 178. The court has therefore complete judicial knowledge of the geography of the sea front in question, and of the positions of the islands adjacent thereto, to whose partition the three related acts must be applied. To the States of Mississippi and Alabama were given, in identical language, all islands "within six leagues of the shore," and to Louisiana "all islands within three leagues of the coast," the conclusion is irresistible that the wider zone of islands given to the States first named was intended to compensate for the fact that the latter has more than four times as long a sea front as both combined. Everything indicates the intention of Congress to give to each of the three States in question the islands directly |