Opinion of the Court.

This being so, the averments of deprivation or impairment afforded no proper basis for jurisdiction, and as to section 1979 of the Revised Statutes, that was inapplicable. Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing Co., 176 U. S. 68.

In truth, the questions as to the nature and extent of complainants' titles or rights, as put forward in the bill, are not Federal questions, but questions of state or general law.

In Hooker v. Los Angeles, supra, it was contended that the decision of the state court against the claim of plaintiffs in error to certain riparian rights and in certain alleged percolating waters, which rights were alleged to be derived from a patent of the United States, and confirmed Mexican grants, was a decision against a title, right, privilege, or immunity claimed under the Constitution or some statute or treaty of the United States, and so reviewable here. But this court held otherwise, and we said:

"Obviously, the question as to the title or right of plaintiffs in error in the land, and whatever appertained thereto, was one of state law and of general public law, on which the decision of the state court was final. San Francisco v. Scott, 111 U. S. 768; Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S. 389. And the question of the existence of percolating water was merely a question of fact.

"The patents were in the nature of a quitclaim, and under the act of March 3, 1851, were 'conclusive between the United States and the said claimants only, and shall not affect the interests of third persons.' The validity of that act was not drawn in question in the state court, and as the right or title asserted by plaintiffs in error was derived under Mexican and Spanish grants, the decision of the state court on the claims asserted by plaintiffs in error to the waters of the river was not against any title or right claimed under the Constitution or any treaty, or statute of, or commission held, or authority exercised, under the Constitution. If the title of plaintiffs in error were protected by the treaty, still the suit did not arise thereunder, because the controversy in the state court did not inVOL. CCI-22

volve the construction of the treaty, but the validity of the title of Mexican and Spanish grants prior to the treaty."

Crystal Springs Land & Water Company v. Los Angeles, 177 U. S. 169, was a bill brought in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of California, and that court ruled, 82 Fed. Rep. 114, that where both parties claimed under Mexican grants, confirmed and patented by the United States in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the controversy was only as to what were the rights thus granted and confirmed, the suit was not one arising under a treaty so as to confer jurisdiction on a Federal court, and that where the only ground of Federal jurisdiction was the allegation that defendant's claim of title was based in part on certain acts of the legislature of the State, which attempted to transfer to it, as alleged, the title held by complainants' grantors at the time of their passage, the court would not retain jurisdiction when an answer was filed by defendant denying the allegations, and disclaiming any title or claim of title not held by it before the passage of the acts. The bill was dismissed, and we affirmed the judgment.

We there cited, among other cases, Phillips v. Mound City Association, 124 U. S. 605, and Robinson v. Anderson, 121 U S. 522. In the one case it was adjudged, as stated in the syllabus, that "an adjudication by the highest court of a State that certain proceedings before a Mexican tribunal prior to the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo were insufficient to effect a partition of a tract of land before that time granted by the Mexican Government to three persons who were partners, which grant was confirmed by commissioners appointed under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1851, 9 Stat. 631, 'to ascertain and settle the private land claims in the State of California,' presents no Federal question which is subject to review here."

In the other, that under the act of 1875, even if the complaint, standing by itself, made out a case of jurisdiction, it was taken away as soon as, when the answer came in, it appeared that defendants either disclaimed all interest in the

202 U.S.

Statement of the Case.

land in question, or claimed title under and not adverse to that of plaintiff. See also Boston &c. Mining Company v. Montana Ore Company, 188 U. S. 632, 643. There are the same disclaimers here as in the Crystal Springs case, but from what we have heretofore said it will be seen that we are of opinion, in any aspect, that the bill was properly dismissed, and that the decree to that effect must be

Affirmed.

ORTEGA v. LARA.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF PORTO RICO.

No. 230. Argued April 17, 18, 1906.-Decided May 21, 1906.

Where jurisdiction of a writ of error to review a judgment of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico depends on amount, the judgment itself is the test and it is insufficient if for $5,000 and costs although it carries interest.

Whenever political and legislative power over territory are transferred from another nation to the United States, the laws of the country transferred, unless inconsistent with provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States applicable thereto, continue in force until abrogated or changed by or under the authority of the United States-and this general rule of law was applied to Porto Rico by the Foraker Act of April 12, 1900, and that act also provided how such laws should be altered or repealed by the legislature of Porto Rico.

Article 44 of the Code of Porto Rico limiting recovery in cases of breach of promise to the expenses of injured party incurred by reason of the promised marriage was a law of Porto Rico and not of the United States and was subject to repeal by the legislature of Porto Rico, and, having been so repealed prior to the breach alleged in this case, a writ of error from this court cannot be maintained on the ground that the ruling of the District Court that the recovery was not limited to such expenses was a denial of a right claimed under a law of the United States.

The District Court of the United States for Porto Rico has jurisdiction when the parties on both sides are subjects of the King of Spain.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

202 U. S.

Mr. George H. Lamar, with whom Mr. N. B. K. Pettingill was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

While the amount involved is not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, there is a bona fide question based on the Federal law involved. Sec. 44 of the Civil Code was adopted by the Foraker Act and became in effect an act of Congress. United States v. Simms, 1 Cr. 252; Kendall v. United States, 12 Peters, 524; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Glboe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U. S. 540. Sec. 44 of the Civil Code was applicable to the rights of the parties under the contract sued on. The subsequent legislation could not affect the defendant's defenses. Coghlan v. South Carolina, 142 U. S. 101; McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124; United States v. Price, 9 How. 83; New Orleans &c. Co. v. Louisiana, 157 U. S. 219.

Mr. Frederic D. McKenney, with whom Mr. John Spalding Flannery and Mr. T. D. Mott, Jr., were on the brief, for defendant in error:

This court is without jurisdiction to review the judgment. The matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, does not exceed $5,000. During the trial neither the Constitution of the United States nor a treaty thereof nor an act of Congress was brought in question and the right claimed thereunder denied.

Apart from so-called Federal questions in an action for money, the amount of the judgment against the defendant is the measure of the jurisdiction of this court, and it cannot be maintained unless the judgment exceeds $5,000. Mayor v. Evans, 97 U. S. 1. Neither interest nor costs can enter into the computation. West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Rogers, 93 U. S. 565.

Section 44 was repealed by the adoption of the new Code of Porto Rico before the breach of the alleged contract. The parties to a contract have no vested right in the existing general laws of the State which can preclude their amendment or repeal. While it is true that there may be laws which, when accepted by an individual, constitute in themselves binding

contracts which probably could not be altered by subsequent legislation, it is settled in the United States that the laws governing the institution of marriage and the dissolution of the condition are not of this class. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190.

Changes in the laws of evidence, of perjuries and registrations, and those which concern remedies, frauds and limitations of actions, while they may affect the validity, construction or discharge of contracts, are not regarded as necessarily affecting their obligation. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 200; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., 406 et seq.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.

Angela Lara brought her action against Antonio Ortega in the District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico to recover damages alleged to have been suffered by her by reason of his breach of promise of marriage. The date of thé promise was laid as June 1, 1900, and of the breach in 1904. Both parties were subjects of Spain and residents of Porto Rico.

Defendant demurred to the complaint, and the demurrer having been overruled, pleaded the general issue. The cause was tried by a jury and resulted in a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $5,000, interest and costs, on which judgment was entered. Defendant moved in arrest and for judgment non obstante veredicto, which motions were overruled, and this writ of error was thereupon allowed.

At the conclusion of the evidence defendant requested the court to instruct the jury to find in his favor, on the grounds, among others, that the court had no jurisdiction of a suit where both plaintiff and defendant were subjects of the King of Spain, and because the cause of action arose in June, 1900, "at which time there was no provision in the laws in force in Porto Rico for a suit of the character set out in plaintiff's declaration, the only basis for the said suit being the provisions of article 44 of the Civil Code then in force." Similar reasons were assigned in support of the motions in arrest and non obstante.