Argument for Southern Railway Company. 202 U.S. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has directly held that the corporation commission of North Carolina is not a “judicial court." State ex rel. Caldwell v. Wilson, 121 N. Car. 425; State v. Wilmington and Weldon R. R. Co., 122 N. Car. 877. The four cars of coal in question were and are articles of interstate commerce and beyond control of North Carolina Corporation Commission. Where the articles are still in the cars and undelivered, they are subjects of interstate commerce, and the transfer of said articles from the car to the depot or station is a part of the interstate transportation. In the case at bar it will be noted that even such transfer had not taken place, and unquestionably the interstate transportation was uncompleted. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412; Wall v. N. & W. R. R. Co., 52 W. Va. 485; Connery v. Railroad Co., 92 Minnesota, 20. Furthermore, the act to regulate commerce, itself, provides that it shall and does apply to the "transportation of passengers or property" "from one State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, to any other State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country," etc. Congress having legislated no state regulations can apply. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Miami S. S. Co., 86 Fed. Rep. 407. Switching and terminal charges are exclusively covered by act of Congress. Fielder v. M., K. & T. R. Co., 42 S. W. Rep. 362; Walker v. Keenan, C. C. A. 7th Cir. 73 Fed. Rep. 755; I. C. C. v. D. G. H. M. R. Co., 167 U. S. 633; I. C. C. v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 186 U. S. 320. An article of interstate commerce remains wholly free from such state control, as long as it is in the original package. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. Unquestionably coal stored in a car in which it originally started on its transit is still in the original package. Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343. This is not only the law of the United States but the statutes of North Carolina themselves expressly disclaim any applica 202 U.S. Argument for Southern Railway Company. tion to interstate commerce. Act of March 6, 1899, c. 164, § 14. See also McGwigan v. Railroad Co., 95 N. Car. 428. The rules of the North Carolina Corporation Commission as to placing cars loaded with interstate freight, and its orders to place the four cars of interstate freight now in question are void because they interfere with interstate commerce; because they deal with a subject National in its character, requiring uniform treatment throughout the United States, and a subject over which the action of Congress is exclusive, the States being powerless to interfere at all; and because Congress has in fact legislated on this particular subject, and the field is exclusively occupied by existing acts of the Federal Government. This court has never separated the cases into those which aid interstate commerce and those which interfere with interstate commerce, and it has never held that the States may pass acts in aid of commerce, while they are forbidden to pass acts interfering with commerce. The only classification of cases ever made by this court were the three classes set forth in Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 209, where it divides them as follows: First, those in which the power of the State is exclusive; second, those in which the States may act in the absence of legislation by Congress; third, those in which the action of Congress is exclusive and the States cannot interfere at all. The case of Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, has been cited and reaffirmed in the following cases. W. U. Tel. Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 655; M. P. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403, 416; C. & L. Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 586; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150, 153; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592, 623; K. & H. Bridge Co. v. Illinois, 175 U. S. 626, 632; Hanley v. Kansas City S. R. Co., 187 U. S. 617, 620; Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 352; St. Clair County v. Interstate S. & C. T. Co.. 192 U. S. 454, 457. See also Wabash &c. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, which Argument for Southern Railway Company. 202 U.S. has been cited and reaffirmed in many cases, holding that the times and modes of delivery of interstate freight are not the subject of state regulation. This court has never disturbed its rulings in the Wabash case, and while some state statutes indirectly affecting interstate commerce have been sustained it will be found that they in no way conflict with or modify the doctrine laid down. This will more clearly appear by reference to some of the cases decided by this court sustaining certain state statutes. Animals having contagious diseases may be excluded from a State: M., K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137. A law requiring the erection of fences and cattle guards: Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512; M. & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26; M. & St. L. R. Co. v. Emmons, 149 U. S. 364. A state law requiring engineers operating passenger and freight trains to have their sight examined: Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; prohibiting the consolidation of parallel or competing lines: L. & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677; separating the white and col ́ored races: L. N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; prohibiting the running of freight trains on Sunday: Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299. In reference to the Hennington case, Justices Brewer, White, Peckham and Shiras appear to have placed themselves on record in a dissenting opinion that they considered the Hennington case erroneously decided. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 325. A statute forbidding the use of stoves as means of heating cars has been upheld: N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628; requiring trains to stop at county seats: Glad son v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427; requiring a carrier to inform the shipper that a loss has not happened on its line: Railroad Company v. Patterson, 169 U. S. 311; requiring bills of lading to be signed by both parties has been upheld, as a rule of evidence: Railroad Co. v. Patterson, 169 U. S. 311. 202 U.S. Argument for Southern Railway Company. A law requiring a railroad company to stop three trains each way at cities containing 3,000 inhabitants, has been upheld: L. S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; requiring a physical connection of tracks by two different railroads: Wisconsin &c. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287. See the following cases where the regulations are held invalid. I. C. R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142, where a statute of Illinois was declared void because it attempted to require an interstate express train from Chicago to New Orleans to go three and one half miles out of its way and deviate from its course so as to stop at Cairo, Ill. Likewise a statute of Illinois requiring all passenger trains to stop at stations. C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514. In Central Stock Yards Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 192 U. S. 568, an attempt to compel the cars and freight received from one State to be delivered to another at a particular place and in a particular way was held an interference with interstate commerce and the constitution of Kentucky was impotent to produce any such result. The rules of the corporation commission governing loading and unloading interstate freight, are in conflict with the Interstate Commerce Law, and must yield. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. R. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U. S. 27; Interstate Com. Com. v. D. G. H. & M. Ry. Co., 167 U. S. 633; Interstate Com. Com. y. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 186 U. S. 320; Central Stock Yards Co. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 118 Fed. Rep. 113. It was also held by the commission that the Commerce Act covers demurrage, storage, terminal charges, and the distribution of cars, in so far as interstate freight is concerned, in the following cases. Riddle et al. v. Pittsburg & L. E. R. R. Co., 1 I. C. R. 688; Riddle v. N. Y., L. E. W. R. R. Co., 1 I. C. R. 787; Heck v. R. R. Co., 1 I. C. R. 775; Cutting v. F. R. & N. Co., 1 I. C. R. 294; Rice et al. v. Western N. Y. & Penna. R. R., 3 I. C. R. 162; Independent Refiners' Association v. W. N. Y. & P. R. R. Co., 4 I. C. R. 162; Cattle Raisers' Association v. Argument for Southern Railway Company. 202 U. S. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. et al., 7 I. C. R. 513; American Warehousemen's Association v. Ill. Central R. Co., 7 I. C. R. 556, 592; Pennsylvania Millers' State Association v. P. & R. Ry. Co. et al., 8 I. C. R. 531, 553, 558; Palmer's Dock H. & P. Board of Trade v. Penn. R. R. Co., 9 I. C. R. 61. See also opinion of Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit announced February 6, 1906, in United States ex rel. Greenbriar Coal & Coke Company v. Norfolk & Western Railway Company; Fielder v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 42 S. W. Rep. 362. Railroads have the right to make reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of their traffic in their own interests and that of the public. Harp v. Choctaw, O. & G. R. R. Co., 125 Fed. Rep. 445; Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 129 Fed. Rep. 753; Stock Yards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128; Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279. No legislation can supersede the president, general managers, traffic officials and other officers of railway companies charged by the owners with the conduct of the company's business, but the power of the legislature is limited solely to the protection of the health, safety and convenience of the public, and the term "convenience" is not to be construed into the right of the legislature to usurp the management of the company. Lake Shore &c. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684. It would be intolerable if a railway company should at any moment be subjected to orders by telegram from railway commissions to take cars out of trains at any points designated by said commissions and place them upon spur or side-tracks. Such action would disarrange the entire schedules of the railway company throughout its system. It would demoralize the service and endanger the safe conduct and movement of the trains, and would supersede the authority of the officers of the company and practically usurp the management of the railway. A carrier is not obliged to receive or deliver freight at a mere switch track. The switch of the Greensboro Ice and Coal Company was not built under any order of the corporation commission or any state authority, nor was there any contract re |