tage. Now, Commodore Parker attained his results just as Sir Howard Douglass had done, and in a manner analogous to that of the Greeks of twenty three centuries before, by applying in this case, the elementary movements of field artillery to the movements of a flotilla. That the system of naval tactics of the oar and the steam period should be similar will strike no one as extraordinary who for a moment reflects that as the two methods of attack require the same technical order of battle, the systems growing out of that order must, in their most perfect form, be the same. The numerous foot notes given in the description of the ancient tactics have already defined the present system. The new line of battle is given on page 10, fig. 1. "Fleet Tactics under steam", where the several vessels are supposed to be heading in the direction of the attack.*

Having established his line of battle, the author of the work referred to judiciously ignores the nomenclature of the late system of sail tactics, substituting therefor the terms used for similar formations in the army. The old "line abreast" gives place to the "line;" the "line ahead" to "columu," and "line of bearing" or "bow and quarter line," to "echelon". (single and double.) Those three formations, then, and the movements necessary to pass from one to another constitute, in the main, the elementary tactics designed by that officer and adopted by his government. Commodore Parker makes some valuable suggestions in regard to the Commanders-in-chief, whose rôle, he justly observes, (page 219) approximates to that of the General. "He should take post, whence, without being an active participant in it, he may overlook the battle" and direct his forces.

It was the indiscreet valor of the Spartan Callicratidas and a false idea of his duty as Commander-in-chief, that cost him his life, and contributed largely to the loss of his fleet at Arginus. For his conduct on this occasion, and his answer to the advice not to attack the Athenians, that "he could not fly without shame," he was severely criticized by both Cicero and Plutarch (although the latter extols himn as of all Greeks the most worthy of admiration); for he sacrificed his fleet and the interests of his country to his own reputation for personal courage.t

* It is very evident from this order of battle that the modern ship of the line must have a full circle of fire, as at Lepanto. That every vessel of war is now fitted for ramming is assumed as a matter of course.

† Plutarch in his life of Pelopidas makes some very just observations on this subject. Contrast the reply given above with that of “Old Antigomus": The latter has the true Nelsonian ring.

Philip, (son of Demetrius,) during the great sea-fight with Attalus, already referred to, withdrew in a small vessel from the heat of battle, and took his station whence he could survey the entire scene of conflict. This enabled him to profit by the mistake of Attalus, and to capture the galley of that Prince. After the Comte de Grasse was made prisoner in his flag-ship, the Ville de Paris, in 1782, the French Government issued orders to the effect that Commanders of squadrons should do precisely what Commodore Parker here recommends. It was in consequence of this order that De Suffern, some months later, shifted his flag to the small frigate Cleopatre in one of the battles with Sir Ed. Hughes. Admiral Porter always preferred, during battle, to be on board a small and fast steamer. This enabled him to view his entire line and place himself wherever his presence might be needed. At the bombardment of Fort Fisher he carried his flag on board the Malvern, a small side-wheel steamer of 600 tons, that had been captured in running the blockade, and purchased for the

navy.

In establishing the fact of a similarity between two tactical systems widely separated by time-more interesting to the speculative mind, perhaps, than valuable to the student, there is no intention of holding up the tactics of the ancients as worthy of imitation. Though we acknowledge the Greeks to be our masters in the art of war, yet tactics change with the change of weapons; what may have been admirable in their day might prove, therefore, utterly inpracticable now. With strategy it is not so. The capture of Sphacteria (Navarino) by the Athenian fleet was a fine exhibtion of strategy. As a diversion it was completely successful, bringing the Spartan Campaign in Attica to an abrupt termination. It has justly been regarded as one of the most brilliant coups of the Pelopennesian war. When Regulus defeated the Carthaginian fleet he might have continued on, to assist in the investment of Lilybæum; but he chose rather to cross over to Africa, making a great strategic move, and one which, under an abler general, would have resulted in the speedy reduction of Carthage. When Alexander the Great crossed into Asia, had the advice of Memnon the Rhodian been followed, and the Phoenician fleet sent to the coast of Greece as a diversion, the most splendid campaign in all history might possibly have been spoiled. Any of these movements would be judged skillful to-day.

The consummate strategy of Themistocles and Alcibiades are even now commended. The principles of strategy are immutable. Agatho

23

cles, king of Syracuse, William the Conqueror, and Cortez, each in his own time landed on an enemy's shore and burned his ships behind him. And so, to-day, any great leader, having the same motive, would resort to an equally desperate measure.

In regard to the tactics of battles it is not intended to speak further than to observe that there are certain general rules here too which are unchangeable.

The parallel, the most ancient order of battle, for example, has been condemned by military writers as the weakest of all. The parallel order reënforced at one point, is, however, based on sound principles.

The oblique order, is the most approved. It gives many chances for success, and provides, as far as possible, against mishaps, says Dufour. "L'ordre oblique est l'ordre de bataille le plus usite, le plus savant, et le plus susceptible de combinaisons." (Guibert, quoted by Sir Howard Douglass). With the advanced wing reënforced it is particularly strong, and in strict accordance with that principle so much dwelt upon, that an overwhelming force should be thrown on one decisive point of the enemy so as to crush that, and beat him in detail.

The double echelon is also a very strong formation, and its application to a fleet is sanctioned by the enlightened judgment of Sir Howard Douglass. Again, very great stress is laid by military writers on the necessity, in every case, for a reserve to reënforce a weak point, or aid in crushing the decisive point. These orders of battle are all applicable to a fleet; while celerity of movement, the advantages of assuming the offensive, great range and accuracy of fire, an unobstructed circle of fire, and the presenting of the smallest target for the enemy's missiles, all apply with equal force to naval operations as well as to those on shore. Now all these points were clearly recognized by the ancients.

It would be folly, even were it practicable, to attempt to form the new line of battle either with vessels that could not ram, or that carried their guns in broad-side only. It would be equally unwise to attempt to oppose short range guns to long; or low to high speed. And, finally, we are forced to the conclusion that the true way to study naval tactics is to do so in connection with the study of Military and Naval history and of the science of war as taught at the best military schools.

In the ardor of pursuing the theme we have been led somewhat beyond the range of the volumes under consideration, and must come to an abrupt conclusion. Full of historical research as these works undoubtedly are, the author himself teaches us, perhaps unwittingly, the best and most practical lesson, in affording by his own scholarship a

brilliant illustration of the change from the "rough and tough old Commodore" to the higher culture of the modern school.

Falconer, the Sailor-poet thought that going to sea made one stupid: that at sea the intellect was "blasted in the barren shade."

64

'Sad Ocean's genius in untimely hour

Withers the bloom of every springing flower:

Here fancy droops, while sullen clouds and storm
The generous climate of the soul deform."

However it may have been in his day of long passages under sail, it certainly is not so in the steam period when more time is afforded for study and reflection. We commend the careful perusal of " Fleets of the World" to our young officers who are, in time, to mould our fleet and shape its destinies, in the hope that, at least so far as the economy and efficiency of the Navy are concerned, we may look confidently to the fulfillment of the celebrated prophecy that,

"The young America will soar to be what Athens was."

GENTLEMEN:-With the introduction of the 8 inch converted rifle, the United States Navy has taken its first decided step in the practical development of a system of rifled ordnance; and it becomes a matter not only of interest but of the greatest importance to all naval officers, that they should be able to form a rational opinion of the value and probable results of this first experiment. We are all aware that in the composition of this ship's battery there is but little that is original with Americans; and in considering its details, those who have but lightly followed up the progress of rifle development in Europe find themselves lost in a maze of inquiries. Why, for example, is the Palliser mode of conversion taken instead of the Parsons? Why do we insert a tube into a gun of a large calibre instead of rifling and hooping an 8 inch smooth-bore on the old French plan? Why do we convert guns at all? If we build them, should they be of steel like the German, steel and wrought iron like the English, steel and cast iron like the French, or cast and wrought iron like our own Parrott guns? Should we have breech or muzzle loaders; mechanical fitting, expanding or compressing projectiles; regular or increasing twist, square headed or pointed solid shot &c.?

I wish that it were in my power to satisfactorily answer all or even a great part of the perfectly rational questions that might be asked on