bone v. Warren, 10 Johns. 587; King v. | Atl. 818; Little Miami R. Co. v. Washburn, Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384, 8 Am. Dec. 415; 22 Ohio St. 324; Michigan C. R. Co. v. MinAmerican Ins. Co. v. Fisk, 1 Paige, 90; Teague v. Russell, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 420; Southampton Dock Co. v. Southampton Harbour & Pier Board, L. R. 11 Eq. 254; Weymouth v. Boyer, 1 Ves. Jr. 416; Vincent v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 49 Ill. 33; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. 19 L. R. A. 387, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 522, 54 Fed. 730; Atty. Gen. v. Mid-Kent R. Co. L. R. 3 Ch. App. 100; Missouri P. R. Co. v. United States, 189 U. S. 274, 47 L. ed. 811, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; United States v. Michigan C. R. Co. 122 Fed. 544.

The interest of appellant as consignee and the party injured by the discrimination complained of is sufficient to enable it to main| tain the bill.

eral Springs Mfg. Co. 16 Wall. 318, 21 L ed. 297; Myrick v. Michigan C. R. Co. 107 U. S. 106, 27 L. ed. 326, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Jones, 155 U. S. 333, 39 L. ed. 176, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136; Dana v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 50 How. Pr. 428; Bosworth v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 30 C. C. A. 541, 56 U. S. App. 274, 87 Fed. 72; Coe v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 3 Fed. 778; Vincent v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 49 Ill. 41; Re Petersen, 21 Fed. 889; Michigan S. & N. I. R. Co. v. Day, 20 Ill. 375, 71 Am. Dec. 278; Beers v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 34 Fed. 244; Forsythe v. Walker, 9 Pa. 148; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Odil, 96 Tenn. 61, 54 Am. St. Rep. 820, 33 S. W. 611; Johnson v. New York C. R. Co. 33 N. Y. 610, 88 Am. Dec. 416; McDonald v. Western R. Corp. 34 N. Y. 497; Hewett v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 63 Iowa, 611, 19 N. W. 790; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Burlington, C. R. No prayer for through billing is contained & N. R. Co. 34 Fed. 481; Inman v. St. Louis in the bill. The prayer is that the defend- S. W. R. Co. 14 Tex. Civ. App. 39, 37 S. ant be compelled to accept any and all stock W. 37; Dinsmore v. Louisville, C. & L. R. tendered to it for points of connection with Co. 2 Flipp. 672, 2 Fed. 465; McCoy v. Cinthe Southern Railway Company, and to de-cinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co. 13 Fed. 3; liver the same to the Southern Railway with direction as to its destination, and to recognize the right of the consignor, consignee, and owner to change the destination of shipments of live stock.

Webber v. Gage, 39 N. H. 182; Story, Eq. Pl. § 730; Interstate Stock-Yards Co. v. Indianapolis Union R. Co. 99 Fed. 472; Vincent v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 49 Ill. 33.

Missouri P. R. Co. v. Wichita Wholesale Grocery Co. 55 Kan. 525, 40 Pac. 899; Peoria & P. U. R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 109 Ill. 135, 50 Am. Rep. 605; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Williams, 95 Ky. 199, Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Becker, 32 44 Am. St. Rep. 214, 24 S. W. 1; Wisconsin, Fed. 849; Iowa v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 425, 33 Fed. 391; 5 45 L. ed. 194, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; BurlingAm. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 166; Ga-ton, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Dey, 82 Iowa, 312, lena & C. U. R. Co. v. Rae, 18 Ill. 488, 68 12 L. R. A. 436, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 584, 31 Am. Dec. 574; 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1st | Ain. St. Rep. 477, 48 N. W. 98; Michigan C. ed. p. 904; Dorsey v. Cock, 4 Bibb, 45; R. Co. v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212, 7 N. W. Tibbs v. Timberlake, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 16; Dor-791; Chicago & G. W. R. Co. v. Armstrong, sey v. Barbee, Litt. Sel. Cas. 205, 12 Am. 62 Ill. App. 228; Worcester v. Norwich & Dec. 296; Stapp v. Phelps, 7 Dana, 300; W. R. Co. 109 Mass. 112; People ex rel. Sandford v. Farmers Bank, 1 Bush, 340; Green v. Duchess & C. R. Co. 58 N. Y. 152; Mundy v. Kean, Ky. L. Rep. 697; Jones v. People ex rel. Kimball v. Boston & A. R. Strode, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1118, 41 S. W. 562. Co. 70 N. Y. 569; People v. New York, L. Appellee is required, as a common carrier, E. & A. R. Co. 104 N. Y. 58, 58 Am. Rep. to receive, transport, and deliver freight of 484, 9 N. E. 856. all kinds and cars of freight tendered by The duty of the appellee as a common carshippers and consignors at any point on its rier is not discharged until it delivers the line, and to deliver the same to the Southern freight or car of freight to the point of Railway Company at its points of connec- specified connection, and furnishes to the tion with the line of the appellee company, agent of such known specified connection the in every case where the consignor specifical-instructions of the consignor or shipper as ly orders that freight or cars of freight shall to the further carriage or delivery of the be so delivered to the said Southern Railway freight or car of freight. Company; and the appellee is required to carry, in accordance with such specific instructions, without discrimination and for reasonable charges.

4 Elliott, Railroads, §§ 1432, 1440; North v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co. 146 Mass. 315, 15 N. E. 779; Palmer v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 56 Conn. 137, 13

Bosworth v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 30 C. C. A. 541, 56 U. S. App. 274, 87 Fed. 72; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Mineral Springs Mfg. Co. 16 Wall. 318, 21 L. ed. 297; Vincent v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 49 Ill. 41; Coe v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 3 Fed. 778; Selma & M. R. Co. v. Butts, 43 Ala. 385, 94 Am. Dec. 694; Little Miami R. Co. v. Washburn,

22 Ohio St. 324; Colfax Mountain Fruit Co. | 171 U. S. 505, 43 L. ed. 259, 19 Sup. Ct.

R. Co. L. R. 6 C. P. 554; Ihoaco R. & Nav.
Co. v. Oregon Short Line & U. N. R. Co. 5
Inters. Com. Rep. 627, 6 C. C. A. 495, 15 U.
S. App. 173, 57 Fed. 673; Chicago, M. & St.
P. R. Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 9 C. C.
A. 659, 27 U. S. App. 1, 61 Fed. 993; Gibbs v.
Consolidated Gas Co. 130 U. S. 396, 32 L.
ed. 979, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553; Thomas v.
West Jersey R. Co. 101 U. S. 71, 25 L. ed.
950; United States v. Joint Traffic Asso.
171 U. S. 505, 43 L. ed. 259, 19 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 25.

Mr. Helm Bruce argued the cause, and,
with Messrs. Charles N. Burch, Ed. Baxter,
Gibson, Marshall, & Gibson, and Helm,
Bruce, & Helm, filed a brief for appellee:

A railroad company engaged in transporting live stock to a city has the right to establish a live-stock depot in that city, through the instrumentality of a stock-yards company, and to contract to deliver all live stock at that point, and cannot be required to make deliveries at any other point.

Covington Stock-Yards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128, 35 L. ed. 73, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561; Butchers' & D. Stock-Yards Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 14 C. C. A. 290, 31 | U. S. App. 252, 67 Fed. 35.

As bearing upon the question of the difference between forwarding freight by a connecting carrier, as that expression is ordinarily understood, and, on the other hand, merely turning over freight which has reached its destination, to another company, to be delivered at a particular point in a city, see

Western & A. R. Co. v. Exposition Cotton Mills, 81 Ga. 522, 2 L. R. A. 102, 7 S. E. 916; and Nanson v. Jacob, 12 Mo. App. 125, Affirmed in 93 Mo. 331, 3 Am. St. Rep. 531, 6 S. W. 246.

No carrier is bound by law to accept goods for carriage farther than the terminus of his own line, and if in any case, therefore, he is to become liable as a carrier beyond such terminus, his liability must be based upon some further obligation than that created by law.

Hutchinson, Carr. § 145.

The English rule is that, if a common carrier accepts goods marked for a destination beyond his own line, this is prima facie evidence of a contract to carry to the destination as marked.

Myrick v. Michigan C. R. Co. 107 U. S. 102, 27 L. ed. 325, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425.

A railroad company cannot be required to receive freight destined for a point beyond its own line, and load it into its cars, and then, after transporting the same over its line, be compelled to deliver its cars, with the freight in them, to another railroad company, to be transported to the ultimate place of destination, looking to the connecting carrier for the return of the cars and compensation for their use.

Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Denver & N. O. R. Co. 110 U. S. 667, 28 L. ed. 291, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185.

The Interstate Commerce Act does not require the formation of through routes, or the interchange of cars between connecting lines.

Oregon Short-Line & U. N. R. Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 9 C. C. A. 409, 15 U. S. App. 479, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 718, 61 Fed. 158; Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. 26 L. R. A. 192, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 854, 11 C. C. A. 417, 27 U. S. App. 380, 63 Fed. 775; Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 2 L. R. A. 289, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 351, 37 Fed. 567; Oregon Short Line & U. N. R. Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 249, 51 Fed. 465; Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 763, 41 Fed. 559; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Osborne, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 257, 3 C. C. A. 347, 10 U. S. App. 430, 52 Fed. 915.

Section 213 of the Constitution of Kentucky, when properly construed, does not purport to require railroad companies to deliver their own cars to other companies for use by the latter.

Certainly if it were intended to require a railroad company, against its consent, to give up its cars to another company, although it might be, and often is, in great need of them itself, such a requirement ought to be expressed in unequivocal language.

Oregon Short Line & U. N. R. Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 249, 51 Fed. 475, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 718, 9 C. C. A. 409, 15 U. S. App. 479, 61 Fed. 158; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Osborne, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 257, 3 C. C. A. 347, 10 U. S. App. 430, 52 Fed. 914; Little Rock & M. R.

Muschamp v. Lancaster & P. Junction R. Co. v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. 26 L. R. A. Co. 8 Mees. & W. 421.

The American rule is that from the mere acceptance of goods marked to a destination beyond the carrier's line the law will not imply an obligation to carry to this destination, but only to deliver to a connecting line for such purpose, so that the liability of the receiving company as common carrier ceases with such delivery.

192, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 854, 11 C. C. A. 417, 27 U. S. App. 380, 63 Fed. 779.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of appeals affirming a decree of the circuit court which dismissed the plaintiff's bill. (55 C. C. A. 63, 118 Fed. 113.)

ton v. Consumers' Gas Co. [1898] A. C. 447. For the same purpose we further assume that such rights as the plaintiff has may be enforced by bill in equity. See Interstate Stock-Yards Co. v. Indianapolis U. R. Co. 99 Fed. 472. We also lay on one side the question whether the section of the Constitution of Kentucky is or is not invalid as an attempt to regulate commerce among the states. For we are of opinion that the defendant's conduct is not within the prohibitions or requirements of either the act of Congress or the Constitution of Kentucky, as those provisions fairly should be construed.

The bill was brought by the appellant, a |461; Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville Delaware corporation, against a Kentucky & N. R. Co. 2 L. R. A. 289, 2 Inters. Com. corporation, to compel it to receive live Rep. 351, 37 Fed. 567, 610, 620. The rights stock tendered to it outside the state of Ken- under the latter which are relied upon espe[569]tucky for the Central Stock Yards *station, cially could not be established without disand to deliver the same at a point of physical cussion. Compare Atkinson v. Newcastle Wa connection between its road and the South-terworks Co. L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 441; Johnsern Railway, for ultimate delivery to or at the Central Stock Yards. The Central Stock Yards station is at the Central Stock Yards, just outside the boundary line of Louisville, Kentucky, on the Southern Railway Com pany's line, and by agreement between the two companies the Central Stock Yards are the "live-stock depot for the purpose of handling live stock to and from Louisville" on the Southern Railway. The defendant, by a similar arrangement, has made the Bourbon Stock Yards its live-stock depot for Louisville, and declines to receive live stock billed to the Central Stock Yards, or to deliver live stock destined to Louisville elsewhere than at the Bourbon yards. There are physical connections between the Louisville & Nashville and the Southern tracks at a point between the two stock yards, which is passed by the greater portion of the live stock carried by the Louisville & Nashville Company, and at another point which would be more convenient for delivery a little further to the northward. The details are unimportant, except that in order to deliver, as prayed, the defendant would be compelled either to build chutes or to hand over its cars to the Southern Railroad, after having made some contract for their return. The right is claimed by the plaintiff, under the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, chap. 104, § 3 (24 Stat. at L. 379 [U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3155]), making it unlawful for common carriers subject to the act to give unreasonable preferences, and requiring them to afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith. The right is claimed also under the Constitution of was said in Covington Stock-Yards Co. v. Kentucky, especially § 213, requiring Ken-| tucky railroad companies to receive, deliver, transfer, and transport freight from and to any point where there is a physical connection between the tracks, as we understand it, of the railroad concerned and any other. For the purposes of decision we assume, without expressing an opinion, that if the act of Congress and the Kentucky Constitution apply to the case, they both confer [570]rights upon the plaintiff. As to the former,

compare §§ 8, 9, and the act of February 19,
1903, chap. 708, § 2 (32 Stat. at L. 847,
848); Covington Stock-Yards Co. v. Keith,
139 U. S. 128, 35 L. ed. 73, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep.

The Bourbon Stock Yards are the defendant's depot. They are its depot none the less that they are so by contract, and not by virtue of a title in fee. Unless a preference of its own depot to that of another road is forbidden, the defendant is not within the act of Congress. Suppose that the Southern Railway station and the Louisville & Nashville station were side by side, and that their tracks were connected within or just outside the limits of the station grounds. It could not be said that the defendant was giving an undue or unreasonable preference to itself or subjecting its neighbor to an undue or unreasonable disadvantage if it insisted on delivering live stock which it had carried to the end of the transit at its own yard. These views are sanctioned by what was said in Covington Stock-Yards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128, 35 L. ed. 73, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 461. The fact that the plaintiff's stock yards are public does not change the case. See further Butchers' & D. Stock-Yards Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. 14 C. C. A. 290, 31 U. S. App. 252, 67 Fed. 35.

If the cattle are to be unloaded, then, as

Keith, the defendant has a right to unload
them where its appliances for unloading are.
and *cannot be required to establish another[571]
set hard by. On the other hand, if the cat-
tle are to remain in the defendants' cars it
cannot be required to hand those cars over
to another railroad without a contract, and
the courts have no authority to dictate a
contract to the defendant or to require it to
make one. Atchison, T. & 8. F. R. Co. v.
Denver & N. O. R. Co. 110 U. S. 667, 680,
28 L. ed. 291, 296, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185. The
consensus of the circuit courts is to the
same effect. Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v.
Louisville & N. R. Co. 2 L. R. A. 289, 2

Inters. Com. Rep. 351, 37 Fed. 567, 629, 630; | starting point of all that relates to cars. See
Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Com. 108 Ky. 628,
& S. R. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 763, 41 Fed. 633, 57 S. W. 508. The other sections of the
559; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Osborne, 3 Constitution need no special remark.
C. C. A. 347, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 257, 52
Fed. 915; Oregon Short Line & U. N. R. Co.
v. Northern P. R. Co. 4 inters. Com. Rep.
718, 9 C. C. A. 409, 15 U. S. App. 479, 61
Fed. 158, Affirming 4 Inters. Com. Rep.
249, 51 Fed. 465; Little Rock & M. R. Co.
v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. 26 L. R. A. 192, 4
Inters. Com. Rep. 854, 11 C. C. A. 417, 27 U.
S. App. 280, 63 Fed. 775; St. Louis Drayage
Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 5 Inters. Com.
Rep. 137, 65 Fed. 39; Allen v. Oregon R. &
Nav. Co. 98 Fed. 16. All that was decided
in Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson,
179 U. S. 287, 45 L. ed. 194, 21 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 115, was that by statute two railroad
companies might be required to make track
connections. So much of the statute as un-
dertook to regulate rates was not passed
upon. See Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v.
Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 263, 46 L. ed. 1151,
1156, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900. There is no act
of Congress that attempts to give courts the
power to require contracts to be made in a
case like this.

What we have said applies, in our opinion, to the Constitution of Kentucky with little additional argument. The requirement to deliver, transfer, and transport freight to any point where there is a physical connection between the tracks of the railroad companies, must be taken to refer to cases where the freight is destined to some further point by transportation over a connecting line. It cannot be intended to sanction the snatching of the freight from the transporting company at the moment and for the purpose of delivery. It seems to us that this would be so unreasonable an interpretation of the section that we do not find it necessary to consider whether, under any interpretation, it can be sustained. In view of the course taken by the argument we may add that we [572] do not find a requirement that the railroad

company shall deliver its own cars to an-
other road. The earlier part of § 213 pro-
vides that all railroads "shall receive, trans-
fer, deliver, and switch empty or loaded
cars, and shall move, transport, receive, load,
or unload all the freight in carloads or less
quantities, coming to or going from any
railroad,
with equal promptness
and dispatch, and without any discrimina-
tion... Promptness and the absence

of discrimination are the point, and that
shows that the words "coming to or going
from any railroad," qualify the words
"empty or loaded cars" as well as "freight,"
and therefore that the cars referred to are
cars from other roads. The same thing is
shown by the word "receive," which is the

We have discussed the case as if the two stock yards were side by side. They were not, but they both were points of delivery for cattle having Louisville as their general destination. They both were Louisville stations in effect. It may be that a case could be imagined in which carriage to another station in the same city by another road fairly might be regarded as bona fide further transportation over a connecting road and within the requirements of the Kentucky Constitution. However that may be, we are of opinion that the court below was entirely right, so far as appears, in treating this as an ordinary case of stations at substantially the same point of delivery, and, therefore, as one to be dealt with as if they were side by side. As the defendant would not be bound to deliver at the Central Stock Yards if they were by the side of its track, its obligation is no greater because of the intervention of a short piece of the track of another railroad. As we have said, the delivery would have to be made either by unloading or by the surrender of the defendants' cars.

Decree affirmed.

Mr. Justice McKenna concurs in the result.

*CHARLES L. WEDDING and Louis I.[573] Ahlering, Plffs. in Err.,

v.

ROMANZA JEROME MEYLER.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 573-585.) Error to state court-to what court directed

1.

2.

-Federal question—jurisdiction of Indi
ana courts over Ohio river-effect of Vir-
ginia compact.

A writ of error issued from the Federal Supreme Court for the purpose of reviewing the decision of a state court is properly directed to the inferior state court where the judgment of the highest state court was ordered to be entered, and where the record remained.

A decision of the Kentucky court of appeals denying any force or effect to an Indiana judgment, which is based on a denial of the jurisdiction of the Indiana court because of the place of service, presents a Federal question for review in the Supreme Court of the United States, where such denial can be justified only on the ground that the Virginia NOTE. On writs of error from United States Supreme Court to state courts-see notes to Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 37 L. ed. U. S.

267; Kipley v. Illinois, 42 L. ed. U. S. 998;
and Re Buchanan, 39 L. ed. U. S. 884.