black lists for Portugal could still be used by the Associated Governments to prevent inequality of treatment to subjects of those of the Allies whose laws prohibited trade with enemy nationals irrespective of the existence of published black lists.

The War Trade Board approved this proposal on September 26.

PROPOSED LIST FOR SWITZERLAND

The War Trade Board's representative at Paris was informed on July 3 that the Board had approved in principle the creation of an enemy trading list for Switzerland,30 provided the list should be applied in a manner consistent with the agreement of December 5, 1917.31 He was instructed to cooperate with his colleagues in preparing a list which was to be approved by the Board's representative at Berne.

The latter reported on August 8 that Allied representatives had been unable to obtain a positive decision from Switzerland agreeing to the black-listing of members of the Société Suisse de Surveillance Economique, a private institution acting primarily as consignee of goods received from the Associated Governments. He requested authority formally to inform the Swiss Government that if favorable action was not taken by September 1, the Paris committee would, with the approval of the War Trade Board, include members of the Société Suisse de Surveillance Economique in the published list. This authority was given by the Board on August 20.32

The Swiss Government took the position that the establishment of a black list would jeopardize the independence and neutrality of Switzerland by the interference of the Associated Governments, and would conflict with regulations of the Société Suisse de Surveillance Economique. It was then proposed that the Associated Governments should reply jointly to Switzerland. The War Trade Board stated on October 22 that it did not favor the presentation of a joint reply, believing that representations regarding the black list should be kept informal.33 The substances of the reply should therefore, insofar as the United States was concerned, be orally presented and it was to be kept clear that the Board based its black list upon recommendations of its own representative and was not bound by the decision of the Paris or Berne committees.

30 Document 366. 31 Document 296.

32 Document 376.

33 Document 409.

The United States was urged to participate in the presentation of a joint note to the Swiss Government and on November 11 Secretary Lansing instructed the Minister in Switzerland to participate with his British, French, and Italian colleagues. The Secretary did not desire that the United States should formally demand recognition by the Swiss Government of the statutory list of the United States, although he saw no objection to a request that the list should be recognized by the Société Suisse de Surveillance Economique, a private institution.

34 Document 422.

CHAPTER IX

GERMAN SAFE-CONDUCTS

SHIPS CARRYING SUPPLIES FOR SWITZERLAND

The Swiss Minister informed the Department of State on April 24, 1918, that Germany was willing, under certain conditions, to grant safe-conducts to the port of Cette for vessels under the enemy flag engaged in transporting cereals to Switzerland. The vessels should fly the Swiss flag on their foremast, should travel outside the blockade zone, should be unarmed, and they should not call at any port except Cette. Furthermore, they should comply with orders to be examined and should carry an accurate manifest written in German.

The Acting Secretary of State replied to the Minister on April 26 that the terms for granting safe-conducts were acceptable, provided the United States received definite assurances that all submarine commanders had instructions from Germany guaranteeing safe-conduct to these vessels before they sailed.1 He stated on May 3 that the Swiss Minister had confirmed a German announcement that the safeconduct for American ships en route to Cette for Swiss relief could not be effective for three months, since it would take this period to modify existing orders to submarine commanders.2

SWEDISH SHIPS

The War Trade Board's representative at London reported on June 8, 1918, that under an agreement between Germany and Sweden, Germany would grant safe-conducts to Swedish steamers carrying non-contraband cargoes under the agreement between Sweden and the Allies, and also to ships proceeding to oversea countries outside the war zone. Sweden had requested that permission be granted for the carrying of these safe-conducts and Great Britain had agreed.

The Board replied on June 19 that Germany appeared to be issuing safe-conducts which were "nothing more than an assurance that the giver of the safe-conduct will not accomplish that which

1 Document 346.

2 Document 351. 146

under international law he is forbidden to do ".3 The safe-conduct thus became a device to insure control of neutral shipping through a threat of illegal seizure of neutral vessels not accepting this control. Unless the Associated Governments took effective steps to meet the situation, neutral shipping generally might soon be subject to enemy control in a manner which would be "as effective as the control which we exercise by virtue of our bunker control". Although the Board was not prepared to give formal consent for Swedish vessels to carry safe-conducts, should these vessels carry them without our official knowledge and acquiescence, we see no objection to their doing so at the present time ".

66

A month later the Board stated that under Germany's safe-conduct system neutral tonnage might be divided into two categories: (1) vessels operating to some extent in the Allied interest and consequently not receiving safe-conducts; and (2) neutral vessels operated to no extent in Allied interest but primarily in the interest of the neutral and of the enemy. Neutral vessels, except those chartered to the United States, had practically all been performing some service for the Allies. Now these vessels would largely be precluded from rendering this service and the tendency would be to increase the number which would be entitled to safe-conducts. The Board believed that it would become exceedingly difficult to supply northern neutrals with goods required for the production of exports to the Allies. Also this German system would be utilized to break down the Allied system of control through consignment to an approved agency. Germany would benefit distinctly in definitely assuring itself in advance that a large amount of shipping would not assist the Allies, since that would "facilitate German naval operations and permit concentration of efforts against shipping not supplied with safe-conducts."

PROPOSAL FOR A NOTE TO NEUTRALS

The London and Paris representatives of the War Trade Board were informed on July 25 that the German safe-conduct system had been discussed at a meeting of the Board at which representatives of the British Embassy and the French High Commission were present. The Board had adopted a proposal that a joint communication to the following effect should be immediately and simultaneously sent to neutral European Governments: (1) the attempt of the German Government to control neutral shipping generally through a new device improperly termed a safe-conduct, consti

Document 358.

4 Document 372. 6 Document 373.

tuted in fact a threat of illegal condemnation or destruction unless German control was accepted; (2) this control would extend to German supervision of the personnel of passengers and crew, the character and consignment of cargo, and the movements of the vessel; (3) in certain instances, large sums of money must be placed under the control of the German Government by the neutral ship owners; (4) as this control might operate to deprive vessels of their neutral character, the Associated Governments reserved the right to deal with any vessel which had subjected itself to enemy control as the circumstances in each case might warrant.

The Board also proposed that immediate steps should be taken to inform neutral peoples "of the details of the German threats and of the control which they would impose, and to educate these peoples as to the consequences which this control would entail according to the generally accepted principles of international law ".

5

The War Trade Board's representative at London was informed on August 5 that the Board had agreed to modify the proposed communication to neutrals to meet wishes of the Allies. The third sentence was to be omitted and a final sentence to the following effect was to be added: A ship sailing under an enemy safe-conduct would become liable to detention until the conditions which the enemy government had attached to the issue of safe-conducts had been ascertained and scrutinized, in order that such action as the circumstances warranted might be taken. The Board did not favor making public the joint communication to neutrals. Announcement of this action would result in the public's exaggerating its character to a point where the Associated Governments would appear to be weak unless the announcement was followed up by "drastic action as to which we do not now wish to be committed."

The London representative reported that Great Britain considered it unwise to present this communication to neutral governments, as Germany could claim that the offer of safe-conducts mitigated the danger of sinking by submarines. Furthermore, if the communication were delivered to the neutral governments it would immediately become known to shipowners who would tend to keep their ships idle. Great Britain believed that the case of Sweden was different because Germany was reported to have made one of the conditions of granting a safe-conduct, that imports into Sweden should not be reimported to the Allies. If Sweden accepted this, it would be in violation of the agreement of May 29 with the Allies." Great Britain therefore proposed that a statement should be made jointly to Sweden and that a similar note should be sent to any other