if doubt exists, a search of the ship or cargo should be made to establish the facts." PRIZES According to the instructions, prizes should be sent for adjudication to a port within the jurisdiction of the United States, except under extraordinary circumstances. A prize master with a crew should be sent on board the prize for this purpose. If this was impracticable, a prize might be escorted into port by the capturing vessel or by another vessel of war of the United States or of an Ally. A neutral ship, except one engaged in direct unneutral service, must not be destroyed "save in case of the gravest military emergency ", and it should not be destroyed until after visit and search and until after all persons on board had been placed in safety. Great Britain inquired in August 1917, whether the United States would accede to a British-French convention of 1914 for determining jurisdiction for the adjudication of captures by their naval forces. This question was referred to the Navy Department, which stated that if enemy vessels were captured by the United States Navy it would be convenient to have in Allied ports "the necessary Admiralty Court machinery promptly to adjudicate in the matter of such prizes." Because of the absence of enemy merchant ships from the high seas and the small percentage of war vessels which might be captured and not sunk, serious complications were not anticipated. Furthermore, there was "ample authority and precedent" for captured vessels being taken into an Allied port and there held for convoy to the United States; or the vessel might be sold there and the proceeds sent to a United States court for adjudication. The Navy Department further stated that, as Japan was not a party to the convention, accession by the United States might result in different rules of procedure in the Atlantic and Pacific. Finally, accession was inadvisable as it might be a "seeming approval of certain practices and principles " against which the United States had protested in its note of October 21, 1915.10 Great Britain was informed on February 13, 1918, that "in view of the present character of the war ", the United States would defer consideration of the question of accession to the convention.11 'Document 311. 10 See p. 21. CHAPTER XI OPERATIONS OF THE NAVY THE NORTH SEA BARRAGE The representative of the United States Navy at the Inter-Allied Conference of November-December, 1917, reported a joint decision to undertake with Great Britain "the closing of the North Sea by establishing and maintaining a mine barrage." The Navy Department later explained that the purpose of this barrage was to prevent the exit of submarines from the North Sea.2 1 The British Admiralty issued a notice on April 26, 1918, that in view of Germany's unrestricted mine and submarine warfare against the Allies and against neutral shipping, "a prohibited area will be established in the North Sea on May 15, dangerous to all shipping, and should be avoided."3 The prohibited area was approximately fifty miles wide and extended from the territorial waters of Norway more than three-fourths of the distance across the North Sea toward the Orkney Islands. American and British naval forces began in June to lay mines in this area. A few months later Norway was urged to adopt measures to prevent the passage of submarines through Norwegian territorial waters. In a communication which the American Chargé was instructed on August 27, 1918, to present to the Norwegian Government, it was stated that the United States and Great Britain were laying a barrage across the portion of the North Sea lying between Scotland and Norway. When this barrage was completed it would "effectively prevent the passage of enemy submarines to and from the Atlantic Ocean by the northern route through the North Sea", provided they were not permitted illegal passage through Norwegian territorial waters. Shortly thereafter Norway decided to mine its territorial waters to prevent the passage of belligerent submarines. In September American and British forces began to lay mines in an area which was a prolongation westward almost to the Orkney Document 302. 2 Document 430. 'Document 348. 'Document 382. 125055-36-VOL. II-12 155 Islands, of the area previously announced. A decision was then taken not to announce the second area but "to secretly route all shipping so as to avoid it, with the hope that submarines might still attempt to use it after it had been mined." After the armistice with Germany the second area was announced by the British Admiralty.5 TREATMENT OF NEUTRAL SHIPPING 7 The Navy Department stated on July 5, 1918, that the mandatory routing of neutral merchant vessels had not been practiced by the United States Navy. It later stated that, shortly after the United States entered the war, convoys of merchant vessels had been permitted to assemble in American ports. These vessels proceeded from the ports under escort according to convoy rules issued by the British Admiralty and approved by the Navy Department; rules which did not appear to the Navy to conflict with principles contended for in the American note of October 21, 1915. Vessels traveling in convoy were required to follow certain routes, and some were required to put into a port of call prior to the port of ultimate destination. The Navy concurred in these requirements for the purposes of giving safe routing instructions through dangerous sea areas, providing escort, or furnishing modified orders concerning destination. To enable vessels to pursue a safe route, the Navy Department had also concurred in British Admiralty instructions requiring vessels on long voyages to stop at an outlying routing station if they had sailed from a port at which no routing officer was stationed. The Navy Department stated that it had " concurred in and indorsed" British routing instructions by allowing British routing officers to be established in American ports and by advising American vessels to obtain routing instructions from these officers. Routings were indorsed by the Navy solely to furnish vessels the safest possible course through waters made dangerous by enemy activities; they were "never indorsed for the purpose of causing vessels to be taken into port with the object of visit and search therein.” The Department of State inquired in January, 1919, whether vessels of the United States Navy had cooperated with British naval vessels in the execution of the plan of search and seizure contested in the note of October 21, 1915. The Navy Department replied that as detailed reports of the operations of the naval vessels had not been studied it was not then possible to state categorically that none had participated directly or indirectly in such search and seizure.® 'Document 428. Document 367. 'Document 431. 8 Document 431. Ten years later the statement was made that there was in the Navy Department "no record of any case of search and seizure " by vessels of the United States Navy, of the kind contested in the American note of October 21, 1915. The Navy Department also stated that although the belligerent right of visit and search of neutral ships was exercised constantly by the Navy during the war, it had no record of any neutral ships or cargoes being brought into port by vessels of the United States Navy for adjudication as prizes. CHAPTER XII FREEDOM OF THE SEAS STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT WILSON President Wilson declared in an address of January 22, 1917, that the freedom of the seas was the "sine qua non of peace, equality, and cooperation." Although a somewhat radical reconsideration of many rules of international practice might be necessary in order to make the seas free and common in practically all circumstances, he believed that the motive for such changes was " convincing and compelling." It need not be difficult, he stated, either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desired to reach an agreement on the subject. He considered the problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the cooperation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas free and safe. Finally, the President stated that he proposed "that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty." One year later, January 8, 1918, President Wilson announced his program of fourteen points. Point II provided for absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, "alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action." Point XIV provided that a "general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." The German Government notified the Government of the United States on October 6, 1918, that it accepted as a basis for peace negotiations the program laid down by President Wilson in this address, and in his subsequent pronouncements. The German Government requested the immediate conclusion of a general armistice. ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS The President sent Colonel House to Europe as his special representative to participate in armistice negotiations. House cabled 1 Document 219. "Document 307. 158 |