[The publishers have been furnished with the two fol- displacing as well as of appointing federal officers, in lowing speeches, delivered in Secret Session.] MARCH 17, 1830. EXECUTIVE POWERS OF REMOVAL. The question being upon a resolution calling on the President for the cause of removal of certain officers, opposition to arbitrary Executive discretion, and servility to Executive will; and of rendering the Senate the ve nal register of Executive edicts! For the freedom of inquiry into the exercise of Executive discretion and official trusts, in opposition to Executive irresponsibility, and screening the Executive from the light of truth by a sup. pression of free inquiry into our public affairs, as in the Mr. BARTON said, that, upon the important questions identical cases of removal now before the Senate. We of the power of the President of the United States to re-contend for the freedom and purity of elections, unawed move from office, and of the Senate to restrain him in an abusive exercise of that power, depended the question whether we are to have, in each succeeding Presidency, a four years' despotism with an irresponsible tyrant, if he be so disposed; or a Republican Government of laws, with a checked and restrained Executive. To the discussion of these questions, [said Mr. B.] involved in the calls for information of the causes of removals now pending before the Senate, I come avowedly as a gleaner after the Senator from Delaware, [Mr. CLAYTON] and if I can find any heads of wheat, worth notice, in this clean shorn field over which he has passed, I will endeavor to gather and preserve them; but if I find none, it will be no dishonor to rake and bind after such a cradler, in such a field. by official punishments, and uncorrupted by official rewards, in opposition to removals from office for such causes as those above stated. Here are the issues joined between us: and from your decision, should it be against us, and against all your own former decisions of the same questions when other men were in power, we will appeal to the people of the United States, on whose behalf we contend, and who are always honest when rightly informed of the merits of a cause. These questions are of vastly more importance to the permanency and purity of our liberties, and to the great cause of free governments of laws, as contradistinguished from arbitrary governments of Executive will, than either of the Presidential questions of themselves, that have agitated this republic since its foundation; and of more importance than any question of public policy, political econ omy, or expediency, that has divided the counsels of the nation during the lapse of half a century. These are the only questions on which I felt any desire to address the Senate. My former remarks sprang out of the occasions that produced them; but on these I feel compelled, by the verbal and written injunction of some of the great minority in Mississippi, to present their views and my own. With that minority I have had the honor to act for many It is no longer a dispute about names, such as Federalist or Republican; Ultra Federalist or Democrat; National Republican or State-veto Republican; or any other cant words or phrases, with which to deceive the public, and rally partisans around our respective standards. It is a dispute in which is involved the preservation of our republican institutions and our constitutional liberties. The issues are now fairly joined upon the great fundamental principles of the Government, without regard to party names. The majority contend that the President has the pow-years, through good and through evil report, in all the ater to remove federal officers of the class now before us, and that the Senate has no right to inquire into the cause of removal; but must presume the cause to have been lawful! and cannot restrain the President in an abusive exercise of that power, but must rely on impeaching him by the House of Representatives! tacks made upon the constitution of the Union in that State, in the shape of relief laws; judge-breaking; stoplaws; and the loan office act-that bold attempt to issue bills of credit by the authority of a State, to retrieve the fallen fortunes of adventurers and speculators, in violation of the letter and spirit of that instrument! The minority deny all these positions except the remov- In all attacks upon that best legacy of our ancestors, the ing power for cause; and claim that the settled practice of act of Union, we have stood together, sometimes in majothe Senate shall be adhered to. That the provisional ritics, and sometimes in minorities, against the powers of power of removal from office by a President, when it ex-interest and ignorance; knowing that the preservation of ists at all, is a high legal trust, to be exercised only for the its principles, checks, and restraints, chiefly distinguishes public benefit, in sound discretion, for cause relating to the our government of law and liberty from those despotic official conduct or fitness of the incumbent; and should governments of arbitrary Executive discretion that have not be perverted from its high purposes to those of parti- | so long despoiled the best rights of man over the greater san warfare, or personal vengeance, for opinion's sake, or portion of the earth. And in this most fearful of all atthe exercise of the elective franchise, or to make room tacks ever made upon the constitution-introducing a four for rewards for votes, or influence in our Presidential years' despotism, if the President be so disposed, and elections--or, in a word, to purposes of tyranny and bribe-striking at our elective franchise, the root of all our conry combined. stitutional liberties, we will stand together again, whether in a majority or minority, and invite all who love the President much, but love their country more, to join with us, and rally around the standard of the constitution, We contend for the restraining powers of the Senate of the United States, as understood by the contemporary expounders of the federal constitution, in matters of VOL. VI.--58 SENATE.] Executive Powers of Removal. MARCH 17, 1830. It is no question whether a President may remove, at Will any Senator here avow the opinion that these officers his own will and pleasure, his Secretary of State. That and their emoluments, or the provisional removing power was the very question before Congress in the great debate of the President, were designed as either the means of of 1789. Such an officer is the mere pen, in the hand of bribery, or instruments of punishment, in the hands of a the President, to write with-bound to do just such things candidate for the Presidency, or of a President in office, as are prescribed by the personal orders of the President, to buy votes, or punish the opposing votes in our Presin matters for which the President himself is responsible dential contests? Not one man will avow this. That as the head of the Executive Department; and consequent- would be grossly abusing a power conferred for the publy he must exercise his freedom of selections, or how could lic good, and corrupting the very sources of republican, he be responsible? In such case, the act of July, 1789, elective, and representative government-the great elecsettles the question, by acknowledging the lawful right in tive franchise itself. A removal of this class of public of the President to dismiss this instrument when he pleases. ficers is like a nomination for office, only provisional and Nobody would wish to force a disagreeable member of inchoate, until it becomes absolute and definitive by the the cabinet on the President. The public interest re- subsequent sanction of the Senate, to be given in our esquires harmony between them. And the Senator from tablished and long practised manner of proceeding upon Tennessee [Mr. GRUNDY] might have spared himself all Executive business. his argument to prove this; for no one had denied or dis- As in nominating to office, so also in removing or disputed it. Still Mr. Madison, in the debate of 1789, ex- placing from office, in this class of the public officers, the pressed the opinion, that a wanton removal of this officer originating act is, and for the public convenience ought to of the President, and not of the public, might subject a be, with the President; and in ordinary cases and times President to impeachment—although the law had given the act of the President receives the undisputed sanction him the absolute power to make the removal--if the mo- of the Senate. All past experience shows this to be the tive could be ascertained before human tribunals: as a mo- fact, either because the representatives or Senators of the ther would chastise her boy for breaking his rattle from a person nominated or removed know his suitableness or peevish or wicked motive, or for a bad purpose. And qualification for office, or the cause of his removal, or bewhat does this opinion assert more than the great princi- cause Presidents are not ordinarily disposed to abuse their ple of our rights, that all powers conferred upon the Ex-powers; but for the security of the public, if there be an ecutive are but trusts for the public benefit, and cannot be allegation or suggestion of the unfitness of the nominee, perverted to other ends? There might be difficulty in or of the illegality of the removal, it becomes the duty of ascertaining the motive or end of the act before human the Senate to inquire into the matter; and act accordingly, tribunals; but I see none in the abstract principle advanc-by an active exertion of their restraining power. ed by Mr. Madison. It is purely republican. One de sign of representation is to avail the public of the better lights from the scene of appointment or removal, than a President, pent up in the Metropolis, can have. I do not admit, for one, that the Senate can, by law, or otherwise, renounce the restraining power which belongs to their organization; but I admit that, in practice, the But let me examine the true nature and extent of the President should have great freedom in choosing and re- despotism now proclaimed by the majority; the arguments jecting his cabinet; and the act of 1789 cannot be consi- by which they attempt to sustain themselves in their new dered as going beyond that line. But the class of officers autocracy--contrary to all their arguments, reports, and now before the Senate, and their predecessors, attempted votes heretofore; and, if possible, the causes and practical to be removed by the President, were not under consider-consequences of this astounding proclamation. ation in the debate of 1789. This is a class of public offi-. The founders of the republic, and the people of the cers--of officers of the law--whose term, tenure, and du- United States, when they adopted the federal constitution, ties of office are fixed and prescribed by the laws of the were especially jealous of the powers of the President, land, and not by the Executive will, as in the other class. and the encroaching spirit of Executive will. To that The first class are assistants to the President, and made point all their principal fears were concentrated; and the removable at his pleasure by law. But this class of fede- history of that day shows that it was with some difficulty ral officers are public property, and not removable at the the people of the United States could be induced to adopt arbitrary will of a President. If good and faithful, the the Union, lest the President, with the powers then accordpublic is interested in their services; if bad and unfaithful, ed to him, should become the destroyer of their liberties. the public good requires their removal in the mode of proceeding required by the respective tenures of their offices, as prescribed by the known law. A dark and secret inquisition was never intended to be admitted into our institutions; nor was a refusal to tell the cause of objection and condemnation heretofore known to the genius of our republic; not even to the military, subject to orders; nor to the culprit, arraigned at the bar. We admit the legal right and duty of the President to supersede, suspend the functions, or, if you prefer the term, remove District Attorneys, Marshals, Registers and Receivers of Public Moneys, and Custom House Officers, and more especially the whole class of our money gathering agents, and such others as are made removable by him for cause relating to their official conduct, or fitness for their stations; but such removal or suspension is subject to the restraining powers of the Senate, on cause shown. The public interest and safety require that it should be so; and our institutions are conformed to the exigency. This, like other powers, is a public trust; and to pervert it from its original purpose is an abuse, and not a lawful use of the power. The cause of removal generates and gives life to the power of removal, as the overt act of treason gives application and life to the power to hang for treason. Their fears of Executive encroachment were not idle chi- MARCH 17, 1830.] Executive Powers of Removal. [SENATE. ing power and duty of the Senate during the Presidential In the discussion of "Foot's resolution" he introduced term, when, if ever, he would be disposed to violate the rights of the citizen. 66 the argument upon this topic of the removing power of the President, and restraining power of the Senate, and The power is now boldly asserted on this floor by the told us he was not, as a citizen, in favor of removals for majority, for the first time since the foundation of the re- opinion's sake, or for votes given, or to make room to republic, of removing this class of federal officers by the ward followers, by the public offices of the country; and President at discretion, without the slightest restraint by then my hopes were bright, and I drew the most favorathe Senate, and without even the right of a culprit to ask ble inferences; but-yes, then came the hope-destroying the cause of condemnation, upon a blind and servile pre- but," that in the latter branch of a sentence has spoiled sumption, on the part of the Senate, that the cause was law- so many glorious promises, in this world, held out in the ful and good! And traversing the line of their whole lives, first member of it-"but you shall not inquire whether the and their recent course under the late administration, the removals were for such causes or not!" and then my hopes majority have proclaimed over this subject an absolute in him died within me. We asked bread, and he gave us despotism and right of dark and ex parte inquisition! It a stone. We desired a fish, and he gave us a scorpion. fell upon my ear like the anathema of the minority pro. We cannot eat either of them. Let this administration nounced from the modern Vatican! It sounded like the digest both, if it can. knell of our constitutional liberties! And let not the Sena- Constitutional liberty, expelled from most governments tor from Tennessee [Mr. GRUNDY] "lay the flattering upon earth, faint with wandering the desert, and scorched unction to his soul," nor deceive himself, in the moments by the vertical rays of domestic tyranny, beheld the Senaof the intoxicating victory of the combination, by suppos- tor afar off, like the broad top of an umbrageous tree, proing the public mind can be diverted from the great and mising her shade and protection; she hastened, heated and vital principles at issue between us, by telling them the fatigued herself the more, to approach him, and repose dispute is about the miserable offices of the country, or under his shadow; but she found his roots surrounded by comparing the struggle for these great republican princi- many rods of impassable, pestilential morass of Executive ples to an attempt to agitate the ocean by throwing pcb. will, so that she could not enter the circumference of his bles into it, as he has done. We admit the people of the shade, and she looked in another direction. United States cannot be agitated-they ought not to be agitated-on account of the offices or the emoluments. In approaching the argument of the Senator from Virginia, [Mr. TAZEWELL] I will not permit myself to suppose Was it the value of the tea tax, let me ask him, that in- that the late consul to Algiers, (Mr. Lee,) against whom I duced some of the fathers of the revolution to throw the voted with reluctance, arising from an acquaintance in tea chests into the harbor of Boston, and commence the 1824, that gave me an exalted opinion of the splendor of American revolution! Or was it the principle assumed by his mind; and from the double expense of outfit, and custhe British crown and Parliament, to bind the colonies, in tomary present to the Dey of Algiers, represented to us all cases whatsoever, by an ex parte, arbitrary will, in by the Senator from Virginia, as if he would persuade us which the colonies had no voice-for the British crown to vote for him; as well as from the arguments urged by never advanced the claim to do so by a dark and secret the Senator from Tennessee, [Mr. WHITE]-I will not inquisition. The victims might be present in the capital suppose this consul is to be made the scape-goat to bear of England, and even in the House of Parliament, and away the sins of this administration; and that the majority, know all the causes of their condemnation. Britons would having established their reputation with the public by his not bear the tyrannical principle now advanced. The rejection, are now about to turn round and swallow all colonies would not bear one of a milder form. And if that huge batch of nominations lying on your table-even their posterity he not wofully degenerated from the spirit all the hireling printers and editors of party papers, whose of their ancestors, since they drew the broad distinction nominations were cautiously held back for the arrival of between the value of the trifling tea tax and the great the Virginia Senators from the late convention--as if it principle involved in it, they will exclaim with us, "take were taken for granted that modern Virginia produces a all the offices in the country during the term of your Pre- race of men, good and true, with such elastic and distendisident, but restore to us our constitutional liberties, sacri- ble Senatorial guzzles, as to swallow down Camel's rump ficed to screen a rash President and cabinet from the light of the green mountains--pinus nondum secta in suis montiof inquiry, by this portentous declaration of Executive bus--with all its pines, oaks, and hemlocks unfelled upon irresponsibility, and dark inquisition!" its sides! Old Virginia did once produce a race of men capable of distinguishing between the value of a tea tax and the great principle of regulated liberty involved in the demand-a race apt to revolt at any arbitrary or improper use of Executive power, and jealous of the encroachments of Executive will. Let me now examine the substance of the arguments by which this despotic principle is supported. And first in order is the President himself. In his first message, he labors to propagate the idea that offices, in this country, are not private property, but public trusts. We admit it. The President is right. Will he admit, in turn, our proThe Senators from Virginia and Louisiana [Messrs. positions, above laid down, and more especially that offi. TAZEWELL and LIVINGSTON] have pointed out the power of ces are not the private property of a President or cabinet, impeaching the President as our only remedy for an abuwith which to buy popularity and votes, or to reward men sive exercise of the power of removal-and the Senator for votes or influence, or as instruments with which to from Missouri [Mr. BENTON] Concurs with the former in punish opponents for their votes and opinions? His argu- placing these matters upon the high responsibility of the ment is a two-edged sword, and cuts both ways with equal President!"-meaning impeachment as a remedy, or that keenness and force; unless, indeed, it be sinful in the car- "the King can do no wrong!" and the two former also urge dinal and bishop to eat pig and lamb, in order that his auxiliary arguments, which I shall notice separately. Upon holiness the Pope may monopolize the market of Rome, this common doctrine of the majority, that impeachment and eat them all himself! The Senator from Tennessee is our only remedy, we contend they are wrong upon the [Mr. GRUNDY] has disappointed all my hopes in him upon reason and utility of the thing, as well as upon the authorithose momentous questions. I had been taught--and I ty of the case. now discover greatly mistaught--to look to him as a star Mark the gradual approaches of despotism. Under the of constitutional liberty in the West. In our need I cast last administration, all the majority, who were then in the my eyes and hopes upon him; but he vanished like a me- Senate, held to a diametrically opposite creed; and now, teor from my view, and left me standing disappointed and within a few days past, there has been a great consolidain the dark. tion of phalanx among the faultering and oscillating ranks SENATE.] Executive Powers of Removal. MARCH 17, 1830. of the majority. Men who through their lives have taught this Government, in writing of the United States, says, and practised the reverse-men who have been doubting the first term of an American President is always spent in during the session, seem suddenly to have been converted, securing his re-election to a second; and as to the restrainand confirmed in this new and monstrous faith of Execu- ing powers of the Senate, a little management in the distive irresponsibility, dark inquisition, and four years' des- position of offices can always secure a majority of that potism! Not hereditary as yet--the people are not ready body. There was too much truth in that book, whether for that. Not even for life as yet-the people are not pre- it be palatable or not. pared for that either. But a despotism for years, with no other restraint but to impeach the dominant party, in the person of their leader, whose popularity they abuse! Consul for years, with a servile Senate! Then Consul for life, with a more servile Senate! Then Emperor of France, with absolute power! It is more usual and practicable to approach it by gradual undermining, or by taking sufficient distance, and planting a style of precedent two feet high, then four, six, eight, ten, until the assailants reach and surmount the wall, enter the fortress, and carry even the citadel itself. The usual process is for a combination, under some name or other, to rally around some popular leader, usually one dazzling the multitude with military fame; set him up for their head, to answer their own purposes; seize the Government, and gradually demolish, one after another, the last landmarks of constitutional liberty; and then taunt the slaves by telling them to go exercise the right of rebellion, and rescue themselves by victory if they can. If you succeed, it will be glorious revolution--if not, your chains can be riveted no closer! No, sir, instead of a dominant party, such as the present triumphant combination, impeaching their President, the astonishing scene at this moment exhibited in this body shows the impossibility of that being the appropriate preventive against the abuse of power by the Executive." In the recess, a rash administration, surrounded and pressed All history warns us that such are the regular gradations by a mercenary host of office hunters, claiming the reward by which the liberties of mankind have been successfully of their prostituted influence and votes, contrary to the assailed and overcome. They seldom fall by one grand known original design of the President, rushed into a coup de main on the first assault. The rampart of written course of proscription and rewards, that led them into constitutions is seldom overleaped at the first effort, as Re- an inextricable dilemma. The friends of law and the mus overleaped the mimic walls of his brother Romulus outraged elective rights of the citizen demanded the at the rude foundation of Rome. cause of the removals. If the administration should come out with the true causes, like conscious innocence unveiling herself, and acknowledge they had used the offices of the country as their own private property, as means of rewards and punishments, for the exercise of the right of election, the honest yeomanry of the United States, who had no sinister views in the late election, would condemn them. If the administration should shrink from the truth, fear to tell the people that their public offices had been used as bribes to buy popularity, or weapons of war upon opponents, and make a false return to our call, we could and would expose the falsehood of the return, and the cajoled public would give a verdict against them, and damn them for the double crime. Let the administration choose either horn of the dilemma, and public condemnation will be inevitable. There is no alternative but for the The only redeeming feature in this four years' despotism majority to refuse to allow the inquiry-the high and hithof the majority, is the right of impeaching the President, erto unalienable right of inquiry into the exercise of Exto which we are pointed as a relief from our chains. That ecutive discretion and official trust, which stands in reis to say, go put the majority down if you can; for never publics in opposition to the maxim that "the King can until then could you impeach their President, if there do no wrong" in monarchies. And, with all the precept were cause. Was ever the miracle achieved of inducing and practice of their lives staring them in the face, the a majority, in the spring tide of success, to impeach them- majority has now resolved to exclude every ray of light selves, in the person of their leader, for deeds of despot- from the causes of removal. This administration cannot ism done to accommodate themselves and their friends? bear the responsibility; but, if it be distributed among some Impeachment indeed! As well might some philanthropist | twenty-five or six Senators, it may be less felt; and we travel in the South, and there proclaim, trumpet-tongued, need not be surprised if the most lucrative offices and to the slaves of America, "Rise! impeach your masters splendid appointments should be thrown at their feet by before themselves, for holding your race in slavery for two the grateful administration; as the King would reward his hundred years!" And if the children of Africa should parasite for saving the royal reputation at the hazard of doubt the practicability of inducing the masters to im- his own; or, as Alexander, whose madness had rushed him peach and condemn themselves, when made judges in into some inextricable ambuscade or dilemma, would retheir own cause, let him explain himself intelligibly--ward old Parmenio, Philip's general, for covering him "Rise, turn the tables on your masters; enslave them for from the assailants, by risking his own life, and sacrificing two hundred years in your turn, and make them raise the veteran phalanx! I appeal from the interested argucorn, cotton, and rice, indigo, tobacco, and sugar cane, ments of the dominant party, who are accused by the mifor you." nority of this violation of our constitutional rights, to the venerable and disinterested authority of the illustrious dead, who founded the Government, and set it in motion; and in due time I will appeal to the past acts of the majority as good authority against themselves, and no more. But suppose the miracle performed, of a majority, in the zenith of power, impeaching themselves in the House of Representatives, for the uses they have made of the President's popularity and military eclat. Is it quite sure we could persuade two-thirds in the Senate to condemn and punish him for cause, even if that were the preventive remedy against arbitrary will? In the concluding paragraph of the same number seventy-seven of the Federalist, upon this very subject of appointment and removal, after showing the constant reMr. Hamilton, in writing his seventy-seventh number of straining power of the Senate to be the preventive remethe Federalist, was a prophet. In treating of the suppos- dy to save the republic from harm, by the encroachment ed danger of the Senate overruling the President, and as- of Executive will, Mr. Hamilton points out "his liability suming the Government, he said, "besides this, it is evi- at all times to impeachment, trial, dismission from office, dent that the power that can originate the disposition of incapacity to serve in any other, and to the forfeiture honors and emoluments, is more likely to attract than to of life and estate, by subsequent prosecution in the be attracted by the power which can merely obstruct their common course of law. But these precautions, great as And Mr. Hamilton, like another Elijah, seems they are, are not the only ones which the plan of the to have shed his mantle upon his Elisha. A foreigner, sup-convention has provided in favor of the public security. posed to be Mr. Poletica, the late Minister from Russia to In the only instances in which the abuse of the Executive course. MARCH 17, 1830.] Executive Powers of Removal. [SENATE. authority was materially to be feared, the Chief Magis- tional in the case of a marshal, for example, all the estrate of the United States would, by that plan, be subject- tates held under the sales of the successor would be void, ed to the control of a branch of the legislative body. What and the proceedings in such cases, from the beginning, more can an enlightened and reasonable people desire?" might be opened, and the property of the country unsetSuch was the exposition upon which the people adopted tled! Suppose it be so, is not that a question for the Judithe constitution of government presented by its framers.ciary Department? Can any decision of the Senate, either Thus we see that the high power of impeachment was way, on these calls for information on these nominations, intended only for punishment and disqualification, in ex- change the legality of such titles? That matter is already traordinary cases of corruption and crime; and, in party fixed one way or the other for the past. Let us do our duty times, can never be used until after the dominant party is for the future. Would even the violation of our oaths, down, if at all. It was never intended as the common and of the constitution, secure such titles, if they be preventive remedy of restraint upon the encroachment of void? Executive will, pending the Presidential term, when, if The Senator from Louisiana, (Mr. LIVINGSTON) as a ever, the mischief will be done. So in an attorney, re- reason for excluding the light of inquiry from the deeds ceiver, collector, marshal, and the like, the mischief they of the administration, points us, in addition to the power do is not in the moment of transit from the end of one of impeachment, to the responsibility of the President to term to the beginning of another. Pending the term, as the people at the end of his term! and even says, that is well with the President as with the inferior officers of the better and more direct than the greatly divided responsiGovernment, is the mischief-doing season; and hence the bility of this more numerous body! So seem to think restraint of the Senate on the President, and of the ap- the powers that be; and hence the cabinet and President, pointing power on the officers of the class before the Se- being but a small body, shrink so modestly from this innate, during their terms. The highest and lowest may be quiry, and expect the majority to assume the responsibilisubjected to impeachment, which was intended to be the ty of screening them at their own hazard, by excluding arsenic of the State, to be administered only in extreme the light. cases, and then with a careful and skilful hand, and But let us examine this new security for the public, not as the food of the body politic, and the milk and has- which looks very much like a new edition of the homely ty pudding of the republic, to be taken as daily aliment. proverbs, of shutting the door after the horse is stolen, or In other countries the impeaching and the attaining pow-administering medicine after the patient is dead. The Preer have been employed upon minorities. Man is the sident is responsible, to the extent of his re-election, at same in America. the end of his term; but does that either prevent or cure The Senator from Virginia taught us directly the re- the harm done the republic during the term? So is the verse of this in the Panama report under Mr. Adams; whole class of officers now before the Senate responsible, he now tells us, that to inquire into, and determine to the extent of a re-appointment, to the appointing power, the cause of removal, would be prejudging the cause at the end of the term: but has that been found efficient of impeachment that may come before us! It is an un- to prevent them from embezzling our funds and ruining safe and unsound notion to consider the withholding of our affairs, so far as they lie within their circle of action, the advice and consent to a nomination as a reflection during the term; and then escaping from the continent, even upon the nominee; much less could such withhold- through the mouths of our great rivers and estuaries, ing be prejudging the President guilty of corruption and or going to Texas or Mexico, before that responsibility impeachable offence. But pray, would it be prejudging attaches? the innocence of the President, when he informs us, as he So the President, if disposed himself, or if pressed, as is bound to do, how the vacancy happened, whether by I believe he has been, and still is, by a mercenary party, removal, resignation, or death, to sanction all, and thus into a course of illegal and tyrannical proscription, must be commit ourselves? Did the Senate prejudge Mr. Monroe restrained during the term when the mischief is about to and his cabinet guilty of impeachable corruption, in re-happen: for no man can pretend that our ancestors, watchjecting the military nominations in 1822, on the ground ful of the rights of their posterity, were less jealous of the that others were lawfully in, or entitled to those offices? chief Executive, than they were of the little subordinate It is a new idea of the Senator, and has no soundness in it. agents of the public, or less jealous of the constitutional The whole effect of our proceeding is to exercise our liberties of the country, than of the paltry trash called wholesome restraining power, and determine whether money. Besides, the very point of our objection is, that there be a lawful vacancy to be filled, without touching, if the offices of the country may be thus used as property— either by consent or refusal, the higher and distinct ques- as means of purchasing support, or instruments of represstion, whether there be corrupt and impeachable motives.ing opponents, a combination of ambitious men, using the Is every court that errs in judgment of law, guilty of im- martial fame of a President-the bauble that has always peachable motives, and prejudged by the reversal of the cajoled nations out of their liberty, or had much to do in judgment? Or, does the Senator intend to assume that it, will in time buy their way into a permanent possession there was impeachable motive in the fell swoop of this of the Government; and, with the purse and the sword, administration? I shall not dispute with him upon that compel the people to submit to the great change in the point at present. No, the President, pent up in this city, principles of the Government now proclaimed on this cannot possibly know the fitness of applicants, or the cau- floor; and then run through the rapid gradations to absoses of removal, so well as the Senators from the State; lute despotism, as so many republics have done before us. and hence the wisdom of this representative plan, and We see that combination gradually raising their mounds the restraining power of the Senate in form of advice, and towards the top of our ramparts. We object to their not of condemnation. It should be exercised in candor quietly approaching, and overtopping our walls. They and charity towards the President, as the gentle and ordi- lull us by their speeches, as Titus might have told the "Behold! this is your nary medicine of the State, even by those called the op-Jews at the siege of Jerusalem. position, and not to harass and embarrass the Chief Ma- Sabbath day! It is not lawful to make resistance to our gistrate, or as arsenic to destroy him. If there be cause works on this day." The Jews kept their Sabbath, and of impeachment, it must arise, usually, in the obstinate prosecuted their internal feuds; and Titus raised his perseverance in arbitrary Executive will, after the Senate mounds, and planted his battering rams and catapults. So has approved or rejected. the Senator tells us--behold, these four years are a Sabbath; use no preventive or restraining measures; let us raise, and approach with our mounds, until the end of the Another novel doctrine of the Senator from Virginia is, that if we should determine the removal to be unconstitu |