terpret that language according to his own sense of the instru

ment.

Why was it deemed necessary to speak of its being "the language of the master to the vassal," of "this iron rule," that "Congress wills and submission is demanded?" What is this whole federal government but a mass of powers abstracted from the sovereignty of the several states, and wielded by an organized government for their common defence and general welfare, according to the grants of the constitution? These powers are necessarily supreme; the constitution, the acts of Congress, and treaties being so declared by the express words of the constitu tion. Whenever, therefore, this government acts within the powers granted to it by the constitutiou, submission and obedience are due from all; from states as well as from persons. And if this present the image of a master and a vassal, of state subjec tion and Congressional domination, it is the constitution, created or consented to by the states, that ordains these relations, nor can it be said, in the contingency supposed, that an act of Congress has repealed an act of state legislation. Undoubtedly in case of a conflict between a state constitution or state law, and the constitution of the United States or an act of Congress passed in pursuance of it, the state constitution or state law would yield. But it could not at least be formally or technically said that the state constitution or law was repealed. Its operation would be suspended or abrogated by the necessary predominance of the paramount authority.

The President seems to have regarded as objectionable that provision in the clause which declares that a branch, being once established, it should not afterwards be withdrawn or removed without the previous consent of Congress. That provision was intended to operate both upon the bank and the states. And, considering the changes and fluctuations in public sentiment in some of the states within the last few years, was the security against them to be found in that provision, unreasonable? One legislature might invite a branch, which the next might attempt, by penal or other legislation, to drive away. We have had such examples heretofore; and I cannot think that it was unwise to profit by experience. Besides, an exactly similar provision was contained in the scheme of a bank which was reported by the Secretary of the Treasury, and to which it was understood the President had given his assent. But if I understand this mes sage, that scheme could not have obtained his sanction, if Congress had passed it without any alteration whatever. It authorised, what is termed by the President, local discounts, and he does not believe the constitution confers on Congress power to estab lish a bank having that faculty. He says, indeed, "I regard the bill as asserting for Congress the right to incorporate a United States Bank, with power and right to establish offices of discount and deposite in the several states of this Union, with or without their consent; a principle to which I have always heretofore been

opposed, and which can never obtain my sanction." I pass with pleasure from this painful theme; deeply regretting that I have been constrained so long to dwell on it.

On a former occasion I stated that, in the event of an unfortunate difference of opinion between the legislaive and executive departments, the point of difference might be developed, and it would be then seen whether they could be brought to coincide in any measure corresponding with the public hopes and expectations. I regret that the President has not, in this message, favored us with a more clear and explicit exhibition of his views. It is sufficiently manifest that he is decidedly opposed to the establishment of a new bank of the United States, formed after the two old models. I think it is fairly to be inferred that the plan of the Secretary of the Treasury could not have received his sanction. He is opposed to the passage of the bill which he has returned; but whether he would give his approbation to any bank, and if any, what sort of a bank, is not absolutely clear. I think it may be collected from the message, with the aid of information derived through other sources, that the President would concur in the establishment of a bank whose operations should be limited to dealing in bills of exchange, to deposites, and to the supply of a circulation, excluding the power of discounting promissory notes. And I understand that some of our friends are now considering the practicability of arranging and passing a bill in conformity with the views of President Tyler. Whilst I regret that I can take no active part in such an experiment, and must reserve to myself the right of determining whether I can or cannot vote for such a bill after I see it in its matured form, I assure my friends that they shall find no obstacle or impediment in me. On the contrary, I say to them, go on; God speed you in any measure which will serve the country, and preserve or restore harmony and concert between the departments of government. An executive veto of a bank of the United States, after the sad experience of late years, is an event which was not anticipated by the political friends of the President; certainly not by me. But it has come upon us with tremendous weight, and amidst the greatest excitement within and without the metropolis. The question now is, What shall be done? What, under this most embarrassing and unexpected state of things, will our constituents expect of us? What is required by the duty and the dignity of Congress? I repeat that if, after a careful examination of the executive message, a bank can be devised which will afford any remedy to existing evils, and secure the Presi dent's approbation, let the project of such a bank be presented, It shall encounter no opposition, if it should receive no support, from me.

But what further shall we do? Never since I have enjoyed the honor of participating in the public councils of the nationa period now of near thirty-five years-have I met Congress: under more happy or more favorable auspices. Never have I

seen a House of Representatives animated by more patriotic dispositions-more united, more determined, more business-like.— Not even that house which declared war in 1812; nor that which in 1815-16, laid broad and deep foundations of national prosperity, in adequate provisions for a sound currency, by the establishment of a bank of the United States, for the payment of the national debt, and for the protection of American industry. This house has solved the problem of the competency of a large deliberative body to transact the public business. If happily there had existed a concurrence of opinion and cordial co-operation between the different departments of the government, and all the members of the party, we should have carried every measure contemplated at the extra session, which the people had a right to expect from our pledges, and should have been, by this time, at our respective homes. We are disappointed in one, and an important one, of that series of measures; but shall we therefore despair? Shall we abandon ourselves to unworthy feelings and sentiments? Shall we allow ourselves to be transported by rash and intemperate passions and counsels? Shall we adjourn and go home in disgust? No! No! No! A higher, nobler, and more patriotic career lies before us. Let us here, at the east end of Pennsylvania avenue, do our duty, our whole duty, and nothing short of our duty, towards our common country. We have repealed the Sub-Treasury. We have passed a bankrupt law, a beneficent measure of substantial and extensive relief. Let us now pass the bill for the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands; the revenue bill, and the bill for the benefit of the oppressed people of the district. Let us do all-let us do every thing we can for the public good. If we are finally to be disappointed in our hopes of giving to the country a bank which will once more supply it with a sound currency, still let us go home and tell our constituents that we did all that we could under actual circumstances; and that, if we did not carry every measure for their relief, it was only because to do so was impossible. If nothing can be done at this extra session to put upon a more stable and satisfactory basis the currency and exchanges of the country, let us hope that hereafter some way will be found to accomplish that most desirable object, either by an amendment of the constitution, limiting and qualifying the enormous executive power, and especially the veto, or by increased majorities in the two houses of Congress, competent to the passage of wise and salutary laws, the President's objections notwithstanding.

This seems to me to be the course now incumbent upon us to pursue; and, by conforming to it, whatever may be the result of laudable endeavors now in progress or in contemplation, in relation to a new attempt to establish a bank, we shall go home, bearing no self-reproaches for neglected or abandoned duties.

ON THE BANK VETO,

In reply to the speech of Mr. Rives, of Virginia, on the Execu tive Message containing the President's objections to the Bank Bill.

In Senate of United States, August 19, 1841.

Mr. Rives having concluded his remarks

Mr. Clay rose in rejoinder. I have no desire, said he, to prolong this unpleasant discussion, but I must say that I heard with great surprise and regret the closing remark, especially, of the honorable gentleman from Virginia, as, indeed, I did many of those which preceded it. That gentleman stands in a peculiar situation. I found him several years ago in the half-way house, where he seems afraid to remain, and from which he is yet unwilling to go. I had thought, after the thorough riddling which the roof of the house had received in the breaking up of the pet bank system, he would have fled some where else for refuge; but there he still stands, solitary and alone, shivering and pelted by the pitiless storm. The Sub-Treasury is repealed-the pet bank system is abandoned-the United States Bank Bill is vetoed --and now, when there is as complete and perfect a re-union of the purse and the sword in the hands of the Executive as ever there was under Gen. Jackson or Mr. Van Buren, the senator is for doing nothing! The senator is for going home, leaving the treasury and the country in their lawless condition! Yet no man has heretofore, more than he has, deplored and deprecated a state of things so utterly unsafe, and repugnant to all just precautions, indicated alike by sound theory and experience in free governments. And the senator talks to us about applying to the wisdom of practical men, in respect to banking, and advises further deliberation! Why, I should suppose that we are at present in the very best situation to act upon the subject. Besides the many painful years we have had for deliberation, we have been near three months almost exclusively engrossed with the very subject itself. We have heard all manner of facts, statements, and arguments in any way connected with it. We understand, it seems to me, all we ever can learn or comprehend about a national bank. And we have, at least, some conception too of what sort of one will be acceptable at the other end of the avenue. Yet now, with a vast majority of the people of the entire country crying out to us for a bank-with the people throughout the whole valley of the Mississippi rising in their majesty, and demanding it as indispensable to their well-being, and pointing to their losses, their sacrifices, and their sufferings, for the want

of such an institution-in such a state of things, we are gravely and coldly told by the honorable senator from Virginia, that we had best go home, leaving the purse and the sword in the uncontrolled possession of the President, and, above all things, never to make a party bank! Why sir, does he, with all his knowledge of the conflicting opinions which prevail here, and have prevailed, believe that we ever can make a bank but by the votes of one party who are in favor of it, in opposition to the votes of another party against it? I deprecate this expression of opinion from that gentleman the more, because, although the honorable senator professes not to know the opinions of the President, it certainly does turn out in the sequel that there is a most remarkable coincidence between those opinions and his own; and he has, on the present occasion, defended the motives and the course of the President with all the solicitude and all the fervent zeal of a member of his Privy Council. There is a rumor abroad that a cabal exists-a new sort of kitchen cabinet -whose object is the dissolution of the regular cabinet-the dissolution of the Whig party-the dispersion of Congress, without accomplishing any of the great purposes of the extra session -and a total change, in fact, in the whole face of our political affairs. I hope, and I persuade myself, that the honorable senator is not, cannot be, one of the component members of such a cabal; but I must say that there has been displayed by the honorable senator to-day a predisposition, astonishing and inexplicable, to misconceive almost all of what I have said, and a perseverance, after repeated corrections, in misunderstandingfor I will not charge him with wilfully and intentionally misrepresenting the whole spirit and character of the address which, as a man of honor, and as a senator, I felt myself bound in duty to make to this body.

The Senator begins with saying that I charge the President with "perfidy!" Did I use any such language? I appeal to every gentleman who heard me to say whether I have in a single instance gone beyond a fair and legitimate examination of the executive objections to the bill. Yet he has charged me with "arraigning" the President, with indicting him in various counts, and with imputing to him motives such as I never even intimated or dreamed, and that, when I was constantly expressing, over and over, my personal respect and regard for President Tyler, for whom I have cherished an intimate personal friendship of twenty years' standing, and while I expressly said that if that friendship should now be interrupted, it should not be my fault! Why, sir, what possible, what conceivable motive can I have to quarrel with the President, or to break up the Whig party? What earthly motive can impel me to wish for any other result than that that party shall remain in perfect harmony, undivided, and shall move undismayed, boldly, and unitedly forward to the accomplishment of the all-important public objects which it has avowed to be its aim? What imaginable interest