The effect of this Abb. Ct. of App. Dec., 480; 55 Maine, 438; 2 Gray, 541; 5 B. & Ad., 846; 3 Burrows, 1905, 1913, 1914; 107 Mass., 494. 1980, and 1981. The Court refused to permit the defendants to prove by witnesses who were experts, experienced in the business of fire insurance, and accustomed by their profession to estimating and calculating the hazard and exposures to fire from one building to another, and to fixing rates of insurance, that owing to the distance between the elevator and the mill, and the distance between the elevator and the lumber piles, the elevator would not be considered as an exposure to the mill or lumber, and would not be considered in fixing a rate thereon, or in measuring the hazard of mill or lumber. The Court refused to instruct the jury as requested, that, "if they believed the sparks from the Jennie Brown set fire to the elevator through the negligence of the defendants, and the distance of the elevator from the nearest lumber pile was three hundred and eighty-eight feet, and from the mill five hundred and twenty-eight feet, then the proximate cause of the burning of the mill and lumber was the burning of the elevator, and the injury was too remote from the negligence to afford a ground for a recovery," and in lieu thereof submitted to the jury to find whether the burning of the mill and lumber was the result naturally and reasonably to be expected from the burning of the elevator; whether it was a result which, under the circumstances, would naturally follow from the burning of the elevator; and whether it was the result of the continued effect of the sparks from the steamboat, without the aid of other causes not reasonably to be expected! Held, no error; the true rule is that what is the proximate cause of Held, no error; the subject of pro- an injury is ordinarily a question for posed inquiry was a matter of com- the jury. It is not a question of mon observation, upon which the lay science or legal knowledge. It is to or uneducated mind is capable of be determined as a fact, in view of forming a judgment. In regard to the circumstances of fact attending such matters experts are not permit- it. The primary cause may be the ted to state their conclusions. In ques-proximate cause of a disaster, though tions of science their opinions are it may operate through successive received, for in such questions scien- instruments. 2 Blacks. Rep., 892. tific men have superior knowledge The question always is, was there an and generally think alike. Not so in unbroken connection between the matters of common knowledge. 2 wrongful act and the injury, a con tinuous operation? Ryan v. The N. Y. C. RR., 35 N. CERTIORARI TO FIRE COM- N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL TERM. FIRST DEPT. The People ex rel. George Lake, v. The Board of Fire Commissioners of the City of New York. Did the facts and independent agencies, and this constitute a continuous succession of must be determined in view of the events, so linked together as to make circumstances existing at the time. a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause intervening between the wrong and the injury? It is admitted that the rule is difficult of application. But it is generally held that, in order to warrant a finding that negligence or an act not amounting to wanton wrong is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances. We do not say that even the natural and probable consequences of a wrongful act or omission are in all cases to be chargeable v. to the misfeasance or. nonfeasance. They are not when there is a sufficient and independent cause operating between the wrong and the injury. In such a case the resort of the sufferer must be to the originator of the intermediate cause. But where there is no intermediate sufficient cause the original wrong must be considered as reaching to the effect, and proximate to it. The inquiry must, therefore, always be whether there was any intermediate cause disconnected from the primary fault, and self-operating, which produced the injury. In the nature of things there is in every transaction a succession of events, more or less dependent upon those preceding, and it is the province of the jury to look at this succession of events or facts, and ascertain whether they are naturally and probably connected with each other by a continuous sequence, or are dissevered by new The People ex rel. David Closey v. The People ex rel. Sidney Conklin Decided October 9, 1877. Where a party relies upon mere irregularities in the proceedings, he cannot for the first time raise such objections in a court of re view. They are waived if not raised below. Delay of a year and four months after determination of proceedings is not such laches as will positively deprive an injured party of his right to a writ of certiorari to review them. Writs of certiorari to review proceedings by which the relators were Department of the City of New York. respectively dismissed from the Fire The relators were all charged with a violation of the following regulation adopted by the Fire Department. IN BOARD FIRE COMMISSIONERS, NEW YORK, October 1st, 1874. "Resolved: That on and after this date any member of the department assigning his salary, or incurring liabilities which he refuses or neglects to honorably discharge, will be considered as violating the rules The relator, Lake, is charged with incurring liabilities which he refused to pay. Notice was served upon him, and he appeared in response. The proceedings against Lake were instituted in December, 1874, and determined on the 10th of that month. The writ of certiorari in his behalf was allowed on the 4th of April, 1876. Closey and Conklin were charged with assigning their salary. The counsel for relator, Lake, on the argument on the return of the writ, raised the objection that the regulation had not been published as required to make it binding upon members, and that the offence had been committed previous to the regulation going into effect. Douglass A. Lener, for relators. Held, That the foregoing objections should be made before the tribunal investigating the charges, in these as in other legal proceedings. Proof of such facts would probably have been made, if the objections had been there raised. No such objections having been made below, the law regards them as waived, and the parties practically as admitting that there was no basis in fact upon which they could have been maintained. The relator, Lake, pleaded guilty of incurring the liability, but not of refusing to pay. The refusal to pay was not proven. This involved the board in a jurisdictional defect of authority. For without some proof of that portion of the charge, the relator could not be found guilty and dismissed. The charge against Closey was proved, and he was properly dismissed. The relator Conklin was notified of a similar charge, and although he did not appear the charge against him was fully made out and his dismissal proper. In the case of Lake there was no such laches as deprived him of the writ. The simple circumstance that the place made vacant by his dismissal may have been supplied by another ought not to deprive him of redress when the return has clearly shown him entitled to it. In the cases of Closey and Conklin, proceedings affirmed. In case of Lake, proceeding reversed, but without costs. Opinion by Daniels, J.; Davis, P. J., concurs in result. Brady, J., concurs. LARCENCY. N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL Lorenzo Macino and Veraldi Mi chaeli, plffs. in error, v. The People, defts. in error. Decided October 9, 1877. Where a person procures another to voluntarily give him possession of goods, with the intention by such person so receiving them to steal them, that constitutes the crime of larcency. Writ of error to Court of General Sessions of the County of New York, on conviction of the crime of grand larcency. The prisoners were convicted of larcency for stealing American and French gold coin owned by the com- construction. The answer of the witplaining witness. It was argued and claimed by the counsel for plaintiffs in error, that if any offense had been committed it was that of obtaining goods under false pretences and not that of lar ceny. The case as one of larceny, however, was submitted to the jury by the Court, to which exception was duly taken. The following facts appeared from the evidence in behalf of the People. The complaining witness, who is an Italian, met the two prisoners, also Italians, in the city of New York when about to engage his passage to Italy. One of the prisoners professed to be a priest, and both represented that they were going to Italy and could secure the passage at a lower rate. The priest was represented as being very rich, and the other prisoner said to the complaining witness, "If you have some money you may give it to him because he is very rich." The witness then gave them the money. They then gave him two twenty-five cent pieces with which he was sent for cigars, and when he returned the prisoners had disappeared. When asked on the trial why he gave the money to the priest, witness said, "Because it was surer in his possession." W. F. Howe, for plff. in error. Horace Russell, for deft. in error. Held, That if the complaining wit ness intended when he handed over the money to part with the title to it as well as the possession of it, then a case of larceny was not presented by the evidence. But the testimony presented is susceptible of a different Vol. 5-No. 10 ness that he gave him the money because it was surer in his possession, indicates the existence of a purpose only to make a delivery of its custody; he evidently did not intend to give the money, but, as the jury regarded it, he simply placed it in the hands of the supposed priest to be carried for the owner to Italy. The Court would not have been warranted in taking the case from the jury. It is their province to decide upon conflicting conclusions. The fact that the owner may voluntarily deliver over the custody of his property, does not protect the person procuring it from the legal charge of larceny, where it is received by him with the felonious intention of stealing it. The rule on that subject has been held to be, that if under all the circumstances of the case it be found that a party has taken goods from the owner, though by his delivery, with an intent to steal them, such taking amounts to felony. 62 N. Y., 623. The case was not improperly disposed of, and the conviction should be affirmed. Opinion by Daniels, J.; Davis, P. J. and Brady, J., concur. SURETIES. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL TERM. FIRST DEPT. John Martin and another, applts., v. James W. Walker, and Fanny, his wife, respts. Decided October 9th, 1877. Objection to non-joinder of party as defendant can only be taken by demurrer. fee. Sureties having paid the debt of the principal by Morrow, together with counsel are subrogated to all the rights of the principal, and have the right which their principal had as creditors to set aside a deed made creditors. After such payment by plaintiff by debtor to hinder, delay, and defraud they recovered a judgment against Walker by reason of the payment so made, and issued execution, which was returned unsatisfied. Appeal from a judgment rendered at Special Term, dismissing the complaint, with costs. This action was brought in 1874, to set aside a conveyance of certain real estate made by James W. Walker to one Williamson, without consideration, which real estate was immediately after the conveyance to Williamson conveyed by him to the defendant, Fanny Walker. These conveyances were made on the 4th of of May, 1867, and were claimed to be fraudulent as against the plaintiffs. When the conveyances aforesaid were made an action against the defendant, James W. Walker, for assault and battery was pending. Morrow, the plaintiff in the action for assault, recovered judgment May 24, 1867. Execution was issued on such judgment which was returned unsatisfied, and proceedings supplementary to execution were instituted. For disobedience to an order in the supplementary proceedings, Walker, the judgment debtor, was fined, for contempt of Court, the amount of the judgments recovered by Morrow, and $250 counsel fee in addition. Walker took an appeal from the order punishing him for contempt, and in order to obtain a stay of proceedings procured the plaintiffs to go upon his bond as sureties for the payment of the amount required by the order to be paid. The order appealed from was affirmed, and the plaintiffs were obliged to pay the amount of the fine, which included the judgment recovered Plaintiffs now seek to set aside the deed by defendant conveying the real estate through Williamson to his wife, the defendant, Fanny Walker. The evidence on the trial showed that the conveyances made of the real estate from Walker to Williamson and from Williamson to Mrs. Walker were made for the purpose of enabling Walker to escape payment of such amount as might be recovered against Walker in the Morrow suit pending against him for assault. The objection was taken on the trial that Williamson should have been made a party defendant, and furthermore that Reynolds was not a party plaintiff, as it was alleged that he had assigned his claim to the plaintiff Martin. C. Bambridge Smith, for applts. Held, That the evidence showed that Reynolds, the co-surety, had sufficient interest to maintain the action with Martin, as he had not been fully compensated for the sum paid by him by reason of his obligation on the bond. That strictly Williamson should have been made a party defendant, but that objection could only be taken by demurrer, and the objection had been waived by failure to demur. That although no judgment was obtained by Morrow in the suit for assault and battery at the time of the conveyance by Walker, still the re |