programme of action. The sentiment against war has too often been dissipated in rhapsodic visions of Utopia.

Perhaps now at last, at "the end of the ages," we are really ready for the great undertaking, not as a matter of political and moral idealism, but of social efficiency and practical statesmanship. Perhaps, now, at length, after centuries of high hopes and vague dreams, we are slept-out and willing to wake-up and wrestle with the problem. What is wanted is a mutual agreement, a general treaty creating a league of the civilised nations of the world and pledging them, not to disarm sine die, but to employ their united strength to compel any recalcitrant nation-member to submit its dispute to an international court of arbitration or council of conciliation for a hearing before precipitating overt hostilities.

To accomplish this purpose, numerous plans and programmes have been devised. Among them all the most practical appears to be that put forth by the League to Enforce Peace. And what is the League to Enforce Peace and what does it propose? On June 17, 1915, on the call of one hundred and twenty of the most influential and repre

sentative men from all sections of the country about four hundred met in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, and organised a League whose reason-for-existence should be to adopt a programme of action to follow the present war which would look towards the possible prevention of future wars. The announcement which introduces the Proposals advocated says, "We believe it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following." Four proposals were adopted at the organisation meeting, as follows:

First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judg ment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

Second: All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the

signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.1

Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article One.

Briefly, it is proposed that a league of nations, including the United States, should be created at the end of the present war. Such a league would not constitute an "entangling alliance," wherein one group of nations combine to protect one another against an opposing group similarly united. An invitation to join the league would be extended to all civilised and progressive nations. A general treaty would be signed by the terms of which the member-nations would mutually agree to submit

1 The following interpretation of Article 3 has been authorised by the Executive Committee:

"The signatory powers shall jointly employ diplomatic and economic pressure against any one of their number that threatens war against a fellow signatory without having first submitted its dispute for international inquiry, conciliation, arbitration or judicial hearing, and awaited a conclusion, or without having in good faith offered so to submit it. They shall follow this forthwith by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be dealt with as provided in the foregoing."

for public hearing any and all disputes whatever which might arise among them.

To carry out the programme it would become necessary to set up two international tribunals: A Judicial Court for the purpose of hearing and deciding those questions that can be determined by the established and accepted rules of international law; and a Council of Conciliation for the purpose of composing, by compromise, all other questions which come up that, unless settled, would be likely to lead to war. The Court, after preliminary inquiry, would determine before which tribunal a given case would go.

In the event of any member-nation threatening war against any other member-nation, before first submitting its quarrel for public review and report, all the other nations who are members of the League would immediately join in bringing to bear both diplomatic and economic pressure to estop the would-be aggressor. If, after this joint protest, it persisted with overt acts of hostility and actually commenced war, then the other member-nations, with their combined military and naval forces, would come to the defence of the one attacked, or perhaps, more strictly speaking, would discipline the aggressor. This might require that each nation

would have to pledge itself to provide and maintain its fair quota of the necessary military forces; but, on the other hand, it is confidently expected that the acceptance and operation of the programme would result in the gradual reduction of armaments, if indeed a specific agreement to reduce armaments were not made one of the essential terms treaty creating the league of nations.

The forces of the League would be used for one purpose only: to compel submission of matters in dispute to a Court of Inquiry before any war was begun or persisted in by any member; they would not be employed to execute the judgments of the court or to enforce the unwilling acceptance of awards. The appeal to arms would still remain available to the several nations as a last resort. is believed that the prolonged postponement, plus the public discussion, plus the justice of the award, would all tend to ensure its acceptance in the majority of cases.

It

The programme begins with a proposal which is substantially the same as the essential provision in the Bryan arbitration treaties contracted between the United States and some thirty nations, viz., to submit all questions for a public hearing and to delay hostilities for a year or more. The pro