VI, pp. 346-354; Andrews, United States in Our Own Time, pp. 48-56.

4. Immigration and Chinese Exclusion: Wilson, Division and Reunion, pp. 298–300; Sparks, National Development, pp. 32–34; Coman, Industrial History of the United States, pp. 368–374; Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, Chap. VIII.

5. The French at Panama: Sparks, Chap. XIII; J. B. Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, pp. 137-158; Andrews, pp. 399-404; Dewey, National Problems, pp. 117–123.

6. The Fur Seal Dispute: Dewey, pp. 208-214; Dunning, British Empire and United States, pp. 285-291; Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, Chap. I.

7. The Venezuelan Boundary Dispute: Dewey, pp. 304–313; Dunning, Chap. VII; Henderson, pp. 411-446; Foster, Century of American Diplomacy, pp. 467-474.

8. The Cuban Question: A. B. Hart, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, Chap. IV; J. H. Latané, Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America, Chap. III; J. M. Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, Chaps. XII-XIV; F. E. Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain: Diplomacy, Chaps. XVI-XXIII.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE WAR WITH SPAIN

AFTER the passage of the Dingley Tariff the McKinley administration was occupied largely with foreign affairs.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

With the The McKin

Cuban ques- ley administion rapidly tration approaching a crisis John Sherman, the veteran senator from Ohio, was appointed secretary of state, not because of any fitness for the position, but in order to make a place in the Senate for Mark Hanna, McKinley's campaign manager. General Woodford was sent to Madrid to succeed Hannis Taylor and the administration began immediately to apply itself to a settlement of the Cuban question. The good offices of the United States were again tendered and Spain was

reminded of the resolution passed by Congress the year before and warned that Congress was soon to convene again. As a result of this pressure the Spanish ministry

resigned and on October 14 the liberal ministry of Sagasta assumed office. Weyler was recalled and General Blanco appointed governor and captain-general of Cuba. The new ministry promised to grant autonomy to Cuba, and President McKinley declared in his message of December 6, 1897, his intention of allowing time for the new policy to be tested. The promise of autonomy came too late; the Cubans would no longer be satisfied with anything short of independence. On January 13, 1898, there was serious rioting in Havana as a demonstration against the autonomy scheme and ConsulGeneral Fitzhugh Lee told his government that he doubted whether Blanco could control the situation and that it might be necessary to send warships for the protection of Americans. As a result of this suggestion the United States battleship Maine was sent to Havana toward the last of January and while she was lying quietly at anchor attention was diverted to Washington by an incident which led to the retirement of the Spanish minister, Dupuy de Lôme. On February 9 the New York Journal published in facsimile a letter from the minister to a friend in Cuba which severely criticized President McKinley and contained reflections on his character. The letter was genuine, though surreptitiously acquired, and there was no satisfactory explanation which de Lôme could offer. On being notified that the immediate recall of the minister was expected, the Spanish government replied that his resignation had been tendered and accepted by cable.

The blowing up of the Maine

Before the excitement over this incident had subsided, the battleship Maine was suddenly blown up at her anchorage in Havana harbor on the night of February 15 and two of her officers and 258 of her crew were killed. An American naval court of inquiry reported after a careful examination of witnesses and of the wreck that the destruction of the ship was due to a submarine mine. A Spanish board of inquiry claimed in a brief report made a few days later that

the explosion had occurred in the forward magazine of the ship. It is generally admitted that the American report was correct, but the responsibility for the mine has never been disclosed.

Notwithstanding the demands of the "yellow" press, the American people displayed great self-control until the report of the court of inquiry was made public. End of Then all restraint was thrown aside and the diplomatic country witnessed an outburst of warlike fervor negotiations such as had not been seen since 1861. "Remember the Maine" became a watchword and the demand for war was overwhelming. President McKinley decided, however, before resorting to war to make one more effort at a diplomatic settlement. He proposed an armistice between Spain and the insurgents pending negotiations for a permanent adjustment through the good offices of the United States. The Spanish government refused to grant an immediate armistice, but made vague suggestions about leaving the pacification of the island to a Cuban parliament.

President McKinley regarded negotiations with Spain as closed, and announced that he had decided to refer the whole question to Congress. His message was delayed a few days at the urgent request of Consul-General Lee in order to give time for Americans to get out of Cuba, and on Sunday, April 10, he was informed by the Spanish minister that at the solicitation of the Pope the queen had decided to declare an armistice and to call a Cuban parliament. The promised concessions were ambiguously expressed and seemed too much like another play for time. The president decided, therefore, not to withhold the matter from Congress any longer.

In his message of April 11 the president reviewed the Cuban question at length and came to the conclusion that forcible intervention was the only solution, and was justified not only on grounds of humanity, but as a measure for the

protection of the lives and property of American citizens, and for the purpose of putting a stop to a conflict which was a constant menace to our peace. He referred to the Maine only incidentally as "a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable."

Congress demands the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba

There was little doubt that a reference of the question to Congress meant war. The House acted with unusual promptness, but the Senate differed from the House in wanting to recognize the Cuban republic as then organized. The House prevailed and on April 19, the anniversary of the battle of Lexington, and of the first bloodshed of the Civil War on the streets of Baltimore, the fateful resolutions were adopted, declaring that the people of Cuba ought to be free and independent, demanding the immediate withdrawal of Spain from the island, and authorizing the president to use the land and naval forces of the United States and the militia of the several States for the purpose of carrying these resolutions into effect.

Another resolution disclaimed any intention to exercise sovereignty or control over Cuba except for its pacification, and asserted that the United States would then leave the government and control of the island to its people. These resolutions were, of course, equivalent to a declaration of war, and as soon as they were approved by the president the Spanish minister asked for his passports.

The block

As soon as the Spanish minister withdrew from Washington, Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, commander of the North Atlantic squadron, then at Key West, was ade of Cuba ordered to blockade the northern coast of Cuba, while Commodore Winfield Scott Schley was stationed with a "flying squadron" at Hampton Roads in readiness to protect the American coast in case the Spanish fleet aimed a blow in that direction, or to join Sampson in case it appeared in the West Indies.