I admit total ignorance of

tween dog and dog is new to me. the code duello among dogs, or what constitutes a resort to arms, or rather to teeth, for redress. Whether jealousy is a just cause of war, or what different degrees and kinds of insult or slight, or what violation of the rules of etiquette, entitle the injured or offended beast to insist upon prompt and appropriate satisfaction, I know not; but I am glad to know that it is not claimed upon either side that this struggle was not dog-like and fair. Indeed, I was not before aware that it was alleged that any law, human or divine, moral or ceremonial, common or statute, undertook to control these matters, but supposed that this was one of the few privileges which this class of animals still retained in the domesticated state; that it was one of their reserved rights, not surrendered when they became a part of the domestic institution, to settle and avenge in their own way all individual wrongs and insults, without regard to what Blackstone or any other jurist might write. Moreover, the defence is not rested upon the principle of self-defence, which would have raised a novel question as to the liability of the offending dog for excess of force, and whether he would be held strictly to proof of the necessity and reasonableness of the force exerted, under a plea that in defence of his carcass, or of the premises committed to his watch and care,' he did necessarily a little bite, scratch, wound, tear, devour, and kill the plaintiff's dog, doing no unnecessary damage to the body or hide of the said dog.""

After thus explaining that the liability for the results of a dogfight does not in any manner depend on the question which dog was in fault in the particular contest, this being a matter which the law does not aspire to ascertain, he proceeds to explain the real principle involved, thus: "There is no evidence that this dog was a dangerous animal, or one unfit to be kept. The cases in which dogs have attacked human beings, although trespassers, and the owners have been held liable, are not applicable. It is one thing for a dog to be dangerous to human life, and quite

another to be unwilling to have strange dogs on the master's premises. To drive these off is a virtue. Owners of valuable dogs should take care of them proportioned to their value, and keep them within their own precincts or under their own eye. If owners of dogs, whether valuable or not, suffer them to visit others of their species, particularly if they go uninvited, they must be content to have them put up with dog-fare, and that their reception and treatment shall be hospitable or inhospitable according to the nature or the particular mood and temper at the time of the dog visited. The courtesies and hospitalities of doglife cannot well be regulated by the judicial tribunals of the land. I can see no just grounds for this judgment."

In one instance a monkey was arrested on a charge of assault and battery. The newspapers of the day narrate the case thus:

On the arraignment of the prisoners in the Tombs Police Court, a monkey was led by his Italian owner to the bar. He climbed nimbly to the railing which separates prisoners from the magistrate, and, chattering volubly, doffed his cap and bowed to the justice with profound gravity. "What is this?" the justice asked." A prisoner," answered a policeman. "His name is Jimmy. I arrested him for assaulting Mary Shea."-"A monkey arrested for assault !" exclaimed the justice. "Where is the complainant?" Mary Shea stepped forward. She unwrapped and exhibited a sadly lacerated finger, and explained that she kindly offered Jimmy a piece of candy, but he grabbed her finger and bit it. "What did the man do to you?" asked the magistrate. "Nothing, your Honor!" said Mary; "but, sure, he owns the murthering baste!" The Italian owner protested that he was not even present at the casualty; but that the monkey was wildly fond of candy, and, in his frantic eagerness to bite the piece offered him, had unintentionally bitten the finger instead. "If Mr. Darwin were prosecutor in this case," remarked the judge, "he might, perhaps, convince me that the statutes authorize imprisoning monkey criminals; but, sitting alone, I do not think

I can lawfully commit Jimmy."-" And is there no law for monkeys?" expostulated Mrs. Shea.-"None whatever, ma'am," answered the justice; "what do you think ought to be done to him?"-"Why, sure, I think he ought to be locked up.""But we cannot imprison a monkey. Your only remedy is to bring a civil suit against the owner for damages.”—“ And is there no justice to be had against the miserable brute ?”—“ There is no law which makes a monkey criminally punishable for biting. The monkey is discharged," concluded the justice; and all departed, Mrs. Shea murmuring, "This is a nice country for justice!"

The dog-law of Michigan declared that "any person" might kill a dog found running at large without a collar marked as the law required. A small dog strayed away from home without his collar, and a large dog whom he met flew at him and killed him. There was a lawsuit, for the small dog was a valuable pet, and the lawyers for the big dog's owner cited the law, and argued that their dog had the right to kill the other because the latter was at large without a collar. But the court said it would be preposterous to consider their dog in the light of a person exercising a statutory authority.*

It was quite consistent with the general view of regarding animals as merely things that the early English law, upon which ours is founded, allowed very little support to efforts for protection of animals. To injure an animal which belonged to another man could, indeed, be prosecuted as a breach of the owner's right of property. And abusing an animal in public view was punishable; such conduct was a nuisance; for it was either shocking or demoralizing to those who witnessed it. But beyond these rules there was no clear rule for the punishment of cruelty. A man might torture an animal belonging to himself, within his own private premises, and go free of punishment.

* Heisrodt v. Hackett, 34 Mich. 283.

RECENT LEGISLATION.

Hence the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals has, from the commencement of its labors, found a necessity to plead for a reform in the law itself. Under the executive leadership of Mr. Henry Bergh and the professional counsels of Mr. Elbridge T. Gerry, it has accomplished not only a routine enforcement of existing laws, as indicated by the reports of arrest and trial of car-drivers, stable-proprietors, pigeon-match makers, and others, but also important measures of new legislation. Its efforts have developed and crystallized in laws and decisions what was doubtless a growing thought in the community-the view that sentient life should receive protection for its own sake; that cruelty deserves punishment as intrinsically wicked. A series of enactments has been secured in New York, culminating in a general provision by which any person who is wilfully concerned in any act or neglect causing unjustifiable suffering or death to any animal, or, as the law explains that word, living creature, is punishable. And special provisions of law cover specifically the more ordinary and salient forms of abuse-fights between animals; swill-feeding of cows; transporting or impounding live-stock without prescribed food and rest, or in an inhuman manner; abandoning useless animals to die uncared for; overdriving or overloading beasts of burden; ruining horses' feet by salting the streets after snow-storms, and similar acts.

Nearly all the States have followed the example-have enacted like laws and organized similar associations. And efforts of the same character have been made in foreign lands. There were, not long ago, two hundred and twenty-nine of these societies, working in co-operation, guided by common principles and laboring upon homogeneous methods, for the repression of cruelty throughout the civilized world.

CHAPTER XXIV.

LOTTERIES.

THOSE persons who doubt whether the principles of Christian morality are really making progress, who fear that mankind, amidst the apparent growth of civilization, is growing worse instead of better, may find some comfort in the modern suppression of lotteries.

HISTORY OF THE PROHIBITION.

To discern the evil of lotteries and act upon the knowledge is one of the advances of modern times. They date from 1530 in Europe; and the general decision in England and America to prohibit them entirely was reached about 1830: it took society three centuries of experience to learn that they were utterly bad. A century or so ago, there are said to have been in England four hundred lottery-offices, and the business was approved and popular. A heavy tax, soon afterwards laid upon them, diminished the number to about forty. For half a century they continued to be used, under authority of law, as a legitimate mode of raising funds for public objects. A considerable contribution to the early endowment of the British Museum, and another in aid of the Virginia colony, were raised in England by government lotteries. But adverse laws put them, early in the present century, completely under ban. They were extensively used, and with legislative and popular approval, in our States for a long time. Through the first half-century of New York's existence as a State, to run a lottery was treated as a sort of franchise, like banking, which, to be sure, must not be free to everybody, lest it might be abused, but should be granted by the State as a sound