66 the suit would not lie. The dummy had as good a right to run as the horses. If the dummy frightened the horses, that was the carriage-owner's lookout. If the carriage frightened the dummy, that was the company's loss.-Nearly the same thing happened in Nebraska in the scarecrow case. A man sued because, as he said, he drove in his buggy to the railroad depot, and there the company had arranged a scarecrow" near the wagon-road crossing, by placing its cars in such a manner as to present "a horrid and frightful appearance," one of them bottom side up, and another half loaded with sprawling timbers, which frightened his horse, and he himself was thrown out of the buggy and badly hurt. But the court held that the company was not to pay damages because the horse was frightened at the aspect of the cars, but only if the cars were placed or managed in some wrong or improper way.* What about blowing whistles? In some places a railroad company is required by law to sound a whistle at a crossing. If they do so, and a horse is frightened, must the company pay damages? No. In Connecticut a countryman drove up to the door of a country store, tied his horse to a post, and went in to trade. Near by was a factory, and when twelve o'clock came the engineer sounded the steam-whistle to send the operatives home to dinner. It was a loud, sharp whistle, and frightened the horse. He had a bad habit of pulling at his halter; and when he heard this whistle, he pulled so hard that the halter broke; and from the breaking of the halter his neck was broken. Lawsuit for damages. The court said, No. The factory had a right to blow a whistle, and the horse ought not to have pulled his own head off on that account.f The foregoing are a few only of the cases of this description which have occurred. They are enough to show that whoever * Atchison, &c., R. R. Co. v. Loree, 4 Neb. 446. is using a highway for lawful travel, and in a prudent manner, is not responsible for mischief done by another's horse becoming frightened. Quite different are the decisions where a street is used for some other purpose than travel, or where there is negligence. Such was the case of the dancing bears of Madison, Wis. Their proprietor applied at the mayor's office for a permit to exhibit his pets. It was granted, and he led them out upon a chief street to dance for the amusement of the populace. Instead of amusing a spirited horse which was driven through the street, the performance frightened him into a run, the carriage was upset, and the occupants thrown out and badly hurt. Action against the city for damages brought a verdict for the plaintiffs. The court said that dancing bears upon a city sidewalk were an obstruction to the highway, for allowing which the authorities must pay.—In a certain case in Maine the element of negligence was curiously presented. A father permitted his daughter, a young girl, to take a ride with his horse and wagon. She was quietly and carefully driving along the highway near her father's house, when " an animal called by various names, such as hog, sow, swine, and by the classical counsel for plaintiff monstrum horrendum, aged, of large size, filthy, unclean by the Levitical, and prohibited from running at large in the streets by the statute, law" (this is the judge's own description of the creature), suddenly arose from the gutter and frightened the horse, which ran away, and the wagon was smashed, and the young lady thrown out and hurt. The hog, be it observed, did no obnoxious act; it was his mere personal appearance which alarmed the horse. The court held the owner of the hog liable for the damages because he was negligent in letting the beast go without a keeper.* Besides, the animal was not travelling; highways are for travelling, not for lying in gutters.-Very consonant to this decision is the New Hampshire pigsty case, where * Jewett v. Gage, 55 Me. 538. a man built his pigsty from his yard out into the highway, and when a lady drove by, her horses were frightened by the squealing of the pigs, and ran, and she was thrown out and hurt. The town had to pay damages here, because the overseers were in fault for not compelling the farmer to remove the sty. CHAPTER XXVIII. FINDING AND STEALING. THE frequent announcements of losses of valuable parcels, ranging from two-hundred-thousand-dollar packets of money and securities down to portemonnaies, watches, and jewelry, may well awaken interest among sharp-sighted city pedestrians in what has been adjudged about the rights and duties of finders. For a majority of lost things there are finders. What are their obligations and claims? LOST GOODS. He gave it a wide Suppose one comes upon a lost article-a wallet on the sidewalk, a stray cow or horse, a bundle of goods fallen from a passing wagon: he is not bound to pick it up, or to say or do anything about it. There is a story of an Irishman who was cheated by means of a counterfeit five-dollar bill. Next day he espied a genuine five-dollar bill lying in the path. berth. "Bad luck to ye! I lost five dollars by a brother o' yours yesterday." Patrick was acting strictly in the exercise of his constitutional rights. One who meets with what another has lost is not under any duty to meddle with it; he may leave it alone if he likes. But if he chooses to take it in charge, he takes it subject to the duty of making all reasonable effort, under the circumstances, to restore it to the owner. A thing that is lost still continues the property of its owner. If the finder takes it up intending to keep it, when by marks on it, or other circumstances, he could, if he would try, restore it to the owner, he is guilty of stealing. If his intention was honest when he took the article, but he afterwards changes his mind, neglects to seek the owner, and spends the money, or uses the thing as his own, he is not quite a thief in the law as it prevails in most parts of the country, but he is liable to an action by the owner whenever his wrongful appropriation of what he has found is discovered. But if the true owner never appears, the thing belongs to the finder. And, as a general rule, no third person has a right to take "treasure trove" away from the finder. The finder's right is better than that of any one else except that of the loser. Therefore the case which was narrated in the newspapers of a factory-girl in a paper-mill who found two fifty-dollar bills in the rags she was assorting was doubtless correctly decided. The proprietor of the mills claimed the notes because they were found in his rags; and when the girl refused to surrender them, he complained of her for stealing. But the judge decided in her favor.-A similar case occurred in Rhode Island. A man bought a second-hand safe on speculation; it was so old and worn that he offered to sell it to the blacksmith of the place for ten dollars, but the latter declined. Then he engaged the blacksmith to put the safe in repair, and keep it for him till he should find a buyer. In repairing the safe, the blacksmith found a parcel of one hundred and sixty-five dollars concealed, by some mistake or oversight, in a crevice in the sheet-iron lining. When he returned the safe, he kept the money; but the safe-owner, having by some means learned the circumstances, sued him for it. The decision was in favor of the blacksmith.* The principle which explains both these cases is that the money, having been lost in the rags or the safe, still belonged to its original owner, and the finder had the right to keep it until that owner should claim it. The purchaser of the rags or safe did not by his purchase acquire any title to the money concealed in them, because neither buyer nor seller knew it was there, or intended a sale of parcels of money. Having, therefore, no title, * Durfee v. Jones, 11 R. I. 588. |