ernment.

another country. A doctrine that an individual must continue subject to his native allegiance until released by his sovereign was a legitimate consequence of the Old-World theories of govBut the American view, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, has always been thought to involve one's right to renounce natural allegiance and become a citizen of another country consenting. This question was long and earnestly controverted between Great Britain and the United States. One of the causes which led to the war of 1812 was the assertion of the right of British ships of war to inspect crews of American vessels on the high seas, and take out seamen of British birth, notwithstanding they had been naturalized in this country. The practical assertion

of these claims has declined in modern times. In 1868 Congress passed a declaratory law* asserting the right of expatriation as "a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and repudiated all claims of foreign States to enforce allegiance of their subjects after naturalization. In 1870 a treaty was exchanged with Great Britain providing that British subjects naturalized here should be treated, for all purposes, by Great Britain as American citizens. And we have similar treaties with several other European governments. Then, by an act of Parliament passed in the same year, Great Britain seems to have given the consent which she formerly withheld, to the expatriation of her subjects. It declares that any British subject voluntarily naturalized in any foreign State shall be deemed to have ceased to be a British subject, and will be regarded as an alien. He may, however, return and be readmitted to British nationality.

* Rev. Stat. § 1999.

Stat. 33 and 34 Vict. ch. 14, § 6.

THE MODERN SIGNIFICATION OF CITIZEN.

The American idea, then, regards the whole great mass of persons who are by birth, or have become by naturalization, members of the body politic as privileged in being citizens. As respects administration of internal affairs, this class embraces all who constitute the people of the State or nation, share the protection of either by right, and not from favor, and bear the cherished responsibilities of allegiance and support. The term excludes visitors, intruders, temporary residents, persons unwilling or not yet qualified to assume allegiance, and some others; and thus it may well be used to designate a condition of a grant of political power, or to limit the description of persons to whom the right to hold offices or lands, or the ballot, is accorded. But it does not include these rights, nor is it sufficient to confer As respects administration of matters abroad, citizens are those who, rendering allegiance to the government at home, are entitled to travel or reside abroad, in the national name, under the country's flag, protected by its treaties, aided by its diplomatic service, and succored, if necessity arises, by its forces. This thought has gained force and weight with the growth of the nation. Whatever has increased the prestige, influence, or power of the American name has enlarged the importance and value of American citizenship. Yet there is an aspect in which the idea grows vague in proportion as it expands. Already, under American institutions, citizenship in Boston, Albany, or San Francisco has no such salient, effective meaning as was attributed to it among cities in the Middle Ages. Citizenship in Massachusetts, New York, or California cannot signify so much under a constitution declaring equal rights in all the States as it may denote among independent cantons or principalities upon the continent of Europe. It is not like air, light, or water, which may be enjoyed by all if there is enough of it; but like rank, priority, or station, which vanish under the attempt to con

fer them upon all. And as the advance of civilization, extending citizenship to more and more persons, and binding divers governments more and more firmly under compacts and constitutions securing to the citizen of anywhere his privileges everywhere, is seen to make the condition and privileges less and less distinct, so one seems to foresee that, in the remote future, citizenship may become merged and lost in the harmony of governments and the brotherhood of man.

CHAPTER VI.

CIVIL RIGHTS.

WHAT ARE THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS?

THERE is quite a complex series of constitutional provisions and acts of Congress which are often mentioned as "the Civil Rights laws." "Civil rights" is an expression broader than "rights of citizens;" it includes those rights, privileges, and immunities which the law concedes to all orderly persons in the community, irrespective of distinctions of class or peculiar rights acquired by an individual. Several enactments became. necessary, soon after the civil war, to secure these general rights of all mankind. Some of their provisions are of comparatively little general interest, such as those punishing interference with officers, and those providing special actions and remedies. Others, protecting the right to vote, and punishing interference with voters, have been explained and discussed in the political journals until they have been made familiar to all. There are three which are not generally understood, yet bear upon the ordinary business of the people, and on such establishments as hotels, saloons, theatres, cars, and steamboats. They are often mentioned. If a holder of a ticket to a concert or theatre is refused his seat on account of color, he threatens a Civil Rights action. If a colored man calls for refreshments at a saloon, and the proprietor refuses to serve him, he consults a lawyer about suing under the Civil Rights laws. At the South, two or three married couples have been prosecuted because, contrary to the law of the State, the husband was black and the wife white, and their lawyers have argued that such law amounted to nothing, because contrary to the Civil Rights laws. At the North, when

the Jews were excluded from Saratoga or Coney Island hotels, they were counselled that by virtue of the Civil Rights laws they could insist on being received. The Supreme Court has been engrossed by the question whether, since the Civil Rights laws, colored men may be left off the jury lists. The laws classed under the general term "Civil Rights laws" are three acts of Congress passed in 1866, 1870,* and 1875. The act of 1866 was the first general law of the kind, but there is an earlier trace of the principle. In 1863, the Alexandria and Washington Railroad Company, which then ran from Alexandria to the south side of the Potomac at Washington, became desirous to extend its line northwardly, so as to connect with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and thus make a through line. Congress gave it leave to do so, and to go through Washington, upon condition that no person should be excluded from the cars on account of color. The company built the extension, and was accustomed to run two cars-one set apart for colored persons, the other for white. One day a colored lady passenger objected to this ar rangement-purely upon principle, it seems, for the cars were alike comfortable-and persisted in going into the car for white persons. The conductor put her out, and she brought an action. The Supreme Court decided that Congress intended that there should not be any discrimination on account of color among the passengers. It was not enough that the company would carry different races in the same trains; they must be carried upon an equality.†

It was about three years after this charter that the series of *Rev. Stat. § 1977, 1978.

† Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. at L. 336.

This decision (Railroad Company v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445) was founded on the language of the particular charter, and does not show that the general Civil Rights laws forbid carriers of passengers to assign separate cars or cabins to colored persons; and a later case (Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485) held that the States cannot enact such a prohibition, and intimated that Congress had not yet done so.