ject, and causing a judicial investigation, to settle and determine whether or not it was legal and lawful to subject these individuals to this confinement, on the ground that they are not citizens. They accordingly authorized the Governor to appoint an agent in the State of South Carolina, and in any other place where these occurrences took place, to bring that question before the tribunals of the United States, in order that a decision might be had. The Governor appointed, as agent in South Carolina for that purpose, a highly respectable professional gentleman, in the city of Charleston, who declined accepting the office. The Governor then appointed another gentleman of the bar in the same city, who also declined accepting the office. He thereupon appointed an eminent citizen of Massachusetts, and sent him there for this purpose. Well, sir, in order that there might be no misapprehension or misunderstanding, this gentleman, on his arrival, addressed a letter to the Governor of South Carolina stating the object of his visit. The following is the letter:

"CHARLESTON, November 28, 1844. "SIR: Your Excellency is already informed of remonstrances made by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts against the arrest and imprisonment of her citizens in South Carolina, against whom the commission of no crime is alleged. The Legislature of Massachusetts has recently passed a resolve authorizing the Governor of the State to appoint an agent for the purpose of collecting and transmitting accurate information respecting the number and the names of citizens of Massachusetts who have heretofore been or may be, during the period of the engagement of the agent, imprisoned without the allegation of any crime.' The agent is also authorized to bring and prosecute one or more suits in behalf of any citizen that may be so imprisoned, at the expense of Massachusetts, for the purpose of having the legality of such imprisonment tried and determined in the Supreme Court of the United States.

"The Governor of Massachusetts has appointed me an agent of that State to execute the purposes above mentioned, and I arrived in this city this morning for that purpose.

"I do not know that your Excellency will consider it proper in any way to notice this subject, yet propriety seemed to require this communication. "With great respect, your Excellency's obedient servant, "SAMUEL HOAR.

"His Excellency J. H. HAMMOND, Governor of South Carolina."

Well, sir, the Governor of South Carolina, instead of returning an answer to this individual, laid the subject before the Legislature, and the populace of Charleston took it up also, without waiting for the action of the Governor or any other authority. I will not enter more particularly into details of the occurrences at Charleston, but this gentleman, as he states in his official report, was compelled, from what was done and said, to leave the place. The Legislature of South Carolina immediately took up the message of the Governor communicating the letter of the agent, and passed certain resolutions in relation to this subject, amongst which was one authorizing The Governor to expel this individual from the State. The following are the resolutions :

"1. Resolved, That the right to exclude from their territories seditious persons or others, whose presence may be dangerous to their peace, is essential to every independent State.

"2. Resolved, That free negroes and persons of color are not citizens of the United States, within the meaning of the Constitution, which confers upon the citizens of one State the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several States.

"3. Resolved, That the emissary sent by the State of Massachusetts to the State of South Carolina, with the avowed purpose of interfering with her institutions and disturbing her peace, is to be regarded in the character he has assumed, and to be treated accordingly.

"4. Resolved, That his excellency the Governor be requested to expel from our territory the said agent, after due notice to depart, and that the Legislature will sustain the Executive authority in any measure it may adopt for the purpose aforesaid."

They also passed an extraordinary law, in addition to existing laws, which, if I can rightly understand the substance of it, is, that it shall be criminal for any person to undertake to obstruct, or hinder, or interfere with the operation of the laws of South Carolina by which individuals are confined, or, in other words, precluding these individuals from the right of having this question settled in the courts of justice. This is the law, passed in 1844: "An Act to provide for the punishment of persons disturbing the peace of this State in relation to slaves and free persons of color.

"1st. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives, now met and sitting in general assembly, and by the authority of the same, That any person or persons who shall, on his, her, or their own behalf, or under color or in virtue of any commission or authority from any State or public authority of any State in this Union, or of any foreign Power, come within the limits of this State for the purpose of, or with the intent to disturb, counteract, or hinder the operation of such laws and regulations as have been or shall be made by the public authorities of this State in relation to slaves or free persons of color, such person or persons shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be committed for trial to the common jail of the district, by any one of the judges of the courts of law or equity, or the Recorder of the city of Charleston, unless admitted to bail by the said judge or recorder, and, upon conviction thereof by any court of competent jurisdiction, shall be sentenced to banishment from the State, and to such fine and imprisonment as may be deemed fitting by the court which shall have tried such offence.

"2d. That any person within this State who shall at any time accept any commission or authority from any State, or public authority of any State in this Union, or from any foreign Power, in relation to slaves or free persons of color, and who shall commit any overt act with intent to disturb the peace or security of this State or with intent to disturb, counteract or hinder the operation of the laws or regulations of the public authorities of this State, made, or to be made, in relation to slaves or free persons of color, such person shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof before any competent court, shall be sentenced to pay, for the first offence, a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and to be imprisoned not exceeding one year; and for the second offence he shall be imprisoned for seven years, and pay a fine not less than one thousand dollars, or be banished from the State, as the court may see fit.

"3d. That the Governor for the time being shall require any person or persons, who shall or may have come within the limits of this State, on his, her, or their own behalf, or under color or in virtue of any commission or authority from any State in this Union, or from any foreign Power, having relation to the laws or regulations of this State on the subject of slaves or free persons of color, to depart from the limits of this State within forty-eight hours after such notice, and such person shall thereupon be bound to depart; and in case of his neglect or refusal so to depart as aforesaid; the said person shall be committed by the same authority hereinbefore stated for trial in the common jail of the district, unless admitted to bail as hereinbefore stated; and upon due conviction before any court of competent jurisdiction, shall be sentenced to be banished from the State, and to such fine and imprisonment as the court shall think expedient.

"4th. That any person who shall be convicted a second or any subsequent time, under the provisions of the first or third sections of this act, shall be imprisoned for a term not less than seven years, and shall pay a fine not less than one thousand dollars, and shall, in addition thereto, be banished from the State.

"5th. That it shall be the duty of the sheriff of the district to see that any sentence of banishment be duly executed, and that the offender be sent without the limits of the State; and in case any person so banished shall return within the State, (unless by unavoidable accident,) the sheriff of the district where he may be found shall hold him in close confinement, under the original sentence, until such offender shall enter into recognizance before the clerk of the court, with sufficient

sureties, to comply with the terms of said sentence, and forever to remain without the limits of the said State."

In addition to this, there is an act denying the right of such person to the writ of habeas corpus. There the question stands from that day to this. The doors of the courts of justice are effectually closed, and apparently forever closed. There the question, I say, stands-upon these facts and these laws, which exist in South Carolina and elsewhere, and are enforced against persons of this description. Thus far there have been no means of bringing to the test the validity of such laws. While South Carolina denies that people of this description are citizens entitled to the privileges conferred by the constitution, Massachusetts and many other States admit them to the rights of citizens. They treat them as such, and they claim that the provisions of the constitution extend to and embrace them, and being citizens of Massachusetts, they of right may claim the privileges and immunities of citizens of South Carolina, or in any other State that belongs to the Union. All that I wish to state, at this late hour of the day, is, that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has been anxious to do one single thing, and nothing else, and that is, to submit this question to the tribunal which the constitution has provided for its final settlement. She is anxious for nothing else but that the question should be submitted to the tribunal which the constitution has provided, and that that tribunal should settle it by deciding whether or not these laws of other States are constitutional. If they are decided to be constitutional acts, then she will acquiesce in such decision. If, on the contrary, they are not constitutional acts-if they are in violation of the rights of these citizens, then it seems to me only fair and just that the doors of the courts which are now closed should be opened, and the question should be brought to a determination, that they may know what their rights are. I might enter much more largely into this question, and discuss the question of citizenship, but it has really nothing to do with this simple act of legislation. I do not propose to settle the question here, but to provide that it may be settled by the proper judicial tribunal. My amendment proposes that, and nothing else. It provides that it shall be the duty of the district attorney, where persons of this description are seized and imprisoned, in the manner described, by a writ of habeas corpus to bring them before the district or circuit court, and let the question be decided there, at the expense of the United States Government; which is, as it seems to me, very reasonable, because the Senate well knows, without my stating it, the fact that these colored persons, who ordinarily go out as cooks and in other subordinate capacities on board vessels, are quite incapable of asserting their own rights; and it seems but just towards them that the United States should do it. It is due to Massachusetts, and other States which have similar causes of complaint; and now is the time and this the place to do justice and allay excitement in all quarters.

Mr. BUTLER. I am not prepared, I must confess, to enter upon the discussion of this subject this evening, but, if allowed time, I believe I can fally vindicate the laws of the State which I in part represent. Indeed, I have once before argued this same question. To say, as has been boldly said here, that it is in the power of Massachusetts to make citizens and give them rights in South Carolina different from what persons of a similar character in that State would have, is a proposition calculated to arrest marked attention, and to startle the public mind in the States which entertain a different notion on this subject. But first, let me ask, why is this proposition directed particularly to South Carolina, or to the Southern States alone? I understand that Illinois, and some other of the Northwestern States, have in their constitutions prohibitory clauses, denying to persons of this character the right to become citizens; and why not refer to them also?

It is true that the constitution declares that the citizens of one State shall enjoy all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of another State; but I assert here that there can be no such thing as making a colored man a citizen of South Carolina. By the laws of South Carolina no such person is capable of attaining that status. A free man of color there may and does possess many civil rights. He can sue and be sued, has the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, and has the right of holding property the same as a white man—and, by the by, many of them hold slaves there. In fact, he has all the rights, except what may be called the complete right, of citizenship. And this right the legislation of no other State can give him in the State of South Carolina. There can be no such thing, therefore, as one State making citizens of a particular class of persons, and endowing them with privileges and rights superior to and beyond what are enjoyed by persons of a similar character in any State to which they may go. This, however, is a question which I am not prepared to argue fully at this moment, nor do I think it is one that is germane to this bill at all. If it is pressed, however, I will procure the evidence, and show that these acts of South Carolina, of Louisiana, and perhaps of Georgia, are no more stringent on this subject than are the provisions of the constitutions of some of the nonslave-holding States. Illinois certainly has a clause, not only not recognizing colored persons as capable of becoming citizens, but denying them the right of a local residence. Sir, would it not be a novel principle to introduce in our political relations, to say that it is in the power of Massachusetts to confer on my slave the right to return and claim privileges in South Carolina, to which, under the laws of that State, he could never have been entitled even had he remained there, or even to claim those rights appertaining to free persons of color which he had forfeited by his escape from the State? It is a monstrous proposition. A slave escapes from me in South Carolina and goes to Massachusetts; he obtains his freedom there by a refusal to surrender him up, and he is made a governor-I suppose he may be made a governor, or brigadier general, or something of that description in Massa

chusetts.

Mr. DAVIS of Massachusetts. Yes, sir.

Mr. BUTLER. So I supposed, sir. Well, General Snowball comes back to South Carolina, and he goes to his master, and tells him, "Sir, I am a citizen, and I demand to be put in the enjoyment of all the rights to which the white citizen is entitled. I demand the right to go into your society, to go into all your public assemblages, to go into your churches-in a word I demand all the rights which appertain to any free citizen of South Carolina!" The idea is preposterous, not to say revolting, I know that this is thought in the abstract to be a very innocent kind of legislation, but in the concrete, gentlemen, I am sure, do not understand `what they are legislating upon. But, sir, I repeat, I do not intend to go into this argument this evening, and if this amendment is insisted upon, I shall ask, as a matter of courtesy, that it be postponed until to-morrow, or Monday.

Mr. FOOTE. I suppose that we are all familiar with the argument. Mr. BUTLER. All are not so familiar with it as the Senator, nor am I as prompt, perhaps, in these matters as he. It is a grave question, and deserves full investigation and consideration.

Mr. FOOTE. I merely intended to say that I had heard the able argument of the Senator on this subject, on a former occasion, and supposed we were all familiar with it.

Mr. BUTLER. The question is of too serious import to be thus disposed of. I could procure, I suppose, the materials and references which I require, after some delay, but I hope the amendment will not be pressed this evening. I feel bound, however, inasmuch as it is a matter touching the

courtesies of society in South Carolina, to say a word in reference to the treatment experienced by the gentleman sent from Massachusetts, to which allusion has been made. I think, sir, after the many refusals which had been intimated to Massachusetts on this subject, that when she insisted on sending Mr. Hoar there, it was, under the circumstances, a proceeding very well calculated to excite the popular feeling. He went there, however, with his daughter, and on the occasion referred to, the gentlemen of Charleston, with marked courtesy and delicacy, so far from permitting the crowd which the excitement had collected to go to the house where they were, absolutely prevented it. Mr. Hoar was understood to be a gentleman, a man of professional position in his own State, and my friend Mr. Rose, who was one of the committee appointed on the occasion, politely invited the daughter to his own house. He said also to Mr. Hoar, "We do not require you to leave Charleston. You are perfectly welcome, and we invite you to share fully in all the social relations of our society. All we ask of you is to give up this commission, and not attempt to interfere with this question here." I will not deny that the gentleman was placed in an embarrassing position under the circumstances, as a man of honor, in view of the relations in which he stood towards his State; but in justice to the people of South Carolina, and particularly the people of Charleston, I wish to say that there was no mob on that occasion. The fact is, there was a strong popular feeling, but this is the mode in which they treated this gentleman-they merely asked him to give up his commission, and refrain from acting under it. Mr. Hoar replied that he must retain his commission, and discharge his duty to his State, so far as he could, and it was then said to him, "if that be your situation, we intimate that you had better leave the city," and on that intimation he did leave. Not a hand was raised against him, and such was the delicacy with which he and his daughter were treated in this matter, that she might have continued to reside in and enjoy the society of Charleston, and hardly have known that any thing of the kind had occurred. She never would have known it, from her own observation. I know that this matter has been variously represented, but these are the facts, and I have no desire other than that they shall be placed before the community in their true light. Now, sir, the appearance before a court in that city of a person of this description, claiming the enjoyment of all the rights pertaining to a white man, would be a most novel exhibition, to say the least. Many of us in South Carolina have freed these persons-I myself have done so, as the representative of an estate-and have sent them to the North. I know also of many free colored persons who have left Charleston and gone there, among them the Joneses, as respectable persons of that class as there are at the North. Many of them have petitioned the Legislature to allow them, under a special law, to return, but permission has been refused them. And yet, under the proposition presented here, Massachusetts has only to take these people and make citizens of them, and they may return to South Carolina in violation of that law. What can be said of such a proposition as that?

I have said, on another occasion, that the old acts of Congress are very particular in referring to the sailors engaged in the foreign commerce of the country, to designate them as citizens, and as native free persons of color, thus expressly making a distinction between citizens and free persons of color. These are the acts of Congress passed-I will not say in the better days of their history-but certainly when a more cordial understanding existed between Massachusetts and South Carolina. The act of 1790, in regard to seamen, for instance, if examined, will be found to contain a clause saying expressly that citizens only, or native free persons of color, shall be sailors thus distinguishing between them, and clearly showing that it was never contemplated that free persons of color should ever be regarded as cit