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He must show, not say, how he came by this knowledge. If a man be found with stolen goods, he must prove how he came by them. The place of deposit of the club was premeditated and selected, and he knew where it waş.

Joseph Knapp was an accessory, and accessory only; he knew only what was told him. But the prisoner knew the particular spot in which the club might be found. This shows his knowledge something more than that of an accessory.

This presumption must be rebutted by evidence, or it stands strong against him. He has too much knowledge of this transaction, to have come innocently by it. It must stand against him until he explains it.

This testimony of Mr. Colman is represented as new matter, and therefore an attempt has been made to excite a prejudice against it. It is not so. How little is there in it, after all, that did not appear from other sources! It is mainly confirmatory. Compare what you learn from this confession, with what you before knew.

As to its being proposed by Joseph: was not that true? As to Richard's being alone, &c. in the house: was not that true?

As to the daggers: was not that true?

As to the time of the murder: was not that true?

As to his being out that night:

was not that true? As to his returning afterward: was not that true? As to the club: was not that true?

So this information confirms what was known before, and fully confirms it.

One word, as to the interview between Mr. Colman and Phippen Knapp on the turnpike. It is said that Mr. Colman's conduct in this matter is inconsistent with his testimony. There does not appear to me to be any inconsistency. He tells you that his object was to save Joseph,

and to hurt no one; and least of all the prisoner at the bar. He had, probably, told Mr. White the substance of what he heard at the prison. He had probably told him that Frank confirmed what Joseph had confessed. He was unwilling to be the instrument of harm to Frank. He therefore, at the request of Phippen Knapp, wrote a note to Mr. White, requesting him to consider Joseph as authority for the information he had received. He tells you that this is the only thing he has to regret; as it may seem to be an evasion, as he doubts whether it was entirely correct. If it was an evasion, if it was a deviation, if it was an error, it was an error of mercy; an error of kindness; an error that proves he had no hostility to the prisoner at the bar. It does not in the least vary his testimony, or affect its correctness. Gentlemen, I look on the evidence of Mr. Colman as highly important; not as bringing into the cause new facts, but as confirming, in a very satisfactory manner, other evidence. It is incredible, that he can be false, and that he is seeking the prisoner's life through false swearing. If he is true, it is incredible that the prisoner can be innocent.

Gentlemen, I have gone through with the evidence in this case, and have endeavored to state it plainly and fairly, before you. I think there are conclusions to be drawn from it, which you cannot doubt. I think you cannot doubt, that there was a conspiracy formed for the purpose of committing this murder, and who the conspirators

were.

That you cannot doubt, that the Crowninshields and the Knapps were the parties in this conspiracy.

That you cannot doubt, that the prisoner at the bar knew that the murder was to be done on the night of the 6th of April.

That you cannot doubt, that the murderers of Captain

White were the suspicious persons seen in and about Brown Street on that night.

That you cannot doubt, that Richard Crowninshield was the perpetrator of that crime.

That you cannot doubt, that the prisoner at the bar was in Brown Street on that night.

If there, then it must be by agreement-to countenance, to aid the perpetrator. And if so, then he is guilty as PRINCIPAL.

Gentlemen, your whole concern should be to do your duty, and leave consequences to take care of themselves. You will receive the law from the court. Your verdict, it is true, may endanger the prisoner's life; but then it is to save other lives. If the prisoner's guilt has been shown and proved beyond all reasonable doubt, you will convict him. If such reasonable doubts of guilt still remain, you will acquit him. You are the judges of the whole case. You owe a duty to the public, as well as to the prisoner at the bar. You cannot presume to be wiser than the law. Your duty is a plain, straight-forward one. Doubtless, we would all judge him in mercy. Toward him, as an individual, the law inculcates no hostility; but toward him, if proved to be a murderer, the law, and the oaths you have taken, and public justice, demand that you do your duty.

With consciences satisfied with the discharge of duty, no consequences can harm you. There is no evil that we cannot either face or fly from, but the consciousness of duty disregarded.

A sense of duty pursues us ever. It is omnipresent, like the Deity. If we take to ourselves the wings of the morning and dwell in the utmost parts of the seas, duty performed, or duty violated, is still with us, for our happiness, or our misery. If we say the darkness shall

cover us, in the darkness as in the light, our obligations are yet with us. We cannot escape their power, nor fly from their presence. They are with us in this life, will be with us at its close; and in that scene of inconceivable solemnity, which lies yet farther onward, we shall still find ourselves surrounded by the consciousness of duty, to pain us wherever it has been violated, and to console us so far as God may have given us grace to perform it.

ARGUMENT OF MR. WEBSTER

IN THE GOODRIDGE CASE

THIS argument was addressed to a jury in April, 1817, on the occasion of the trial of Levi and Laban Kenniston, in the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, held at Ipswich, in the county of Essex, for an alleged assault and robbery by Levi and Laban, on the person of Major Elijah Putnam Goodridge, of Bangor, Maine.

It was true (Mr. Webster said) that the offence charged was not capital; but perhaps this could hardly be considered as favorable to the defendants. To those who are guilty, and without hope of escape, no doubt the lightness of the penalty of transgression gives consolation. But if the defendants were innocent, it was more natural for them to be thinking upon what they had lost, by that alteration of the law which had left highway robbery no longer capital, than upon what the guilty might gain by it. They had lost those great privileges, in their trial, which the law allows, in capital cases, for the protection of innocence against unfounded accusation. They have lost the right of being previously furnished with a copy of the indictment, and a list of the Government's witnesses. They have lost the right of peremptory challenge; and, notwithstanding the prejudices which they know have been excited against them, they must show legal cause of challenge, in each individual

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