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will of their populations; the liberations of Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians, and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, decidedly alien to Western civilization. The intentions of his Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, regarding Poland have been clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addrest to his armies.

"It goes without saying that if the Allies wish to liberate Europe from the brutal coveteousness of Prussian militarism, it never has been their design, as has been alleged, to encompass the extermination of the German peoples and their political disappearance. That which they desire above all is to insure a peace upon the principles of liberty and justice, upon the inviolable fidelity to international obligations with which the Government of the United States has never ceased to be inspired. United in the pursuit of this supreme object, the Allies are determined, individually and collectively, to act with all their power and to consent to all sacrifices, to bring to a victorious close a conflict upon which they are convinced not only their own safety and prosperity depend, but also the future of civilization itself."

The reply of the Entente Allies was dated January 10. Twelve days later President Wilson delivered before the United States Senate an impressive address in behalf of peace. The keynote of the speech was that, while the United States would willingly join in any international movement to secure the future peace of the world, the basis of peace must be just and lasting and such as the United States could approve. Such a peace could only be brought about by general consent, and should not be imposed by force of arms upon vanquished nations. It should recognize the principle of nationality and the right of every people to political and economic freedom. To illustrate these general principles, the President specified as desirable the creation of a "united, independent, and autonomous Poland" and a general recognition that "the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free." If a satisfactory readjustment of international relations could be secured as result of the war, the President was sure that America would not be backward in guaranteeing its permanence, since that would not be abandoning the principle of the Monroe Doctrine, but applying it to the whole world.

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This address profoundly stirred the nation. Many even of President Wilson's political opponents found much to praise in it. Pacifists of all parties welcomed it as a most important diplomatic step and one much to the credit of the administration. This was not the famous "Fourteen-points" speech which played so large a part in the final settlement of the issues of the war at the Peace Conference in Paris in the winter and spring of 1919. The "Fourteen-points" speech was not made until January 8 of the following year, and was Wilson's answer to Germany's so-called peace offensive at Brest-Litovsk.

A week later came from Germany a note by the side of which all events in the trenches, and all discussion of peace possibilities in various parliaments. paled into insignificance. The world now had from Germany a new ultimatum in the form of a reply to the address of President Wilson in the Senate. Asserting that the main tendencies of the President's address as to peace corresponded largely with the desires and principles profest by Germany, and declaring that Germany's opponents had declined to accept these principles, the ultimatum proceeded to state that the German Government was now compelled to continue its fight for existence, again forced upon it, with the full employment of all weapons that were at its disposal. Germany therefore announced that, on and after February 1, she would pursue what was popularly known as the von Tirpitz system of ruthless submarine warfare. Sea traffic was to be stopt "with every available weapon and without further notice," in what she defined as "blockade zones" about Great Britain, France, Italy and the eastern Mediterranean. Germany went so far in this extraordinary document as to issue instructions to the United States as to how American vessels should be marked by flags and painted with signs in order to avoid being torpedoed, and further, announced that the United States would be permitted to dispatch only one steamer a week in each direction to England, and only then. when the point of destination was Falmouth, England. Moreover, this single weekly steamer would have to arrive "at Falmouth on Sunday and depart from Falmouth on Wednesday, taking a lane that Germany prescribed."

Germany's action in this matter was accepted as virtually a declaration of war against the whole world. Specifically it amounted to a declaration of war against the United States, unless the people of the United States were willing to take their instructions from Germany as to what ships they should send out on the high seas and how they should sail them, with death as an alternative. The new policy was a revival, with some added and more obnoxious details, of the policy Germany had declared in February, 1915, and against which President Wilson had protested by saying that Germany would be held to "strict accountability" if American rights were injured or American lives were lost. The President had then said the United States regarded such a policy as "an indefensible violation of neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly relations existing between the two Governments.1

The German Government now said it would torpedo every American ship found in this zone, other than one that was proceeding on a certain date over a route Germans had prescribed. In the same breath it had the audacity to assert that "the freedom of the seas has always formed part of the leading principles of Germany's political program." The note concluded with a hope that the United States would "view the new situation from the lofty heights of impartiality, and assist, on their part, to prevent further misery and unavoidable sacrifice of human life." This expectation from Germany that the United States would cheerfully put its merchant marine under the specific charge of the German Government would have been thought comic, had it not been so tragic, so utterly self-sufficient. Read after the return of peace, it seemed like a bit of German sarcasm, rather than a sober and determined statement of war policy by men still possest of sane minds. It had become clear to the Allies, moreover, that the Chancellor's peace bid of December 12 was merely a mask covering an ulterior purpose; that what the Chancellor really meant was, "Now be good and give us what we want, or you'll be sorry."

1 of this note, and other negotiations with Germany covering two years and pertaining to the sinking of the Lusitania and other ships on which American lives were lost, more detailed accounts are given in that part of this work which deals with the war on the sea. See Volume IX.

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THE NEW YORK PREPAREDNESS PARADE OF MAY, 1916 One of the earliest notable demonstrations of the growing popular conviction that a break with Germany was inevitable 9

V. IV-2

A second memorandum which followed from the German embassy, on instructions from Berlin, said that Germany would meet the activities of her enemies by forcibly preventing, in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean, all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England, and from and to France. "All ships met within that zone," said the memorandum,

INTERNATIONAL FILM SERVICE, N. Y.

JAMES W. GERARD

until 1917

"will be sunk." The Imperial Government was confident that this measure would result "in a speedy termination of the war and in the restoration of peace which the Government of the United States has so much at heart"-a statement which to most Americans seemed still more a piece of sarcasm, or insolent irony rather than a grave diplomatic

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utterance.

Three days later President Wilson sent to Count von Bernstorff his passports and recalled the American Ambassador, Mr. Gerard, from Berlin. -an act which met with much American Aribassador to Germany popular approval. When Bernstorff learned that he was to go home he said: "I am not surprized. My Government will not be surprized either. The people of Berlin knew what was bound to happen if they took the action they have taken" a statement seen later to have been strictly true. Germany really believed she could starve England before the United States could become effective, should we choose to go to war, and hence Germany was safe in defying us. President Wilson told Congress on February 3 that the United States Government had announced, after the sinking of the Sussex, that it would break off diplomatic relations with Germany unless she abandoned certain features of her submarine warfare. As she had now declared her purpose

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