1.

Maximum penalty inflicted does not exceed the limit authorized by law, and is in no way violative of the fourteenth

amendment to the federal constitution.Collins v. Johnson, 237 U. S. 502, 509, 59 L. ed. 1071, 1079, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 649, 652.

1.

Indictment or information-Construction of language.-It is necessary, in a prosecution for subornation of perjury, to make an averment in the information that the defendant knew that the witness was aware of the falsity of his (the witness's) evidence. To say that defendant falsely, and contrary to his oath, did "depose, swear, testify, state," etc., reciting the alleged false testimony, does not charge perjury. It is not the equivalent of saying that the witness "wilfully" or "knowingly" did the act. To say that a witness testified falsely does not necessarily imply that he did it wilfully or knowingly; and saying that he so testified, contrary to his oath, is merely to say, in another form, that he testified falsely. The language of the statute is, "wilfully, and contrary to such oath, states as true any material matter which he knows to be false." This, or language of like import, must be employed, to satisfy the statute.-People v. Ross, 103 Cal. 425, 427, 37 Pac. 379.

2. Same-Essential averments.-It is essential, in an indictment for subornation of perjury, that it should aver not only that the statements made by the witness were false in fact, and that he knew them to be

false, but also that the party procuring him to make those statements knew that they would be intentionally and wilfully false on the part of the witness, and thus the crime of perjury would be committed by him.-People v. Ross, 103 Cal. 425, 428, 37 Pac. 379.

3. Same-To sustain an indictment for procuring a person to commit perjury, it is not obviously necessary that perjury has in fact been committed. It can not be committed unless the person taking the oath not only swears to what was false, but does so wilfully and knowingly. He who procures another to commit perjury must not only know that the statements to be sworn to are false, but also that the person who is to swear to them knew them to be false, for unless the witness has that knowledge, the intent to swear falsely is wanting, and he commits no perjury.-People v. Ross, 103 Cal. 425, 428, 37 Pac. 379.

4. Same-When bad.-An information for "attempting to suborn perjury" is bad, where it does not aver the materiality of the testimony, or what testimony was, but merely avers that defendant endeavored to procure another person to swear falsely and commit perjury in a specified suit.— People v. Thomas, 63 Cal. 482, 483.

5. Liability for damages.-One suborning witness to swear falsely against a defendant in a criminal prosecution is not liable to such defendant in damages for his act.-Taylor v. Bidwell, 65 Cal. 489, 490, 4 Pac. 941.

6. "Attempting to suborn perjury" is not the generic name of any class of offenses.People v. Thomas, 63 Cal. 482; People v. Ross, 103 Cal. 425, 37 Pac. 379; Elkin v. People, 28 N. Y. 177; State v. Holdin, 1 McC. L. (S. C.) 31.

See, ante, § 118 and note.

definition of murder, and is repugnant to the definition of murder given in our statutes. The commission have therefore deemed it advisable to omit the words quoted, and to affix the punishment to the act itself."

FALSE RETURN UNDER OATH.

1, 2. Attorney-Falsely denying under oath he had collected money-Not perjury.

3. Construction of statutes.

4. Schedules in insolvency-Omission from, perjury.

5. Same-Sufficiency of information. 6. Evidence-Admissibility of memoranda. See, also, ante, § 121 and note.

1. Attorney-Falsely denying under oath he had collected money-Not perjury.—An attorney is not subject to conviction for the crime of perjury under an information charging him with falsely denying under oath that he had collected and received a certain sum of money on account of, and in settlement of, a judgment obtained in an action in favor of a client, where it appears from the proof of the offense that the only judgment rendered in the action was set aside by reason of an error in computation of the amount found to be due.-People v. McLeod, 29 Cal. App. 537, 156 Pac. 970.

an

2. In a prosecution for the crime of perjury in making false statements in answer filed to a complaint in a civil action, it is sufficiently proved that the notary public before whom the answer was verified was at least a de facto officer at the time the oath was administered, by the introduction in evidence of the commission issued by the governor, and the record of the county clerk showing that the notary had taken and subscribed the oath of office in due form, notwithstanding no proof was made that the notary had given the bond required by the statute.-People v. McLeod, 30 Cal. App. 435, 158 Pac. 506.

3. Construction of statutes.-The provision in the Insolvency Act which makes wilful omission from a schedule of property a misdemeanor does not affect the statute concerning perjury.-People v. Platt, 67 Cal. 21, 23, 7 Pac. 1.

4. Schedules in insolvency -Omissions from, perjury.—Any petitioner in insolvency who wilfully omits from his schedule any property or effects whatsoever, is guilty of perjury, where he makes a verification to such false schedule, knowing it to be false. People v. Platt, 67 Cal. 21, 7 Pac. 1. 5. Same-Sufficiency of information.-An information for perjury is sufficient when, taken in its entirety, it charges that the defendant has committed such offense by corruptly and collusively, through an agreement with a certain creditor, omitting such creditor from the inventory which the law required him to make as a part of his assignment as an insolvent, which inventory was filed in the proper office, and sworn to by affidavit in due form before the proper officer, and which was attached to the inventory and filed with it, and which affidavit was false, in that the defendant swore in it that his inventory was "just and true," when he well knew it to be false and corrupt.-People v. Naylor, 82 Cal. 607, 608, 23 Pac. 116.

6. Evidence-Admissibility of memorandum book. In a prosecution for perjury for swearing to a false list of taxable property, a memorandum book is not admissible evidence against the defendant, to prove that the property therein was that given in by defendant, or that it was all his property given in by him, or that he swore to it as a correct list of his property.-People v. Quinn, 18 Cal. 122, 125.

1.

Attempt to prevent attendance of witness.-Attempt wilfully and corruptly to prevent attendance of witness before any lawful tribunal for administration of justice is indictable offense at common law.State v. Holt, 84 Me. 509, 24 Atl. 951.

2. Same-Indictable whether successful or not.-Attempt to prevent witness from appearing and testifying before grand jury, whether successful or not, is offense punishable by common law.-State v. Carpenter, 20 Vt. 9.

3. Dissuading, hindering, and preventing witness from appearing before court in pursuance to summons is indictable at common law. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 87, 74 Am. Dec. 665, 666.

4. Same Intentionally and designedly getting witness drunk for express purpose of preventing his attendance before grand jury or any open court is such interference in proceedings in administration of justice as will constitute indictable offense.-State v. Holt, 84 Me. 509, 24 Atl. 951.

5. Same-Threatening and beating another because he is a witness, for the purpose of intimidating, impeding, or influ

encing him in giving his testimony, is violation of Rev. Stats. U. S., section 5399 (Federal Penal Laws, § 135, 7 Fed. Stats. Ann. 2d ed., p. 688).-United States v. Kee, 39 Fed. 603.

6. Indictment for dissuading, hindering, and preventing witness from appearing at court in response to summons need not allege on whose behalf witness was summoned, such act being punishable, no matter in whose behalf the witness is summoned.— Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 87, 74 Am. Dec. 665, 666.

7. Infamous crime.-Attempt to prevent witness from testifying at trial is not.State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, 30 Am. Dec. 450. 8. Irregularity of proceedings in which witness has been recognized is immaterial in prosecution for endeavoring to prevent appearance of such witness before grand jury. State v. Carpenter, 20 Vt. 9.

9. Summons need not have been issued. -State v. Holt, 84 Me. 509, 24 Atl. 951; following Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 87, 74 Am. Dec. 665, 666; State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, 30 Am. Dec. 450.

BRIBING WITNESS.

1. Evidence admissible.

2. Instruction.

1. Evidence admissible.-Evidence is admissible to show that the false evidence which witness is asked to give was material in the case in which it was to be adduced, by showing the general nature of the crime with which the accused in such case was charged, but should not go beyond this. People v. Fong Ching, 78 Cal. 169, 174, 20 Pac. 396.

2. Instruction that it is not crime in this state to encourage witness by pecuniary gifts to be truthful, but neither is it among the recognized customs of this country to subsidize the personal integrity of our citizens in order to prevent them from lapsing into falsehood and perjury, is erroneous, as being comment on the evidence and invading the exclusive province of the jury. People v. Fong Ching, 78 Cal. 169, 173, 20 Pac. 396.

of money, not only procure witnesses, but

379.