certain conduct is a crime must be determined from the language of the statute. Constructive crimes-crimes built up by the courts with the aid of inference, implication, and strained interpretation-are repugnant to the spirit and letter of English and American law. A concurrence of act and intent, or criminal negligence, are the only elements essential to constitute a crime or public offense within the meaning of § 20 of the Penal Code, the only exception being those cases where malice aforethought is made by § 188 of the same code a necessary and additional element.-See Ex parte McNulty, 77 Cal. 164, 11 Am. St. Rep. 257, 19 Pac. 237; People v. Elliott, 90 Cal. 586, 27 Pac. 433; People v. McNulty, 93 Cal. 427, 26 Pac. 597, 29 Id. 61; People v. Wright, 93 Cal. 564, 29 Pac. 240.

5. Municipal corporations Applicability of Penal Code to.-"The provisions of the Penal Code constitute a general law applicable to all municipal corporations, whether created by freeholder charter, existing under special charter granted prior to the adoption of the present constitution, or organized under the general municipal act. The judicial proceedings which are there provided for may be inaugurated by the grand jury or by a private individual. Under the charter the proceeding can be inaugurated only by the mayor. In the one instance a more general right is conferred to

proceed towards the removal of such officers than in the other. Authorizing proceedings under the general law to remove municipal officers is not inconsistent with the charter provisions also empowering the board of trustees to do the same thing. There are simply provided several tribunals in which to administer the same remedy, and the remedies are cumulative. The subjectmatter over which jurisdiction is conferred is common to both-official delinquency; and the same remedy is to be applied by each-removal from office. It is not at all unusual for different tribunals to have concurrent jurisdiction over the same subjectmatter, the same parties, and, to be empowered to grant the same relief; and, in our judgment, that is the condition here. The jurisdiction conferred upon the board of trustees is not exclusive, but concurrent with that of the superior court under the provisions of the general law. And the granting of this power to remove delinquent officers by the charter is not at all inconsistent with the existence of concurrent jurisdiction in the superior court over the same subject-matter. Nor did the charter provision in that respect supersede the general law as inconsistent with the charter under § 8, art. XI of the constitution."— Coffey v. Superior Court Sacramento Co., 147 Cal. 525, 533, 82 Pac. 75, 78. See, post, § 15 and note.

tion to one another.

2. As to how act cited.

3. Arrangement of laws.

4. Laws interwoven with one another.

5. "Penal Code," means what.

For corresponding sections, see Kerr's Cyc. Pol. Code (2d ed.), § 2; Kerr's Cyc. Civ. Code. § 2 and note; Kerr's Cyc. Code Civ. Proc. (2d ed.), § 2 and note.

1. As to construction of the codes, with relation to one another, and of their various

provisions, see Kerr's Cyc. Pol. Code (2d ed.). §§ 4478 et seq.; Kerr's Cyc. Civ. Code (2d ed.), § 1 and note.

2. As to how act cited establishing the Penal Code.-See, post, $24.

3. Arrangement of laws.-Nearly all of our general laws are arranged, for convenience, under four main headings, or names, to wit, the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Penal Code, and the Political Code,-but no one of these codes itself. is complete in Legislation under any one code is inseparably interwoven

with legislation under the others; and legislation upon any imaginary subject would not be held invalid because found in any particular code.-Lewis v. Dunne, 134 Cal. 291, 294, 86 Am. St. Rep. 257, 55 L. R. A. 833, 66 Pac. 478.

4. Laws interwoven with one another.We have a code system which is, for convenience and partial classification, divided into four codes, to each of which a name is given; but they are inseparably interwoven with one another, and no one of them is complete in itself, or absolutely confined to a particular subject, and enactments of sub

stantive law establishing rights are not to be held inoperative because found in any particular code.-Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 72, 82 Am. St. Rep. 330, 53 L. R. A. 221, 63 Pac. 170.

All the codes one statute.-See Kerr's Cyc. Civ. Code (2d ed.), § 1 and note..

5. "Penal Code," means what. In the absence of any showing to the contrary, the words "Penal Code" must be presumed to mean the Penal Code of California.People v. Mortier, 58 Cal. 262, 268.

As to effect of codes, see Kerr's Cys. Pol. Code (2d ed.), §§ 4478 et seq., and notes,

§ 2. When this act takes effect.

§ 3. Not retroactive.

§ 4. Construction of the Penal Code.

§ 5. Provisions similar to existing laws, how construed.

§ 6. Effect of code upon past offenses.

§ 7. Certain terms defined in the senses in which they are used in this code.

§ 8. What intent to defraud is sufficient. § 9. Civil remedies preserved.

§ 10. Proceedings to impeach or remove officers and others preserved.

§ 11. Authority of courts-martial preserved. Courts of justice to punish for contempts.

§ 12. Of sections declaring crimes punishable. Duty of court.

§ 13. Punishments, how determined.

This code takes effect at

so declared.

clearly apparent that such was the intention.-Gates v. Salmon, 28 Cal. 320, 322.

As to retroactive effect to be given to laws, see Kerr's Cyc. Civ. Code (2d ed.), § 1, note par. 6; § 3 and note.

2. Same-Prohibitory clauses-Except as to cases within prohibitory clauses in state constitution, or in constitution of the United States, it is competent for state to give to statute retroactive effect.-Von Schmidt v. Huntington, 1 Cal. 55, 65.

3. Same-Registry laws are usually held not to have retroactive effect, except so far as they may affect vested rights.-Bank of Ukiah v. Moore, 106 Cal. 673, 680, 39 Pac. 1071.

See Kerr's Cyc. Civ. Code (2d ed.), § 3 and note.

active can not be so construed.-Bank of Ukiah v. Moore, 106 Cal. 673, 680, 39 Pac. 1071.

5. Ex post facto laws-What are.-The following are considered ex post facto laws: 1. Every law that makes action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action; 2. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; 3. Every law that changes punishment, and inflicts greater punishment than law annexed to crime when committed; 4. Every law that alters legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony than law required at time of commission of offense, in order to convict the offender.-Calder V. Bull. 3 U. S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L. ed. 648; Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277, 326, 18 L. ed. 356.

6.

Same-Same-Changing punishment.A law is ex post facto when it changes punishment, and inflicts greater punishment than that which law annexed to the crime when committed.-Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 96, 106, 26 N. Y. 167, 169.

7. Same-What are not-Code.-Where act to be punished was done by prisoner after code took effect, it can not be said that code became ex post facto when applied to the prisoner.-Ex parte Gutierrez, 45 Cal. 429, 432.

8. Same Same-Changing forms of procedure.-Laws changing mere forms of procedure in criminal action are not ex post

facto laws.-People v. Mortimer, 46 Cal. 114, 118; People v. Campbell, 59 Cal. 243, 246, 43 Am. Rep. 257; State v. Kingsly, 10 Mont. 537, 546, 26 Pac. 1066. See Ala. South Fla. v. State, 86 Ala. 617, 619, 6 So. 52. Mathis v. State, 31 Fla. 291, 312, 12 So. 681. Mich. Beebe v. Birkett, 108 Mich. 234, 236, 65 N. W. 970. Mont. State v. Ah Jim, 9 Mont. 167, 174, 23 Pac. 76. Neb. Marion v. State, 20 Neb. 233, 249, 57 Am. Rep. 825, 29 N. W. 911. Wyo. In re Wright, 3 Wyo. 478, 484, 31 Am. St. Rep. 94, 13 L. R. A. 748, 27 Pac. 565. Fed. McBurney v. Carson, 99 U. S. 567, 569, 25 L. ed. 378.

9.

Same-Same—Changing place of trial. -Law which simply changes place of trial is not ex post facto.-Gut v. Minnesota, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 35, 38, 19 L. ed. 573; Cook v. United States, 138 U. S. 157, 183, 34 L. ed. 906, 913, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268, 275.

10. Same Same -Same-Otherwise in criminal cause, as to statute permitting change of place of trial to another county upon application of prosecutor and without defendant's consent.-People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 359, 11 L. R. A. 75, 25 Pac. 481. See Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293, 302, 40 L. ed. 432, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 304.

11. Same-Same-Reducing or diminishing punishment.-Law, effect of which is simply to reduce or diminish punishment with which an act was punishable when committed, can not be an ex post facto law, because it inflicts no new or additional punishment.-Shepherd v. People, 25 N. Y. 407,

415.

1. Construction of the codes-As to import of terms.-All provisions of code are to be construed according to fair import of their terms, with view to effect its object and to promote justice.-People v. Mesa, 93 Cal. 580, 584, 29 Pac. 116.

2. Same As parts of same statute.-Provisions of four codes are to be construed as though they were all parts of same statute. -Clarke v. Mead, 102 Cal. 516, 520, 36 Pac. 862.

See Kerr's Cyc. Civ. Code (2d. ed.), §§ 1 and 4, and notes.

3.

Same-Certain powers conferred on a court or other tribunal wholly by statute, -e. g. power to suspend sentence under Section 1203, post,-the nature and extent of such powers must be ascertained and determined from the language of the statute itself, since nothing can be added to or taken from the statute, in view of section 1858, Code of Civil Procedure.-People ex rel. Lindauer v. O'Donnell, superior judge, 37 Cal. App. 192, 197, 174 Pac. 102, 104.

As to power of trial court or judge to suspend sentence being unconstitutional, see, post, 1203 and note.

4. Same-In pari materia.-Codes are in pari materia, and must be construed as one. -In re Estate Burdick, 112 Cal. 387, 395, 44 Pac. 734. In this connection see In re Estate Garcelon, 104 Cal. 570, 584, 43 Am. St. Rep. 134, 32 L. R. A. 595, 38 Pac. 414.

See, also, Kerr's Cyc. Code Civ. Proc. (2d. ed.), § 5 and note.

5. Rules for construction of Penal Code. -All parts of statute must be considered, to arrive at real intent of legislature.-People v. San Francisco, 36 Cal. 595, 600.

As to construction of penal statutes, generally, see 8 R. C. L., p. 59, § 10; 25 R. C. L. p. 1056, §§ 281-282, p. 1066, § 290; 4 Am. Cr. Rep. 479, 493; 9 Ann. Cas. 634; 9 Ann. Cas. 707; 3 L. R. A. 224; 56 L. R. A. 674; 47

6. Same-All sections to be read together. The various sections of the code are to be read together and harmonized, if reasonably possible.-People v. Pryal, 25 Cal. App. 779, 147 Pac. 114.

7. Same-Ascertaining intent.-In construing an act, it is duty of court to make effort to ascertain true intent of legislature, to carry it into effect.-People v. San Francisco, 36 Cal. 595, 601.

8. Same-Consideration of head-lines.— The Practice Act is divided into titles, chapters, and sections; and at head of each chapter in the several titles is a note indicating generally the subjects to which the chapter is devoted; and these head-notes, indicating the particular subjects treated of in the several chapters, are entitled to more consideration than is the title to the entire act.-Barnes v. Jones, 51 Cal. 303, 306. See Ex parte Koser, 60 Cal. 177, 192; Sharon v. Sharon, 75 Cal. 1, 16, 16 Pac. 345; Keyes v. Cyrus, 100 Cal. 322, 325, 38 Am. St. Rep. 296, 34 Pac. 722; Mackey v. Miller, 62 C. C. A. 139, 126 Fed. 161, 162.

As to resort to title in case of ambiguity, see par. 20, this note.

9. Head-lines of statutes may be looked to in order to ascertain their meaning where the operative language of the act is uncertain but of no value where the language of the act is plain and unambiguous in its meaning.-People v. Nash, 15 Cal. App. 320, 114 Pac. 784.

10. Same Same Criminal Code of Oregon, fully chapterized, sectionized, and with the syllabi of the different chapters, was submitted to the legislative assembly, and by that body passed in exactly the shape in which it now stands upon the statute books. These syllabi became parts of the law and furnished the highest source from whence to draw information in relation to the nomenclature of the said code.State of Oregon v. Vowels, 4 Ore. 324, 326.

11. Same Same — Editorial note. The rule laid down in the preceding sections relative to the consideration of the headline in the construction of a code section applies in those cases, only, in which the legislature provides the head-line, and not to those cases in which the head-line is supplied by some outside party. The legislature that enacted the Penal Code in 1872 supplied head-lines to each section of that code, and such head-lines are a part of the code. In all the amendments to the Penal Code since its enactment, with exceptions so rare that they prove the rule, all headlines to sections are supplied by outside parties, form no part of the section to which they are prefixed, and can not be resorted to for the purposes of construction. In the Cyclopedic Penal Code, and in all the other Cyclopedic California Codes, all the original head-lines have been retained wher