the treaty 24th March, 1832, and by which the reservee agreed to make title to a contemplated vendee at some future day, requires the certificate of an agent for that purpose, and the approval of the President of the United States, to render it valid. Clarlitko v. Elliot, 5 P. 403. 12. Such a contract, without the certificate of an agent, or the approval of the President is not valid as a conveyance operating in præsenti, or as a stipulation for one to be executed in futuro; and therefore an undertaking by a reservee to protect his tenant in the possession, until the conveyance could be effected, being dependent upon the principal contract for the sale and conveyance, is in the same condition. Ibid. 13. A grant for lands from certain persons of the Creek tribe, to whom the chiefs and head men had assigned the same, in pursuance of the treaty of 1832, will not support an action of ejectment, the patent for the same not having issued until after suit commenced. Fipps v. McGehee, 5 P. 413. 14. That if the assignees from the creek tribe under the provisions of said treaty, had received the assignment, and had been located on the land; or if the land had been located and designated as reserved for this purpose by the locating agent, and then assigned before the commencement of the suit-under such a state of things, an inchoate legal title would have vested, which would have been perfected by a patent subsequently issued, and in view of which the action could yet have been sustained. [Semble.] Ibid. 15. The widow of an Indian is not dowable of lands selected by the husband under the treaty between the United States and the Creek tribe, of 24th March, 1832, and by him conveyed in conformity with that treaty to a purchaser. Chinnubee v. Nicks, 3 P. 362. See Constitutional Law-Dower-Public Lands. INFANT. 1. Minors, defendants in chancery, having been admitted to make full defence by their general guardian, the revising court will consider the sanction given to such mode of defence as equivalent to an appointment of a guardian Cato v Easly, 2 S. 214. ad litem. 2. Under an issue to try the right of property, the jury cannot find against claimant upon the ground of infancy; the proper course being to move for an issue to try the question of infancy, or for the appointment of a guardian. Mundine v. Perry, 2 S. & P. 130. 3. When two sales of property are made by one while a minor, and the last sale is ratified by him after he comes of age, a subsequent ratification of the first sale is void. Derrick, et al. v. Kennedy, 4 P. 41. 4. It seems to be the better opinion that the deeds of an infant conveying lands upon a full equivalent, given or secured, are embraced within the description of contracts merely voidable. Freeman v. Bradford, 5 P. 270. 5. The county courts of this State are invested with plenary power in all matters concerning the estates of infants; and therefore a claim for the maintainance of infant is properly brought, when presented to that tribunal. Gregg et al. v. Bethea, 6 P. 9. 6. Where defendant pleads infancy to plaintiff's declaration, on a promissory note, and plaintiff replies a subsequent promise, he admits the truth of the plea, and proof of a subsequent promise or ratification of the contract alledged in the declaration is necessary to be shewn affirmatively, notwithstanding the protestation contained in the replication—and the introduction of the note is not sufficient for this purpose, Dockery v. Day, 7 P. 518. See Costs-Guardian and Ward-Prochien Ami-Devise, Legacy and Bequest-Parent & Child. INSURANCE. 1. A having the possession of goods, deposited with him for sale by B, effects an insurance upon his whole stock-a loss ensues— s—and A, in his schedule of loss, handed to the insurance office, includes the goods of B, and afterwards gives to B a memorandum, stating that he will account to B for his proportion of insurance, when ascertained.-Held, that A could not by parol show that he intended by the memorandum a mere intention to account out of what might remain after his own loss had been ascertained. Durand v. Thowron & Co. 1 P. 238. 2. That it was not necessary to recovery of B, that he should show that he had ordered the goods to be insured. Ibid. Watkins v. Durand, 1 P. 251. } 3. That one having the possession of goods of another may insure for the benefit of the latter, without the authority in the first instance, and that the cestui qui trust may adopt the policy. Ibid. 4. When A effects an insurance on goods, and in the policy describes them "as owned by himself-held in trust or on commission," and on their destruction, receives the amount for which they were insured, he will be held to be the trustee of B for this purpose, and liable to B in an action for his proportionate part of the insurance. 1bid. to the 5. The protest of a notary public, stating that notice was given agent" of a party, of the protest of his note, is not evidence of such agency; so as to make the notice sufficient, such agency must be proved aliunde. O'Connell v. Walker, 1 P. 263. INTEREST. 1. Declaration on an obligation, in which no specific rate is described— interest at the rate fixed by statute must be adjudged. Clay v. Drake, A. R. 164. 2. Note payable at a future day, but if not punctually paid, to carry interest from the date; will only carry interest from the maturity, as this will be regarded as penalty. Fugua & Hewitt v. Avriel & Martin, A. R. 170. See Collection of Cases, A. R. 209. 3. To carry interest at a rate exceeding 8 per cent. per annum, the contract must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged, and for a loan of money &c. and such interest is recoverable only for the stipulated time of forbearHenry & Winston v. Thompson, A. R. 209. (Collection of Cases, A. R, 209. ance. 4. The act of February, 1818, does not change the rate of interest on contracts, made before its enactment. Bryan v. Moore, A. R. 377. 5, Note, payable in another State, the foreign interest must be proved. Peacock v. Banks, A. R. 387. Evans v. Clark, 1 S. 388. 6. The interest upon a judgment, nunc pro tunc, should only be calculated up to the time when judgment should have been entered. Clemens v. Judson & Banks, A. R. 395. 7. Bill penal payable on demand, carries interest only from time of demand, or date of writ. Vaughan v. Goode, A. R. 417. 8. Note, described as made at Fayettville, to wit, in Madison county, interest according to the laws of Alabama. Garner v. Jeffery, Wyman, & Co. A. R. 167. Mayfield v. Allen, A. R. 274. 9. Judgment by nil decit, shall not be reversed, because $1 too much interest has been charged, 10. Verdict for more than legal interest, appellate court cannot correct. Baldwin v. Stebbins, A. R. 180. 11. In action of debt on note, payable with interest from date-principal and interest should not be claimed as aggregate sum in debt. Butler v. Limerick, A. R. 115. 12. A note, drawing five per cent per month, payable six months after date, under statute 1818, decided to draw the stipulated interest only, until maturity, and from then eight per cent. per annum, Ellis v. Bibb, 2 S. 63. 13. Under the issue of nul tiel record, the court will not give the interest of the sister State on such judgment. The rate and amount of the interest must be found by the jury. Hunt & Coudry v. Mayfield, 2 S. 124. 14. Interest runs on damages given by circuit or supreme court, on affirmance of judgment. Sanders & Fenwick, v. Rives, 3 S. 109. 15. On a note payable at a future day with interest from the date, if not punctually paid, judgment may be properly rendered for principal with interest from maturity. Bodie v. Ely, 3 S. 182. 16. The rate of interest stipulated to be paid on a contract, in the ab sence of written or statutory law may be fixed by a jury according to the custom of the place where the contract is made. Tate v. Innerarity, 1 S. & P. 33. 17. The rate of interest in any one of the United States, is not a matter which the courts can ex-officio notice, but is a question of fact to be ascertained by a jury. Richardson v. Williams, 2 P. 239. 18. Interest may be charged on an open account, when the contract stipulates for a certain period of credit; but the law does not permit rests to be made in such account every six or twelve months, restating the account each time, and converting interest into principal; and no custom or agreement to that effect can alter the law. Mars ex'r v. Southwick et al. 2 P. 351. 19. Interest is recoverable on an open account for goods sold and delivered, when by express stipulation, the account is to be considered as due at a particular day. Moore v. Patton, Donegan & Co. 2 P. 451. 20. Interest recoverable on open account, in common counts in assumpsit, when the defendant agreeed to pay interest, and promised to give bills in discharge of the debt, Ibid. 21. Interest under our statute authorizing its recovery by way of damages is substituted for damages at common law, and semble if in an action of debt no damages are laid in the declaration, yet a recovery may be had of interest. Mc Whorter v. Standifer, 2 P. 519. 22. "In debt or assumpsit, to recover any cause of action embraced in the statute, authorizing the calculation of interest by way of damages for the detention of money up to the time of the rendition of judgment, that more interest by way of damages for the detention, is adjudged by the court, than demanded in the declaration: provided, it appears that no more has been adjudged by way of interest than is recoverable by law upon the debt, as shewn to be due and unpaid by the record." 1bid 23. The allowance of interest, except upon the particular liabilities embraced by statute, must depend upon the circumstances of the case. Το avoid its payment it is competent for a defendant to show that he is not in fault, as that the plaintiff had been absent from the country-without having any known agent, &c. Crawford v. Simonton's ex'rs, 7 P. 110. 24. If a defendant offers no excuse for the non-payment of the principal sum, the interest is recoverable by way of damages. Ibid. 25. Interest is recoverable upon foreign contracts if permitted by the lex loci contractus; and, though interest is recoverable at common law by way of damages, if the demand arises out of this State, it must be shewn what the interest of such state is. Ibid. See Corporations-Partners-Trustees University, Alabama. JUDGMENTS. I. WHEN JUDGMENTS MAY BE RENDERED; THEIR FORM, REQUISITES AND II. WHEN JUDGMENTS WILL BE SUSTAINED, and of thE PRESUMPTIONS IN THEIR FAVOR. III. OF THE Arrest of judgMENT; OF THE TRANSFER AND ASSIGNMENT; AND OF SATISFACTION. IV. WHEN JUDGMENTS WILL BE RENDERED FINAL IN THE APPELLATE COURT; AND OF THE DAMAGES. V. WHAT WILL BE A RELEASE OF ERRORS. VI. OF JUDGMENTS BY CONFESSION. VII. OF JUDGMENTS NUNC PRO TUNC. VIII. OF JUDGMENTS ON MOTION AND SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS. I. When Judgments may be Rendered; their Form, Requisites and Effect; How they may be Amended, and when their Lien Commencces. 1. Assumpsit upon promissory note with common counts, nol pros, must be entered as to the latter, before the court can give final judgment under the statute of 1812. Moreland v. Ruffin, A. R. 19. 2. On an appeal from justice of the peace on unliquidated demand, final judgment by default cannot be rendered without the intervention of a jury. Martin v. Price, A. R.69. 3. Verdict for less sum than the jurisdiction of the court, judgment not reversed unless it appear that a motion for a non suit under the statute of 1817, had been made and refused. Howard v. Wear, A, R. 84. 4. Judgment for more than declaration claims, is error. Dinsmore v. Austill, adm. A. R. 89. } 5. Judgment by default, when there is a demurrer undisposed of, is error, though the demurrer is not sustainable. 6. A recovery cannot be had for more than plaintiff declares for. Ibid. Ibid. 7. Final judgment by default, without the intervention of a jury, cannot be had on a note for payment of a certain amount of cotton at a stated price. Phillips v. Malone, A. R. 110. 8. Judgment by default, without declaration, is error, and cannot be cured by a subsequent filing of a declaration. Rankin v. Crowells, A. R. 125. 9. Judgment by nul dicit, cannot be rendered when some of the pleas answer the whole declaration, though others do not. Tubb v. Madding, A. R. 129. 10. If judgment in slander be entered, as in debt, no error. Purdee v. Burnett, A. R. 138. 11. The use of a past instead of a present tense, $ for dollars, and figures instead of words in the entry of a judgment; is not error. Tankersley v. Silburn. A. R. 185. |