and it was ordered to "be recorded in the Town Books, that the children yet unborn may see the desire that their ancestors had for their freedom and happiness." Then came the tax on tea, and instantly the vote of this town that "we can no longer stand idle spectators," but will join Boston in any measures "to deliver ourselves and posterity from slavery. The spirit of Shepard, Vane, and Dudley was speaking through Appleton and Stedman, Adams and Hancock. Yes, and soon under yonder elm were gathered men still ready to suffer for conscience' sake, and die for love of country, few, ragged, half-armed, united in defying the strongest nation of the world. Yet when Washington found in them the old Puritan spirit he knew that there was a force within his grasp that "could marshal the conscience" of his country to achieve her independence.

A short century more passes. There comes a struggle for human liberty, a call again to patriots and to Puritans. And Cambridge, first in the whole nation, offers her children under the lead of a grandson of a Revolutionary hero; and our old University, charged with being backward in these great agitations, and with being forgetful of the Puritan spirit, though her accuser is himself an answer to the charge, sends forth her sons to die for the principles this old church has ever taught.

I have said enough. I hardly think if Shepard were with us to-day he would say that the prayers and faith of our pious founders had been forgotten, or that after eight generations we had proved untrue to the spirit of his ministry.

This is the word the city bids me say to-day. Shepard and Mitchel, Dudley and Dunster, all have passed away, but each, "though dead, yet speaketh.'

SPEECH

ON THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION, BOSTON, APRIL, 1889.

THE

HE citizens of this Commonwealth are asked to incorporate into their Constitution this provision: "The manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage are prohibited. The General Court shall enact suitable legislation to enforce the provisions of this article."

It is incumbent upon those who advocate putting into the organic law of the State this prohibition upon a beverage, to establish its necessity, justice, wisdom, and expediency as against all upon whom its restraint is to be imposed without their consent and against their protest. The question is not whether the advocates of this measure have a right to apply it to themselves, but how far they have a right to impose it upon others against their wishes.

In answering this question I propose to consider and discuss, not so much the strong and familiar objections to prohibition, but rather the grounds upon which it is advocated. What are these grounds? They all may be comprehended in a single sentence, whatever of form or detail they assume. It is urged that the use and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage is a sin, not only a sin, but a crime of the greatest magnitude, because the cause of other and great crimes and vice, and a most prolific source of misery and poverty. Observe, it is the use and sale, not merely the abuse, of intoxi

cants that is thus alleged to be criminal and the source of crime; therefore the absolute prohibition of their manufacture and sale is demanded. Without stopping to controvert this position of the advocates of prohibition, does their position require or justify constitutional prohibition? If the manufacture and sale of intoxicants are thus criminal, why not prohibit and punish them by statute law as we do other and greater crimes? Such law alone can effect prohibition. Constitutional prohibition will not enforce itself. There must be statute law, or it is a dead letter. Then why not begin where we must end? Without such law, constitutional prohibition is useless and hopeless; with it, it is needless.

Both our National and State courts have constantly decided that there is abundant authority under our present Constitution to pass most stringent and imperative legislation to prohibit the manufacture and sale of liquor. If, then, the premises of the prohibitionists are sound, why seek a constitutional amendment? Why not go at once to where they must come at last, statute enactment?

But, again, it will hardly be contended by the most extreme prohibitionists that the act they seek to prohibit is a greater crime than murder, arson, rape, burglary, highway robbery, embezzlement, etc. I say it will not be so contended, because amid all their exaggeration they do not demand to have like penalties. attached to it. No one suggests as a proper penalty for it death, state prison for life or for years. If it is a lesser crime, why put its prohibition into the Constitution, and leave out all the others? Does not such distinction come almost within the Biblical admonition, "Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye pay tithe of mint and anise and cummin,

and have omitted the weightier matters of the law"? Is not this especially true when the crimes above stated are universally recognized as crimes, while the act proposed to be made a crime by constitutional enactment is far from being so recognized? The reason for their omission from the Constitution is a plain and proper one. The Constitution was intended for no such purpose. Its purpose here, as in every country, is to establish general principles, and to be itself a frame of government. It provides the proper body to make, construe, and execute Its end the laws, and clothes each with ample power. is to provide proper agencies for governing, but not to do their work. The Legislature is its agency to make laws, and especially to define crimes, just as the judiciary and the executive branches of government are its agencies to construe and enforce laws already made. To enact by the Constitution a law which is wholly within the power and the proper functions of the Legislature, is just as absurd as by the same means. to do the detailed work of either of the other branches of government.

We

But, assuming all their premises, will the advocates of prohibition tell us what is the necessity for constitutional enactment? The answer usually made to this question, and by men thoroughly earnest and conscientious, is, "We want stability of action. A prohibitory law passed to-day might be repealed to-morrow. want prohibition fixed by organic law." Let us fairly consider this answer. If a prohibitory law is passed, it cannot be repealed or modified, unless a majority of the people wish it and so decide. Is it seriously contended that prohibition can or ought to be maintained, whether by organic law or statute amendment, against the wishes of a majority of the people. Is that the Is it in purpose of putting it into the Constitution?

order that a minority may control the will of the majority? Surely not, so long as we are to be a government of the people, by the people, for the people. Yet stability of action on this subject beyond the power of the Legislature can only be secured by sacrificing the will of the majority and the principle that a majority shall rule.

Suppose, however, prohibition is established by constitutional amendment, and a majority of the people are or become opposed to it: what will be the result?

One of two things: either, as in Rhode Island to-day, an utter disregard of the constitutional provision, and a demand for its repeal, or a refusal by the Legislature to enforce its provisions. If there is danger, as its advocates say, in a sentiment so hostile to prohibition that men will each year at the polls raise an issue over statute prohibition, why may we not have the greater danger that they will thus agitate each year constitutional change? Which is the greater evil?

Again, if popular sentiment is hostile to prohibition, what is to hinder the Legislature from utterly nullifying the law, or making it ineffective? This need not be by an absolute refusal to enact any legislation. It may be done quite as easily by inadequate legislation, or with inadequate provision for its enforcement. There is now in our Constitution a tax upon the right of suffrage, in my opinion unjust and undemocratic. This has become of late years very unpopular; but a minority in the Legislature continues to retain it. But to some extent they meet the popular demand for a change by making the tax smaller, and easier to be borne.

A better illustration still of this point is the provision of the United States Constitution for the rendition of fugitive slaves. This provision was believed before