the Commission has prepared findings and recommendations which, in the view of the majority, will stand as the basis of any further study of this subject. This is a substantial achievement. These findings and recommendations are summarized in Annex 2 as the best evidence both of the scope of the problem and of the realism with which it has been faced.

In addition to thus summarizing what it has done, the Commission has a duty to set forth the reasons why it has not achieved more, for it is important that Governments and peoples may understand the findings it has made, the lessons it has drawn from the difficulties it has met, and the conclusions it has reached.

General conclusions and recommendations.-The mandate given by the General Assembly is clear evidence that all Members of the United Nations share the conviction that, unless effective international control is established, there can be no lasting security against atomic weapons for any nation, whatever its size, location, or power.

The First and Second Reports of the Commission show how and to what extent the world must adapt itself if it wants to be protected against the misuse of its new discovery. Ways and means to eliminate the dangers of diversion, clandestine activities, and the seizure of atomic materials and facilities have been studied at length. Specific proposals have been put forward, together with principles for the governance of national policies and of the policies to be pursued by the International Control Agency itself.

The principles submitted in the two Reports of the Commission provide an alternative to the armaments race that results from the absence of international control and which would not be prevented by the establishment of an inadequate system of control. These principles require that atomic energy must not be developed on the basis of national interests and needs, means and resources; but that its planning and operation should be made a common enterprise in all its phases.

Only if traditional economic and political practices are adapted to the overriding requirements of international security can these proposals be implemented. Traditional conceptions of the economic exploitation of the resources of nature for private or national advantage would then be replaced in this field by a new pattern of co-operation in international relations.

Furthermore, secrecy in the field of atomic energy is not compatible with lasting international security. Co-operative development and complete dissemination of information alone promise to remove fears and suspicion that nations are conducting secret activities.

The unprecedented character of its conclusions has not deterred the majority of the Commission from adopting them, since the scientific and technical evidence makes such conclusions inescapable. Past experience has shown that unless there is a novel approach to the problem of controlling a force so readily adaptable to warfare, atomic weapons-notwithstanding their vastly superior destructive powerwill continue just as uncontrolled as other weapons have been and still are, and the threat of atomic war will remain.

The majority of the Commission is fully aware of the impact of its plan on traditional prerogatives of national sovereignty. But in the face of the realities of the problem it sees no alternative to the voluntary sharing by nations of their sovereignty in this field to the extent

required by its proposals. It finds no other solution which will meet the facts, prevent national rivalries in this most dangerous field, and fulfil the Commission's terms of reference.

The new pattern of international co-operation and the new standards of openness in the dealings of one country with another that are indispensable in the field of atomic energy might, in practice, pave the way for international co-operation in broader fields, for the control of other weapons of mass destruction, and even for the elimination of war itself as an instrument of national policy.

However, in the field of atomic energy, the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union to even those elements of effective control considered essential from the technical point of view, let alone their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field by the first and second reports of the Atomic Energy Commission. As a result, the Commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on co-operation in broader fields of policy.

The failure to achieve agreement on the international control of atomic energy arises from a situation that is beyond the competence of this Commission. In this situation, the Commission concludes that no useful purpose can be served by carrying on negotiations at the Commission level.

The Atomic Energy Commission, therefore, recommends that, until such time as the General Assembly finds that this situation no longer exists, or until such time as the sponsors of the General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946, who are the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, find, through prior consultation, that there exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy, negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission be suspended. In accordance with its terms of reference, the Atomic Energy Commission submits this report and recommendation to the Security Council for consideration, and recommends that they be transmitted, along with the two previous reports of the Commission, to the next regular session of the General Assembly as a matter of special concern.

243. REPORTS OF ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Resolution of the General Assembly, November 4, 1948 The General Assembly,

HAVING EXAMINED the first, second and third reports of the Atomic Energy Commission which have been transmitted to it by the Security Council in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946,

1. Approves the General Findings (part II C) and Recommendations (part III) of the first report and the Specific Proposals of part II of the second report of the Commission as constituting the necessary

1 United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to Congress for the year 1948, State Department Publication 3437,pp. 134-185.

basis for establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons in accordance with the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission; 2. Expresses its deep concern at the impasse which has been reached in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission as shown in its third report and regrets that unanimous agreement has not yet been reached; 3. Requests the six sponsors of the General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946, which are the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, to meet together and consult in order to determine if there exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons, and to report to the General Assembly the results of their consultation not. later than its next regular session:

4. Meanwhile,

The General Assembly,

Calls upon the Atomic Energy Commission to resume its sessions, to survey its programme of work, and to proceed to the further study of such of the subjects remaining in the programme of work as it considers to be practicable and useful.

244. ATOMIC EXPLOSION IN THE U. S. S. R.

Statement by President Truman, September 23, 1949 1

I believe the American people to the fullest extent consistent with the national security are entitled to be informed of all developments in the field of atomic energy. That is my reason for making public the following information.

We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U. S. S. R.

Ever since atomic energy was first released by man, the eventual development of this new force by other nations was to be expected. This probability has always been taken into account by us.

Nearly four years ago I pointed out that "scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in time." And, in the threenation declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and of Canada, dated November 15, 1945. It was emphasized that no single nation could, in fact, have a monopoly of atomic weapons.

This recent development emphasizes once again, if indeed such emphasis were needed, the necessity for that truly effective and enforceable international control of atomic energy which this Government and the large majority of the members of the United Nations support.

1 Department of State Bulletin of October 3, 1949, p. 487.

98756-5072

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245. INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY Statement by the Representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, October 25,

1949

On 24 October 1949, the representatives of Canada, China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America agreed to send to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for transmission to the General Assembly, the following interim report on the consultations of the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission:

"In paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 191 (III) of 4 November 1948, the representatives of the Sponsoring Fowers, who are the Permanent Members of the Atomic Energy Commission, namely, Canada, China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, were requested to hold consultations "in order to determine if there exist a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes, and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons'.

"The first meeting took place on 9 August 1949. The consultations have not yet been concluded and are continuing but, in order to inform the General Assembly of the position which has so far been reached, the six Sponsoring Powers have decided to transmit to it the summary records of the first ten meetings."

It was agreed by the group that any of the representatives of the Governments taking part in these consultations retained the right to submit to the Assembly their observations on the course of the consultations so far. The representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States accordingly submit to the General Assembly this statement, which represents their joint views, in the hope that it may assist the Assembly in its consideration of this problem.

BASIS OF DISCUSSION

It was found desirable to approach these consultations from the viewpoint of general principles rather than specific proposals which had been the basis of most of the discussion in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. To this end, the representative of the United Kingdom offered a list of topics as a basis for discussion. Included in this paper was a Statement of Principles relating to each topic (Annex I). It was pointed out that the United Kingdom Statement of Principles was based on the plan approved by the General Assembly, but at the same time covered the essential topics with which any plan for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the control of atomic energy would have to deal. The list of topics was then adopted as the basis for discussion. The representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States made it clear that their Governments accepted the Statement of Principles set forth in this paper and considered them essential to any plan of effective prohibition of atomic weapons and effective control of atomic

2

1 Department of State Bulletin of November 7, 1949, pp. 686–690. U. N. Doc. A/1050. ? See Official Records, AEC., Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 1.

energy for peaceful purposes. They expressed the readiness of their Governments to consider any alternative proposals which might be put forward, but emphasized that they would continue to support the plan approved by the General Assembly unless and until proposals were made which would provide equally or more effective and workable means of control and prohibition.

PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

At the request of the Soviet representative, the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons was taken up first. The texts which served as a basis for the discussion were point four of the Statement of Principles, and a Soviet amendment submitted to replace that text (Annex II). In the course of the discussion, the Soviet representative declared that the representatives of all six Sponsoring Powers were in agreement in recognizing that atomic weapons should be prohibited, and he therefore drew the conclusion that his amendment should be accepted. The other representatives pointed out that it had always been agreed that the production, possession or use of atomic weapons by all nations must be prohibited. But it was also agreed that prohibition could only be enforced by means of an effective system of control. This was recognized even in the Soviet amendment, but the remainder of the amendment contained a repetition of the earlier Soviet proposals for control which were deemed inadequate.

The Soviet representative insisted that two separate conventions, one on prohibition and the other on control, should be put into effect simultaneously. The other representatives maintained that the important point to be resolved was what constitutes effective control, and that this control had to embrace all uses of atomic materials in dangerous quantities. In their view the Soviet proposals would not only fail to provide the security required but they would be so inadequate as to be dangerous. They would delude the peoples of the world into thinking that atomic energy was being controlled when in fact it was not. On the other hand, under the approved plan, the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons would rest not only on the pledge of each nation, but no nation would be permitted to possess the materials with which weapons could be made. Furthermore, the Soviet Government took an impracticable stand as regards the question of timing or stages by which prohibition and control would be brought into effect.

STAGES FOR PUTTING INTO EFFECT PROHIBITION AND CONTROL

On this topic, the Soviet representative maintained that the entire system of prohibition and control must be put into effect simultaneously over the entire nuclear industry.

The representatives of the other Powers pointed out that this would be physically impossible. The development of atomic energy is the world's newest industry, and already is one of the most complicated. It would not be reasonable to assume that any effective system of control could be introduced and enforced overnight. Control and prohibition must, therefore, go into effect over a period of time and by a series of stages.

The plan approved by the General Assembly on 4 November 1948 does not attempt to define what the stages should be, the order in