has sponsored joint talks, and has submitted to them the Commission's own proposals based on frequent consultations, and lastly, suggested arbitration of their differences with respect to the Truce. 283. The period of investigation has been completed. Within the framework of its terms of reference, following in its endeavours_the provisions contained in its Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, the Commission feels that the possibilities of mediation open to it have been exhausted. Over a prolonged period, in a changing and dynamic situation and restricted by long-standing related clarification which proved to be a real impediment to reaching agreement, the framework of the Resolution of 13 August has become inadequate in the light of the factual conditions in the State. The Commission has been unable, therefore, to mediate much beyond what is today a rather outmoded pattern. The State of Jammu and Kashmir has not been demilitarized, as was envisaged in Part II of the Resolution of 13 August, and until this is achieved the conditions necessary to the holding of a plebiscite cannot begin to be established. As has been seen from those parts of the report entitled Withdrawal of Forces and the Azad Kashmir Forces, the Commission believes that the problem of demilitarization must be treated as a whole, and that the distinctions relative to demilitarization which exist in the division of the problem into Truce and Plebiscite periods as visualized in the original plan of demilitarization has proven one of the most difficult obstacles in achieving agreement on the problem. It is evident that the presence of large numbers of troops in the State is not conducive to the creation of a peaceful atmosphere. The demilitarization of the State is essential to permit the holding of a free and unfettered plebiscite. 284. It is imperative that a settlement of the Kashmir issue be reached and the Commission believes that it can be reached. To this end, conditions should be established at an early date which will make possible the holding of a plebiscite whereby the wishes of the people of the State regarding the future of the State may be freely ascertained. 285. The Commission doubts whether a five-member body is the most flexible and desirable instrument to continue in the task. In the Commission's view, a single person can now more effectively conduct the negotiations which, to be successful, must be carried out in active and constant consultation with the two parties. The designation of a single person with broad authority and undivided responsibility offers a more practical means of finding the balance and compromise necessary to advance the settlement of the dispute. 286. Finally, the Commission feels that, since the Government of Pakistan accepted the suggestion that the issues relating to the Truce be settled by arbitration, and that the Government of India has stated that it does not object to the principle of arbitration as provided for in the Charter, further consideration should be given to the use of this procedure. 1. That the Security Council should ask the two Governments to take all necessary precautions to secure that their agreements regarding the cease-fire be faithfully observed; also that the two Governments be enjoined to abstain from any measure liable to augment tension in the State of Jammu and Kashmir pending the final settlement of the future of the State. 2. That the Security Council designate as its representative a single individual whose terms of reference will be defined after the consultations envisaged in point 3, below, and who would proceed to the Sub-continent with broad authority from the Council to endeavour to bring the two Governments together on all unresolved issues; the representative designated to take into account the objectives pursued by the resolution of the Commission, already agreed to by both Governments, for the establishment of conditions conducive to the holding of a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir whereby the will of the people as to the future of the State may be freely and impartially ascertained. 3. That the Security Council should consult with representatives of the two Governments in order to arrive at terms of reference for its representative including consultation regarding the scope of his authority to settle eventually by arbitration, those issues involved in the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as may remain outstanding which impede the creation of conditions for the holding of the plebiscite. 1 INDONESIA 1 151. SELECTED RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE INDONESIAN CASE DURING THE YEAR 1947 (a) Cease Fire Order, August 1, 1947 2 The Security Council NOTING with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed forces of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, Calls upon the parties (a) to cease hostilities forthwith, and (b) to settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means and keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement. 1 For more complete documentation of the Indonesian Question, see Work of the United Nations Good Offices Committee in Indonesia, Department of State publication 3108, International Organization and Conference Series III, 4; Department of State Bulletin of March 14, 1948, pp. 323-336. The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the year 1947, Department of State publication 3024, International Organization and Conference Series III, 1, pp. 242-245. The Linggadjati agreement of November 1946 provided for the de facto recognition of the authority of the Republic in Java, Madura, and Sumatra; the establishment by January 1, 1949, of a sovereign, democratic, federal United States of Indonesia (U. S. I.), composed of the Republic and at least two other states to be formed in Borneo and the eastern islands; and the linking of the U. S. I. to the Netherlands in a NetherlandsIndonesian Union. Although the agreement was finally signed by both governments in March 1947, negotiations aimed at its implementation failed and on July 21, 1947, the Dutch began "police action" that brought under their control economically important areas of Java, Madura, and Sumatra and reduced the Republic to three noncontiguous areas-central Java, westernmost Java, and parts of Sumatra. The conflict was brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations by Australia and India. (b) Resolution on Good Offices Committee for Indonesia, August 25, 1947 1 The Security Council Resolves to tender its good offices to the parties in order to assist in the pacific settlement of their dispute in accordance with paragraph (b) of the Resolution of the Council of 1 August 1947. The Council expresses its readiness, if the parties so request, to assist in the settlement through a committee of the Council consisting of three members of the Council, each party selecting one, and the third to be designated by the two so selected. 152. TRUCE (RENVILLE) AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, JANUARY 17, 1948 2 The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, referred to in this agreement as the parties, hereby agree as follows: 1. That a stand fast and cease fire order be issued separately and simultaneously by both parties immediately upon the signing of this agreement and to be fully effective within forty-eight hours. This order will apply to the troops of both parties along the boundary lines of the areas described in the proclamation of the Netherlands Indies Government on 29 August 1947, which shall be called the status quo line, and in the areas specified in the following paragraph. 2. That in the first instance and for the time being, demilitarized zones be established in general conformity with the above-mentioned status quo line; these zones as a rule will comprise the territories between this status quo line and, on one side, the line of the Netherlands forward positions and, on the other side, the line of the Republican forward positions, the average width of each of the zones being approximately the same. 3. That the establishment of the demilitarized zones in no way prejudices the rights, claims or position of the parties under the resolutions of the Security Council of 1, 25, and 26 August and 1 November 1947. 4. That upon acceptance of the foregoing by both parties, the Committee will place at the disposal of both parties its military assistants who will be instructed to assume, in the first instance, responsibility for determining whether any incident requires enquiry by the higher authorities of either or both parties. 5. That, pending a political settlement, the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and of security of life and property in the demilitarized zones will remain vested in the civil police forces of the respective parties. (The term civil police does not exclude the temporary use of military personnel in the capacity of civil police, The Netherlands designated Belgium and the Republic of Indonesia designated Australia to serve on the Good Offices Committee, and the United States was selected as the third member. The Committee arrived in Batavia on October 27, 1947 and held numerous meetings with representatives of the Netherlands Government and the Republic of Indonesia. Press release 49 of January 20, 1948: "... Dutch and Indonesian delegations have accepted the proposals of the Security Council's Committee of Good Offices as a basis for the settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. UN Doc. S/649, February 10, 1948. The agreement was signed at the fourth meeting of the Committee of Good Offices with the parties on January 17, 1948, aboard the U. S. 8. Renville. it being understood that the police forces will be under civil control.) The Committee's military assistants will be available to advise the appropriate authorities of the parties and to serve in such other proper capacities as may be requested. Among other, they should; (a) call upon pools of police officers established by each party in its demilitarized zone to accompany the military assistants in their endeavours and moves throughout that demilitarized zone. Police officers of one party will not move into and throughout the demilitarized zone of the other party unless accompanied by a military assistant of the Committee of Good Offices and a police officer of that other party. (b) promote co-operation between the two police forces. 6. That trade and intercourse between all areas should be permitted as far as possible; such restrictions as may be necessary will be agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Committee and its representatives if required. 7. That this agreement shall include all the following points already agreed to in principle by the parties: (a) To prohibit sabotage, intimidation and reprisals and other activities of a similar nature against individuals, groups of individuals, and property, including destruction of property of any kind and by whomsoever owned, and to utilize every means at their command to this end. (b) To refrain from broadcasts or any other form of propaganda aimed at provoking or disturbing troops and civilians. (c) To initiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all troops and civilians of the delicate situation and the necessity for strict compliance with the provisions sub (a) and (b). (d) Full opportunity for observation by military and civil assistants made available to the Committee of Good Offices. (e) To cease immediately the publication of a daily operational communique or any other information about military operations unless by prior mutual agreement in writing, except weekly publication of lists of individuals (giving names, numbers and home addresses) who have been killed or have died as a result of injuries received in action. (f) To accept the principle of the release of prisoners by each party and to commence discussions with a view to the most rapid and convenient implementation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the number of prisoners held by either party. 8. That, on the acceptance of the foregoing, the Committee's military assistants will immediately conduct enquiries to establish whether and where, especially in West Java, elements of the Republican military forces continue to offer resistance behind the present forward positions of the Netherlands forces. If the enquiry establishes the existence of such forces, these would withdraw as quickly as practicable, and in any case within twenty-one days, as set out in the following paragraph. 9. That all forces of each party in any area accepted as a demilitarized zone or in any area on the other party's side of a demilitarized zone, will, under the observation of military assistants of the Committee and with arms and warlike equipment, move peacefully to the territory on the party's own side of the demilitarized zones. Both parties undertake to facilitate a speedy and peaceful evacuation of the forces concerned. 10. This agreement shall be considered binding unless one party notifies the Committee of Good Offices and the other party that it considers the truce regulations are not being observed by the other party and that this agreement should therefore be terminated. For the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands RADEN ABDULKADIR WIDJOJOATMODJO, For the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Chairman of the delegation The signatures appearing above were hereunto subscribed this 17th day of January 1948, on board the U. S. S. Renville, in the presence of the representatives on the United Nations Security Council Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian question, and the Committee Secretary, whose signatures are hereunto subscribed as witnesses: Chairman: Secretary: 153. POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN INDONESIA 1 (a) Basic Principles for the Negotiations Between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, January 17, 1948 The Committee of Good Offices has been informed by the delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and by the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia that, the truce agreement having been signed, their Governments accept the following principles on which the political discussions will be based: 1. That the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices be continued in the working out and signing of an agreement for the settlement of the political dispute in the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura, based upon the principles underlying the Linggadjati Agreement. 2. It is understood that neither party has the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking toward political organizations which are in accord with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement. It is further understood that each party will guarantee the freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times provided that his guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals. 3. It is understood that decisions concerning changes in administration of territory should be made only with the full and free consent of the populations of those territories and at a time when the security and freedom from coercion of such populations will have been ensured. 1 UN Doc. S/649, February 10, 1948, p. 111. These principles were accepted at the fourth meeting of the Committee of Good Offices with the parties on January 17, 1948. |