nience; and the Realists insisted, that they had a po- CHAP. sitive existence exterior to the mind, and were, there Universal be distinguished from a particular one, it will not be so from particulars. XII. HISTORY OF THE SCHOLAS- But if a substance shall be many universal things, I take one of LOSOPHY. these universal things, and I ask-Is it either many things; or, one, and not many? If the last be granted, it will follow that it is single-If the first be conceded, I ask, will it not be either many single things, or many universal things? and thus the process will be in infinitum. Or it will be allowed, that no substance is an universal, and therefore is not a singular. Again-If an Universal shall be one substance existing in single substances, and distinct from them, it will follow that it may exist without them; because every thing prior to another may naturally, by divine power, exist without it. But the consequens is absurd. Therefore Again, if that opinion were true, no individual could be created. If any individual could be, then it would occur, that it would not take its whole being out of nothing, if the Universal, which is in it, was first in another. From the same it would follow, that God could not simply annihilate an individual, unless he should destroy other individuals. Because, if he should annihilate any individual, he would destroy all which is of the essence of that individual; and by consequence he would destroy that Universal which is in it and in others: and by consequence other things would not remain, since they could not remain with a part of their substance wanting, which would be that Universal. Again-Such Universal could not be put as any thing totally out of the essence of the individual. It will therefore be of the essence of the individual; and by consequence an individual will be composed of Universals, and so an individual will not be more universal than singular. Again-It will follow, that something of the essence of our Saviour will be miserable and damned, because that common nature existing really in him, would be damned in the damned, as in Judas. But this is absurd. Therefore- Many other reasons might be adduced, which for the sake of brevity, I pass by. But I confirm my conclusion by authorities:First, by Aristotle, treating in his Metaphysics on this question -Whether the Universal be a substance. He demonstrates that no Universal is a substance, when he says it is impossible that a substance should be any thing of those called universals. [After several references to Aristotle, he adds] From the preceding authorities it may be collected, that no Universal is a substance, howsoever it be considered. A consideration of the intellect alone does not make any thing to be a BOOK fore, real objects of the imagination. They thought that there was such a thing somewhere as an abstract VI. 11 LITERARY ENGLAND. HISTORY OF Substance or not a substance; altho the meaning of the term may cause this name substance to be predicated of it or not, but not pro se. So as if this term, dog-State in this, a dog is an animal. If this stands of the barking animal, it is true; if, of the star in the sky, it is false. Therefore that the same thing should by one consideration be a substance, and by another not a substance, is impossible. Therefore it must be granted, that no Universal is a substance, however considered. But every Universal is a meaning of the mind, which, according to a probable opinion, is not distinguished from the act of understanding. Whence they say, that the meaning, by which I understand mankind, is a natural sign signifying man; as natural, as a groan is a sign of infirmity or pain; and is such a sign, that it may stand for men in mental propositions, as voice may stand for things in vocal propositions. And that the Universal is a meaning of the mind, is sufficiently expressed by Avicenna, 5 Meta. where he remarks, I say, then, that the Universal is expressed in three ways: for that is called an Universal which is spoken of many in action, as man: for that meaning is called an Universal, which nothing forbids to be thought of when it is predicated of many.' From this it appears, that the Universal is a meaning of the mind, conceived to be predicated of many. This may be confirmed by reason, for every Universal is predicable of many; but the meaning of the mind only, or the sign voluntarily instituted, is born to be predicated of many, and is not any substance. Therefore the meaning of the mind only, or the sign voluntarily instituted, is the Universal. But now, I do not use the sign universally for a sign voluntarily instituted, but for that which is naturally Universal; because, indeed, a substance is not born to be predicated afterwards; because, if so, it would follow that a proposition should be composed of particular substances, and by consequence the subjectum would be at Rome and the predicated at Oxford; which is absurd. Again-A proposition either is in the mind or in the voice, or in writing. But to man they are not particular substances. Therefore it appears that no proposition can be composed of substances, but is composed of universals. Universals, therefore, are not substances in any way. 8. Occham, Summa Logicæ, c. 15, p. Occham's next chapter is peculiarly directed against Duns Scotus. Altho it be obvious to many, that the Universal is not some substance existing in individuals, beyond the mind, really distinct or universal bird, which was contained in every indi- CHAP. vidual bird, or which existed somewhere or other in XII. HISTORY: from them, yet it seems to some, that the Universal is in some oF THE manner beyond the mind, and in individuals; not, indeed, really, SCHOLASbut formally distinct from them. Whence they say, that human TIC PHInature is in sortes, which is contracted to sortes by one individual LOSOPHY. difference; which is not distinguished from that nature really but formally; hence they are not two things; yet the one is not formally the other. But this opinion seems to be irrational; because, in creatures there cannot be any distinction whatsoever beyond the mind, unless where the things are distinct. If, then, there be any distinction soever between that nature and that difference, the things must be really distinct. I prove it thus by syllogism. This nature is not formally distinct from that nature. But this individual difference is formally distinct from this nature. Therefore this individual difference is not this nature. So the same thing is not both common and peculiar. Yet, according to these gentlemen, the individual difference is peculiar; but the universal is common. Therefore the universal term and the individual difference are not the same thing. In like manner opposites cannot suit the same thing; but common and peculiar are opposites, therefore the same thing is not common and proper; which would follow if the individual difference and the common nature were the same thing. Also If a common nature were the same really to every individual difference, then there would be really as many common natures as there are individual differences, and by consequence neither of them would be common, but every thing would be peculiar to the difference, to which it was really the same. So every thing is by itself, and not thro another, distinguished from whatsoever it is distinguished. But there is one humanity of chance, sortis, and another of Plato, but they are distinguished in themselves, not then by added differences. Thus Aristotle says, whatever differ in species differ in number; but the nature of a man and of a calf differ in themselves in species; therefore they differ in themselves in number. Hence, that which by no power can concur in many, is by no power predicable of many; but such a nature, if it be the same thing really with individual difference, can by no power suit many things, because it can in no manner suit another individual. Therefore it cannot by any power be predicable of many, and in consequence, can by no power be an Universal. I take that individual difference, and the nature which it contracts, and I ask-Either between them there is a greater distinction than between two individuals, or a less one? There is not a VOL. IV. ΚΚ VI. LITERARY BOOK dependently of any particular one; which seems to resemble the Platonic notion, of some primeval archetypal ideas of every thing existing separately from, and anterior to their created and visible forms. What these ancient schoolmen, with the Aristotelians and Arab logicians, called Universals, Mr. Locke termed Complex Ideas," and "General Ideas," made by abstraction. He says, 'Ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together, I call complex; such as beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe. I call 66 80 greater, because they do not really differ; nor a less, because then they would be of the same ratio, as two individuals are of the same ratio; and by consequence, if one is of itself one in number, the rest would be one in number. So I ask, Whether the nature be an individual difference, or not an individual difference ?-If it be, then I argue syllogistically thus-This difference is not formally distinct from individual difference, but in nature there is this individual difference. Therefore nature is not formally distinct from individual difference. So this difference is peculiar and not common, and this individual difference is in nature; then the nature is peculiar and not common. But if it be said that this individual difference is not in nature, the proposition is established; for it follows, that if individual difference be not in nature then individual difference is not really in nature; because from the opposite of the consequent follows the opposite of the antecedent. Thus by arguing that individual dif ference is really in nature-therefore individual difference is in nature he concludes this chapter with this decision,-" Every essence and quiddity, and whatever is of substance, if it be really beyond the mind, either is simply and absolutely matter, or it is form; or it is composed from these; or it is an imaginable abstract substance, according to the doctrine of the Peripatetics." W. Occham, Log. c. 16. p. 8. 80 Mr. Horne Tooke ought to have the credit of this just remark.f Mr. Locke would not have talked of the composition of ideas, but would have seen that it was merely a contrivance of language; and that the only composition was in the terms; and consequently, that it was as improper to speak of a complex idea, as it would be to call a constellation a complex star: and that they are not ideas, but merely terms, which are general and abstract.' Div. Purley, 1. p. 37. such complex ideas, which contain not in themselves CHAP. the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependencies on, or affections of sub- HISTORY stances; as triangle, gratitude, murther.' XII. OF THE SCHOLAS LOSOPHY. Neither of these two parties allowed the victory to TIE PHIthe other, and their logic maintained either side with equal dexterity, plausibility, and pertinacity. Mr. Locke thought, that our most abstruse ideas are "only such as the understanding frames to itself, by repeat-. ing and joining together ideas that it had either from objects of sense or from its own operations about them;" and that even "large and abstract ideas are derived from sensation or reflection." Mr. Horne Tooke more acutely considers them to be rather words than ideas. It certainly is true that the Universals of the logicians have no similar realities or prototypes in nature. They are words indexing thoughts and combinations of the mind, but are not the representatives of actually existing things. So far the ancient Nominalists were right. But some of them pressed their theory into an erroneous scepticism, from which many results were inferred, that were directed to attack all that we most venerate in nature, and most need in society.82 81 Essay Hum. Und. book 2. c. 12. 82 We might have supposed that such reasoners as these, and such forms of mind had vanished for ever; but a class of men, uncongenial with that true and sound British intellect, which has become the character of our nation, and originating elsewhere, has been lately striving to revive the schoolmen's style of verbal argumentation and barren logic, by à priori reasoning, from asserted propositions, assumed principles, and partial definitions, which suit their wishes and intended conclusions, independent of all past experience: ungrounded upon any confirming facts; and not seeking knowlege, support, illustration or correction from what has already occurred in human society. They decry, explode, and would destroy all preceding histories; the classics; all theistical philosophers; all works of feeling and of fancy; all former moralists and moral compositions; all religion and its virtues; all divine nature; all |