could be ascertained. The necessary repairs could not be made, nor the proper lamps and other security for travel- · lers be provided, nor the draw raised for the accommodation of navigators, nor the many other duties performed which are incident to such property, if it is to be maintained, by any body, for the common benefit of the public.

It is manifest therefore that when the Legislature provided that the Commonwealth should receive and become entitled to hold this property, they laid the necessity for further legal enactments, previous to the time when the surrender to the Commonwealth would be made.

No inquiry need be pursued as to the condition of things in case the surrender of this property to the Commonwealth should take place without any provision being made by law for the manner of using it.

The supposition of such a case is wholly inadmissible. It would imply that the Legislature had been negligent of its duty, and is no more to be imagined, than that it would omit to provide for elections, or taxes, or judicial courts, or any other of those great popular interests by which government is preserved, or anarchy prevented.

Accordingly in 1832, when the time was approaching for the Commonwealth to have a present right of possession, the Legislature extended for a year the duration of the Warren Bridge Corporation, on certain conditions as in the act of that year is provided, by which its own title was postponed for a limited period, and a question avoided as to the exact day on which it might have insisted on a surrender.

In 1833, when the Bridge Corporation had not, and did not pretend to have, any beneficial interest in the charter, (the proprietors having been indemnified for their advan

ces according to the terms of the contract,) the Legislature, by the act of 28th March of that year, authorized the Governor to take possession, appoint toll gatherers and other agents, pay them for their services, and draw his warrant on the Treasury for the necessary repairs and such contingent expenses as might accrue in the case of said Bridge, and continued the tolls, as before they had been established, until the last day of the first session of the then next General Court.

But the Legislature also provided that in case the Warren Bridge Corporation would give a certain Bond, with condition as therein expressed, the Governor should refrain from the official acts personally devolving upon him by that statute, and all those acts should be done by the Corporation, which for that purpose, and in that event, was kept alive and continued in existence.

The Corporation did give the Bond, and thereupon assumed to do and did do what, if no such Bond was given, would have been done by the government of the State under the authority of that Statute.

In the above statement I have not cited the phraseology of the statute, but in a condensed form endeavored to express my construction of its meaning, operation, and effect.

If I am correct, the statutes of '28 and '33 conveyed the right of property and the right of possession to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth became in fact seized of the property, franchise and estate in and to this bridge; persons passing were made liable to toll, and to suit at law in case they refused payment; the obligation to pay and power to collect remained in force by that last statute ex proprio vigore, until the last day of the first session of the General Court, which began in January, 1834; and the Warren Bridge Corporation was the agent

and representative of the Commonwealth for carrying these provisions into effect.

Before the day named for the expiration of that statute, an act was passed, bearing date 28th March, 1834, by which act, the act last named, viz, the act of 1833 was continued in force until the last day of the session of the then next General Court.

If there is any thing plain in the English language, or in common sense, it is this, that by the last named statute, the tolls of Warren Bridge are to be continued, and the toll gatherers are to be appointed, and the bridge is to be kept in repair in the same way, for a limited time to come, as for the then past year, and that the Governor shall assume the execution of the law, unless the Warren Bridge Corporation would again become the agents of the Commonwealth, and give bond to conduct faithfully according to the terms and provisions of the statute.

No doubt existed at the time of the meaning of the law. The Corporation gave the bond which was required, and is now in the Treasury, and proceeded to do the duty which the statute imposed; and so faithfully has this duty been performed, that a sum of money amounting to more than $26,000 has been collected and paid into the treasury of the Commonwealth by that Corporation; after deducting all expenses incident to the preservation of the property, or growing out of the condition of it.

By force of the law of 1834, the toll is assessed, and becomes payable "until the last day of the session of the next General Court;" and by force of the bond, the Corporation is bound to collect and pay it to the treasurer of the Commonwealth for that period of time, under a penalty of twenty thousand dollars.

The General Court commenced its session on the first

Wednesday of January, 1835, and the last day of its session has not yet arrived. That day will probably be in September or October next, on which day the tolls will cease to be demandable, and the Corporation will of course cease to be the public agents, unless between this time and that, some new provision of law shall be enacted.

That some such provision will be enacted, there is no reason to doubt. The Legislature will declare the Bridge a free Bridge, or will prolong the time for taking the toll, and provide a mode of collecting it, as in its wisdom and justice it may deem proper. In the mean time no man may pass it without liability to toll. The Corporation can suffer no man to pass free without a forfeiture of their bond, and the courts of law will sustain an action against any one, at the suit of the Corporation, who may neglect or refuse to pay the sum, which is assessed by the original act. I may add, that any combination to resist the payment of toll, is punishable by indictment; and that any violence or disorder tending to a breach of the peace, may be prevented or suppressed by the intervention of the Magistrates.

The only circumstance calculated to throw the slightest shade over this view of the subject is that which is occasioned by the adjournment of the Legislature, from the eighth of April to the first of September. This, it has been intimated, makes two sessions, of which the first is ended. The law it is further alleged, extends only to the end of the first session, and so has expired; and however it may be with the law, the bond it is urged, lasts in force only for that term, and is therefore void from the eighth instant.

No one of these allegations seems to me to be correct. The session in September is but a continuance of the

session in April, as the session in April was a continuance of that in March, February or January. During the legislative term there have been two hundred adjournments for a longer or shorter period, but these adjournments do not break tthe continuity of the session, whatever be the time that intervenes between the assembling on one day and another.

That an adjournment of the session of the General Court is not a termination, but on the contrary a prolongation of it, is perfectly certain; and it is as clear that the length of the recess between the two meetings, whether for a few hours, a day, several days, weeks or months, does not alter the case. Adjournment, says Jefferson, speaking of the British parliament, is no more than a continuance of the session from one day to another, or for a fortnight, a month, &c., ad libitum. The same is true of the General Court of Massachusetts. The adjournment of either house, by the act of that house alone, is limited to a period not exceeding two days at a time; but it is expressly declared, chapter 1, section 1, art. 1, of the constitution, that the legislative body shall assemble on the last Wednesday in May, and at such other times as they shall judge necessary, and the amendment of 1831, which changed the time from May to January, confirmed this power of adjournment by a provision that "nothing herein contained shall prevent the General Court from assembling at such other time as they shall judge necessary."

But the General Court must first meet in January, which time is fixed by the constitution, and the "other times," must be some future day at which they shall judge proper to assemble. Their judgment fixes this other time. They have authority to fix it by the constitution;