Philadelphia & T. R. Co. v. Stimpson, 14 In Lem Moon Sing's Case it was said: "The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications." And in Fok Yung Yo's Case, the latest one in this court, it was said: 66 Congressional action has placed the final determination of the right of admission [99] in executive officers, without judicial intervention, and this has been for many years the recognized and declared policy of the country.'" What was the extent of the authority of the executive officers of the government over the petitioner after she landed? As has been seen, the Secretary of the Treasury, under the above act of October 19th, 1888, chap. 1210, was authorized, within one year after an alien of the excluded class entered the country, to cause him to be taken into custody and returned to the country whence he came. Substantially the same power was conferred by the act of March 3d, 1891, chap. 551, by the 11th section of which it is provided that the alien immigrant may be sent out of the country, "as provided by law," at any time within the year after his illegally coming into the United States. Taking all its enactments together, it is clear that Congress did not intend that the mere admission of an alien, or his mere entering the country, should place him at all times thereafter entirely beyond the control or authority of the executive officers of the government. On the contrary, if the Secretary of the Treasury became satisfied that the immigrant had been allowed to land contrary to the prohibition of that law, then he could at any time within a year after the landing cause the immigrant to be taken into custody and deported. The immigrant must be taken to have entered subject to the condition that he might be sent out of the country by order of the proper executive officer if, within a year, he was found to have been wrongfully admitted into, or had | illegally entered, the United States. These were substantially the views expressed by the circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit in United States v. Yamasaka, 40 C. C. A. 454, 100 Fed. 404. It is contended, however, that in respect of an alien who has already landed it is consistent with the acts of Congress that he may be deported without previous notice of any purpose to deport him, and without any opportunity on his part to show by competent evidence before the executive officers charged with the execution of the acts of Congress, that he is not here in violation of law; that the deportation of an alien without provision for such a notice and for an opportunity to be heard was inconsistent [100] with the due process of law required by the 5th Amendment of the Constitution. Leaving on one side the question whether an alien can rightfully invoke the due proc ess clause of the Constitution who has entered the country clandestinely, and who has been here for too brief a period to have become, in any real sense, a part of our popu lation, before his right to remain is disputed, we have to say that the rigid construction of the acts of Congress suggested by the appellant are not justified. Those acts do not necessarily exclude opportunity to the immigrant to be heard, when such opportunity is of right. It was held in Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. 272, 280, 281, 283, 15 L. ed. 372, 376, 377, that " though due process of law' generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer and a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings, yet this is not universally true:" and "that though, generally, both public and private wrongs are redressed through judicial action, there are more summary extra-judicial remedies for both." Hence, it was decided in that case to be consistent with due process of law for Congress to provide summary means to compel revenue officers and, in case of default, their sureties to pay such balances of the public money as might be in their hands. Now, it has been settled that the power to exclude or expel aliens belonged to the political department of the government, and that the order of an executive officer invested with the power to determine finally the facts upon which an alien's right to enter this country, or remain in it, depended, was "due process of law, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized to do so, was at liberty to re-examine the evidence on which he acted, or to controvert its sufficiency." Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659, 35 L. ed. 1146, 1149, 12 Sup. Ct. Kep. 336; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 713, 37 L. ed. 905, 913, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 547, 39 L. ed. 1082, 1085, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 967. But this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that made by or for the appellant. Whether furinhere in "due process of law" as under-ther investigation should have been ordered stood at the time of the adoption of the Con- was for the officers charged with the execu[101]stitution. *One of these principles is that tion of the statutes to determine. Their acno person shall be deprived of his liberty tion in that regard is not subject to judicial without opportunity, at some time, to be review. Suffice it to say, it does not appear heard, before such officers, in respect of the that appellant was denied an opportunity to matters upon which that liberty depends, be heard. And as no appeal was taken to not necessarily an opportunity upon a reg- the Secretary from the decision of the imular, set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one that will migration inspector, that decision was final secure the prompt, vigorous action contem- and conclusive. If the appellant's want of plated by Congress, and at the same time be knowledge of the English language put her appropriate to the nature of the case upon at some disadvantage in the investigation which such officers are required to act. conducted by that officer, that was her misTherefore, it is not competent for the Sec- fortune, and constitutes no reason, under retary of the Treasury or any executive of the acts of Congress, or under any rule of ficer, at any time within the year limited law, for the intervention of the court by by the statute, arbitrarily to cause an alien habeas corpus. We perceive no ground for who has entered the country, and has be- such intervention,- none for the contention come subject in all respects to its jurisdic that due process of law was denied to aption, and a part of its population, although pellant. alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States. No such arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved in due process of law are recognized. This is the reasonable construction of the acts of Congress here in question, and they need not be otherwise interpreted. In the case of all acts of Congress, such interpretation ought to be adopted as, without doing violence to the import of the words used, will bring them into harmony with the Constitution. An act of Congress must be taken to be constitutional unless the contrary plainly and palpably appears. The words here used do not require an interpretation that would invest executive or administrative officers with the absolute, arbitrary power implied in the contention of the appellant. Besides, the record now before us shows that the appellant had notice, al though not a formal one, of the investigation instituted for the purpose of ascertaining whether she was illegally in this country. The traverse to the return made by the immigration inspector shows upon its face that she was before that officer pending the investigation of her right to be in the United States, and made answers to questions propounded to her. It is true that she pleads a want of knowledge of our language; that she did not understand the nature and import of the questions propounded to her; that the investigation made was a pre[102]tended" *one; and that she did not, at the time, know that the investigation had reference to her being deported from the country. These considerations cannot justify the intervention of the courts. They could have been presented to the officer having primary control of such a case, as well as upon an appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury, who had power to order another investiga tion if that course was demanded by law or by the ends of justice. It is not to be assumed that either would have refused a second or fuller investigation, if a proper application and showing for one had been The judgment is affirmed. Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice OREGON & CALIFORNIA RAILROAD[103] COMPANY, Appt., v. UNITED STATES. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 103-116.) withdrawal of in 1. The Secretary of the Interior was not author- 2. 3. No interest in any specific sections of land The selection of lands within the indemnity homestead laws as soon as the land should be | 141 U. S. 358, 35 L. ed. 766, 12 Sup. Ct. surveyed. 4. The rights of one who has settled in good faith on an odd-numbered section within the indemnity limits of the grant by the act of July 25, 1866, chap. 242, to the California & Oregon Railroad Company prior to their selection by that company to supply deficiencies in the place limits, cannot be affected by the fact, subsequently appearing, that all the oddnumbered sections within such indemnity limits were needed to supply deficiencies in the place limits. [No. 186.] Rep. 13. The relative rights of two railroads claim- St. Paul & S. C. R. Co. v. Winona & St. Indemnity lands are appropriated to the St. Paul & P. R. Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. Argued March 4, 1903. Decided April 139 U. S. 1, 35 L. ed. 77, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6, 1903. 389. The bill should be dismissed upon the ground that the United States cannot bring that the outcome of the suit would simply Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to review a decree which affirmed a decree of the Circuit Court for the District of Oregon canceling a patent issued to the Oregon & California Railroad Company. Affirmed. United States v. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338, 32 See same case below, 48 C. C. A. 520, 109 L. ed. 121, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1083; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co. 125 U. S. 273, 31 L. ed. 747, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850. Fed. 514. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Maxwell Evarts argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant: The mere occupancy of public land creates no right therein as against the United States, and the land still remains part of the public domain and subject to disposal by the government. The Yosemite Valley Case, 15 Wall. 77, sub nom. Hutchings v. Low, 21 L. ed. 82; Lansdale v. Daniels, 100 U. S. 113, 25 L. ed. 587; Sparks v. Pierce, 115 U. S. 408, 29 L. ed. 428, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102. Relative rights of a railroad under its land grant and an individual are deter mined, and determined only, by the question as to which one first filed record evidence of a claim. Tarpey v. Madsen, 178 U. S. 215, 44 L. ed. 1042, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 849. The fact and date of occupancy are unimportant in determining conflicting claims of an individual and a railroad company to lands within a railroad grant. Ibid.; Northern P. R. Co. v. Colburn, 164 U. S. 383, 41 L. ed. 479, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 98; Whitney v. Taylor, 158 U. S. 85, 39 L. ed. 906, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 796; Buxton v. Traver, 130 U. S. 232, 32 L. ed. 920, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 509. Under the ordinary principles of equity the right of the railroad to the patent for this land, being first in point of time, whether as to its record title or as to its original inception, should be held to be superior to the right thereto of the individual occupants. Mr. Charles W. Russell argued the Lands within the indemnity limits re- not. a sufficient Southern P. R. Co. v. Bell, 183 U. S. 689, 46 L. ed. 390, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232. Settlement before definite location, where no declaratory statement could be filed, takes land out of the place grant if stated, after definite location, in the declaratory statement as occurring prior to such definite location. Tarpey v. Madsen, 178 U. S. 215, 44 L. ed. 1042, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 849. Settlement of unsurveyed place lands in 1881, prior to definite location in 1884, there being a survey and application to file in 1893, long after definite location, gave the settler the land. Nelson v. Northern P. R. Co. 188 U. S. 108, ante, 406, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 302. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: By the act of Congress of March 3d, 1887, chap. 376, it was provided that if, at the [104] completion of the adjustments of land grants thereby directed to be made, or sooner, it appeared that lands had been from any cause erroneously certified or patented to or for any company claiming by, through, or under grant from the United States to aid in the construction of a railroad, it should be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to thereupon demand from such company a reAs between an occupant of the public linquishment or reconveyance to the United lands and a railroad claiming indemnity States of all such lands, whether within lands under a grant from the government, granted or indemnity limits; and, if the comthat one is to be preferred who first obtains pany did not reconvey within ninety days record evidence of his claim. after demand made, it should thereupon be United States v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. ' the duty of the Attorney General to com Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330, 23 L. ed. 424. mence and prosecute in the proper courts the | chap. 242, 14 Stat. at L. 239, the California necessary proceedings to cancel the patents, & Oregon Railroad Company, and such comcertification, or other evidence of title there- pany organized under the laws of Oregon as tofore issued for the lands, and to restore the the legislature of the latter state designated, title thereof to the United States. 24 Stat. were authorized to locate, construct, and at L. 556 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1595). maintain a railroad and telegraph line beIn United States v. Missouri, K. & T. R. tween Portland, Oregon, and the Central PaCo. 141 U. S. 360, 380, 382, 35 L. ed. 766, cific Railroad Company in California. 773, 774, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13, 21, which was For the purpose of aiding in the construcan action brought by the United States after tion of that line, Congress granted to those the passage of the above statute to have companies, their successors and assigns, evcertain patents for land canceled, this court, ery alternate odd-numbered section of public after observing that as to some of the lands lands, not mineral, to the amount of twenty the United States appeared to have a di- sections per mile (ten on each side) of the rect interest in them, said: "As to others, railroad line. But the act provided that it is under an obligation to claimants un- when any of the alternate sections or parts der the homestead and pre-emption laws to of sections should be found "to have been undo the wrong alleged to have been done granted, sold, reserved, occupied by homeby its officers, in violation of law, by re- stead settlers, pre-empted, or otherwise dismoving the cloud cast upon its title by the posed of, other lands, designated as aforepatents in question, and thereby enable it said, shall be selected by said companies in to properly administer these lands, and to lieu thereof, under the direction of the Secgive clear title to those whose rights, under retary of the Interior, in alternate sections those laws, may be superior to those of the designated by odd numbers, as aforesaid, railway company. A suit, therefore, to ob- nearest to, and not more than 10 miles be-[106] tain a decree annulling the patents in ques- yond the limits of, said first-named altertion, so far as it is proper to do so, was re-nate sections; and as soon as the said comquired by the duty the government owed, panies, or either of them, shall file in the as well to the public as to the individuals office of the Secretary of the Interior a map who acquired rights which the patents, if allowed to stand, may defeat or embarrass." Reference was made in that case to United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co. 125 U. S. 273, 286, 31 L. ed. 747, 752, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850, in which it was held that the United States could sue to set aside a patent improperly issued, where it appeared that there was an obligation on the part of the United States to the public, or to any individual, or where it had any interest of its own; also, to United States v. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338, 342, 32 L. ed. 121, 123, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1083, in [105] which it was *held that patents procured by fraud could be canceled at the suit of the United States, where that was necessary to be done in order that it might fulfil its obligations to others. The court then observed: "These principles equally apply where patents have been issued by mistake, and they are specially applicable where, as in the present case, a multiplicity of suits, each one depending upon the same facts and upon the same questions of law, can be avoided, and where a comprehensive decree, covering all contested rights, would accomplish the substantial ends of justice." See also United States v. Oregon & C. R. Co. 176 U. S. 28, 44 L. ed. 358, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261. In this state of the law, the present suit was brought by the United States against the Oregon & California Railroad Company in order to obtain a decree canceling certain patents for lands which, it was alleged, had been illegally, and by mistake, issued in the name of the United States to that company, which succeeded to the rights of the Oregon Central Railroad Company. The case was heard upon a stipulation as to evidence, from which the following facts appear: By the act of Congress of July 25th, 1866, of the survey of said railroad, or any portion thereof, not less than 60 continuous miles from either terminus, the Secretary of the Interior shall withdraw from sale public lands herein granted on each side of said railroad, so far as located and within the limits before specified. Settlers un der the provisions of the homestead act who comply with the terms and requirements of said act shall be entitled, within the limits of said grant, to patents for an amount not exceeding 80 acres of the land so reserved by the United States, anything in this act to the contrary notwithstanding." The Oregon Central Railroad Company was designated by the Oregon legislature as the company organized under the laws of Oregon, entitled to receive the granted lands in Oregon, and the benefits and privileges of the above act of 1866. Prior to October, 1869, that company definitely fixed on the ground and surveyed the first section of the railroad in Oregon. That section extended from Portland to Jefferson, and comprised not less than 60 continuous miles from the northern terminus of the road; and on October 25th, 1869, the company filed in the office of the Secretary of the Interior, and on January 29th, 1870, the Secretary duly accepted and approved, a map of the survey and definite location of that section. During the year 1869 and the months of January and February, 1870, the company definitely fixed on the ground and surveyed the second section of its road, which section comprised not less than 124 continuous miles from Jefferson; and on March 26th, 1870, filed in the office of the Secretary, and on March 29th, 1870, that officer accepted and approved, a map of the survey and definite location of that section. On the 7th of April, 1870, the Commis sioner of the General Land Office, under the | fully equipped, and made ready by the de- tary on March 26th, 1870) from sale or All the lands described in the bill of com[107]location, pre-emption or homestead *en-plaint are distant more than 20 miles from, try; and that withdrawal remained con- but lie within 30 miles on one side of, the No part or portion of the lands described in the bill of complaint are mineral lands, nor are they included by any exception or reservation from the indemnity land grant in Oregon, made by the act of 1866, except so far as, if at all, they were excepted or reserved therefrom by reason of the settlements and facts hereinafter to be referred to. On August 16th, 1892, all the lands described in the bill were free and clear for selection by the defendant company as part and parcel of the indemnity lands granted by the act of Congress, except so far as, if at all, they were excepted or reserved by those settlements and facts. During the years 1868 and 1869, and prior to December the 25th, 1869, the Oregon Central Railroad Company constructed and fully equipped the first 20 miles of the railroad contemplated by the act of 1866, commencing at Portland and extending along the line shown upon the map filed in the office of the Secretary of the Interior on October the 29th, 1869. And in the years 1869 and 1870, and prior to September the 1st, 1870, the above two companies fully equipped the second 20 miles of the rail road, commencing at the end of the first constructed 20 miles and extending along the line shown on the map to a point distant 40 miles from the commencment of the railroad at Portland,―a portion of the second 20 miles having been constructed by the Oregon Central Railroad Company, the re-ulations, and requirements of the Secretary mainder by the defendant. The whole line of railroad contemplated by the act of 1866, commencing at the end of the second constructed 20 miles, was constructed by the defendant company during the years 1870, 1871, and 1872; and prior to December the 4th, 1872, the entire line from Portland to Roseburg was continuously operated for all the purposes contemplated by Congress. Commissioners were appointed by the President to examine the railroad as constructed from Portland to Roseburg. That duty was performed, and they reported to the President, under oath, that the railroad between those points had been completed and equipped in all respects as required, and was ready for the service contemplated by [108] the act of 1866. Those reports were duly accepted and approved by the President. The report as to the seventh, eighth, and ninth sections, including the last 78 miles of the road from Portland to Roseburg, was made on July 10th, 1878, and the next day was accepted and approved. The remaining part of the road in Oregon, extending from Roseburg to the south ern boundary of that state, was constructed, On the 16th of August, 1892, and the 19th of October, 1892, the defendant company filed with the register and receiver of the United States land office at Roseburg its several lists selecting the lands in question as indemnity lands in lieu of lands of equal area, parts of odd-numbered sections within the primary limits of the grant made in 1866 and otherwise disposed of by the United States prior to the passage of that act. Those lists were accompanied by the fees, costs, and charges required by law, and in all respects conformed to the directions, rules, reg of the Interior and of the Commissioner *of[109] In the following years the following persons, each being a duly qualified entryman under the homestead laws of the United States, settled upon the lands respectively claimed for them in this suit, to wit: 1869, Louis [Charles] Heller; 1878, J. R. Peters; 1878, John Sapp; 1882, George C. Peck; 1883, Uriah W. Wren; 1885, Baxter W. Jenkins; 1885, Charles E. Barton; 1888, Joseph A. Cox; 1889, Charles W. Seeley; 1889, John W. Carey; 1890, F. W. Huddleston; 1890, Alfred R. Young; 1890, Abraham M. Peck. Each person made his settlement with the intention of making a homestead entry of the lands, whenever that could be done under the acts of Congress. After the date of settlement each settler continuously resided and made improvements upon his land in the way of a dwelling house, barn, |