are now and have for years been in effect in this state, are reasonable: Where the one-way ticket fare is $0.10 to $1.45, an excess charge of 10 cents should be added. Where the one-way ticket fare is $1.50 to $1.95, an excess charge of 15 cents should be added. Where the one-way ticket fare is $2 to $2.45, an excess charge of 20 cents should be added. Where the one-way ticket fare is $2.50 to $2.95, an excess charge of 25 cents should be added. Where the one-way ticket fare is $3 to $3.45, an excess charge of 30 cents should be added. Where the one-way ticket fare is $3.50 to $3.95, an excess charge of 35 cents should be added. Where the one-way ticket fare is $4 to $4.45, an excess charge of 40 cents should be added. Where the one-way ticket fare is $4.50 to $4.95, an excess charge of 45 cents should be added. Where the one-way ticket fare is $5 and over, an excess charge of 50 cents should be added. Provided, however, that where passengers board trains at nonagency stations, or where for any reason for which they are not responsible they are unable to purchase tickets, no excess fare will be charged; and, provided further, that all passengers may have the privilege of purchasing tickets at the first station where tickets are sold at which the train stops, in which case the excess scale herein provided shall not apply. If, however, the ordinary time during which the train stops is not sufficient for the passenger to alight from the train, procure his ticket, and board the train again, it is not incumbent upon the carriers to have the train wait for him to purchase his ticket and return. I further find as a fact that where common carriers accord half-fare rates to children between the ages of five and twelve years, one half of the excess fare provided above may be added in cases where such children are not provided with tickets where facility to purchase same was available. It is my opinion, therefore, as to the whole case, first, that under the law of the state of California this Commission has the power to authorize carriers to charge train rates, or excess fare over ticket rates, to passengers not holding tickets having had the opportunity to purchase tickets. Second, I find as a fact that it is to the interest of the public as well as to the interest of the carriers that such train rates, or excess fare, should be charged and collected, and that the excess so collected as train rates should be considered a penalty and retained by the carriers. I further find as a fact that the scale of train rates, or excess charges, mentioned above, is just and reasonable. Note. An order in accordance with the above opinion was issued which provided that it should apply to common carriers operating steam railways within the state of California, and should not apply to any interurban or suburban electric street railways within the jurisdiction of the Commission, nor to such railways when operated by a steam railway. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT. STATE EX REL. RAILROAD COMMISSIONERS v. FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY COMPANY. Procedure (Fla. 68 So. 729.) Notice of hearing — Amendment to Commission rule. Where a railroad company has had ample opportunity to be heard on amendments to a rule, it cannot justly complain that the notice given of the hearing did not strictly comply with the statute. Constitutional law - Due process Rate-making power. In conferring upon the Railroad Commissioners authority to make reasonable and just rates to be charged by railroad common carriers for intrastate transportation, instead of merely conferring upon the Commissioners authority to supervise and regulate such rates as may initially be fixed by the carrier, the legislature does not invade the constitutional right of "acquiring, possessing, and protecting property," nor deprive anyone of "property without due process of law.” Constitutional law - Making of rates as regulation. In making rates the Commissioners do not assume the management and control of the property or business of the common carrier, but by making lawful rates they supervise and regulate the rendering of the public service "for the correction of abuses and to prevent un Headnotes by the COURT. just discrimination and excessive charges," as contemplated by the state Constitution. Evidence · Burden of proof — Invalidity of Commission rules. Where, under the statute, a rule duly promulgated by the Railroad Commission is prima facie reasonable and just, the burden is upon the carrier to clearly show by convincing evidence that the rule is invalid as applied to it. Constitutional law — Invasion of property rights — Rates regulation rule. Rule 19 of the Railroad Commission rules is a general regulation fixing the relation and apportionment of existing rates for intrastate freight transportation over two or more distinct railroads. The general application of such rule to the respondent's intrastate business is not shown to unlawfully invade the respondent's property rights. If the application of the rule proves unlawful in whole or in part, a remedy by appropriate procedure exists. It is not shown that such rule will result in unlawful discriminations with reference to or as affected by Federal regulations of interstate commerce. [April 20, 1915; Rehearing denied June 7, 1915.] MANDAMUS by the State, on the relation of the Railroad Commissioners, against the Florida East Coast Railway Company. Peremptory writ awarded. Appearances: F. M. Hudson for relators; Alex St. Clair Abrams for respondent. Whitfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Mandamus proceedings were instituted here to enforce observance by the respondent of the following rule of the Railroad Commissioners: “19. On intrastate shipments of freight not governed by rule 1, which shall pass over the whole or portions of two or more roads not under the same control, the maximum rate charged shall be, in the case of shipments so passing over two such roads, not greater than the sum of the local rates on such freights, less 10 per cent, for the distance hauled over each road, and, in the case of shipments so passing over three or more such roads, not greater than the sum of the local rates on such freights, less 20 per cent, for the distance hauled over each road. The total rate thus ascertained on such freights from the point of shipment to the point of destination shall be divided in such proportion between the railroads over which such freights pass as to give to each railroad interested in the shipment its local rate, less 10 per cent in the case of shipments over two roads, and less 20 per cent in the case of shipments over three or more roads, for the distance such shipment is hauled, conditioned upon the initial line delivering the traffic to the delivering line at its nearest junctional point. "Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prevent the total of any joint rate made under this rule from being divided in such proportion between the roads interested in the same as they may agree upon, but a failure to so agree between the roads interested shall in no way affect the total joint rate to be charged and collected on, or work delay in the transportation of, such freight, or be a subject of appeal to the Commission by the roads at interest." The return of the respondent, in effect, avers that the rule operates to discriminate against shippers located on its line, in that shipments from other lines would have a lower rate over respondent's line than shipments from and to points on respondent's line would have; that the enforcement of the rule would be unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive in that it would greatly reduce the entire receipts of the carrier below the already unremunerative point, particulars being given; that the present rates are reasonable and just to the shippers, but do not, in fact, afford a reasonable compensation for the services rendered, and the enforcement of the rule against respondent will deprive it of just compensation for the services rendered, and violate its property rights under the organic law. A demurrer to the return was overruled. State ex rel. Railroad Comrs. v. Florida East Coast R. Co. 65 Fla. 424, 62 So. 591. Issue having been joined on the answer to the alternative writ, and the rule being by statute deemed to be prima facie reasonable and just, the burden is upon the respondent to sustain by clear and convincing evidence its averments of fact to show that the application of rule 19 to the business of the respondent will cause unjust discrimination, and will violate property rights protected by the state and Federal Constitutions. See State ex rel. Railroad Comrs. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 62 Fla. 315, 57 So. 175. A proffered amendment of the answer or return to the alternative writ sets up that, though notice was given as preliminary to an amendment of rule 19 relating to joint rates, in particulars that are material here, such notice was not in compliance with the mandatory requirement of the statute. The asserted defect in the notice given is that it did not state the division of the joint rate. The statute provides that "before applying joint rates to roads not under joint management and control, the Commissioners shall give thirty days' notice to the owners, operators, or lessees of said road, of the joint rate contemplated, and of its divisions of the same, and give hearings to roads desiring to object to said rates." The alternative writ alleges that on June 10, 1912, the "Railroad Commissioners gave due and lawful notice in writing to all railroads and railroad companies doing intrastate business in the state of Florida that they would on the 17th day of July, 1912, take under consideration the matter of certain proposed amendments to the said rule 19;" that on July 17, 1912, at the hearing in Tallahassee, "upon motion of the Florida East Coast Railway Company and other carriers represented at said hearing, it was ordered that the time for considering and acting upon this matter be extended for thirty days, so as to enable the said Florida East Coast Railroad Company and the other carriers who might so elect to prepare and file such further statistical information as they might deem necessary to properly sustain their several defenses." The return of the respondent "admits that there was a hearing on said proposed amendment to said rule 19 at Tallahassee, Florida, on the 17th day of July, 1912, as set forth in the . . . alternative writ," and "says that it did not put said rule 19 in force because this respondent says that said rule, as amended, was unjust, unreasonable, and beyond the powers of the Railroad Commissioners of Florida to make, for the . reasons" that in its operation the rule would compel discriminations and violate property rights secured by the state and Federal Constitutions. The following provision appears in rule 19 as originally adopted, and also as amended pursuant to the notice referred to: "Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prevent the total of any joint rate made under this rule from being divided in such proportions between the roads interested in the same as they may agree upon, but a failure to so agree between the roads |