IV. SUGGESTIVE NOTES.

In 1776 and 1777 the English planned to capture New York and seize the Hudson. After the failure of Burgoyne, however, they had no definite plans except to get control of the southern colonies. When Burgoyne's army fell into the hands of the Americans, England changed her policy by repealing the tea duty and all the obnoxious acts of 1774, and admitted the principles of colonial independence of Parliament laid down by such men as Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams. Up to this time the educated classes of France had regarded the Americans in the struggle with a great deal of sympathetic interest; but France as a whole was quite willing to see England and America weaken each other in the contest. When, however, there appeared some prospect of reconciliation, she thought it time to interfere, selfishly believing it might be to her interest to establish friendly relations with a country that gave indication of commercial importance in the future. The French alliance with America, speedily followed by war between England and France, resulted early in 1778. This war forced England to protect her colonies and dependencies in different parts of the world, and thus weakened her in her efforts to crush America. In 1779, Spain declared war against England, and in December, 1780, Holland did the same. In the mean time Warren Hastings was busy in India subduing a rebellion, and England had lost the friendship of all neutral powers in

Europe. So we must not be surprised that the English government did so little in the northern States in 1778–79. During these years the British confined themselves for the most part to marauding expeditions, in which they plundered and burned, by the aid of their ships, the towns along the coast, or, in co-operation with the Tories and Indians, laid waste American homes and settlements on the western borders. Lord George Germain, the Secretary of State for the colonies, was as brutal as he was contemptible. His influence made itself especially felt after the first three years of the war in a truculent policy that aimed to worry and tire out the spirit of the Americans. This will largely explain the bloody massacres in the north at the hands of Joseph Brant and his Mohawks and the Cayugas and Senecas, and also the conduct of the Creeks and other Indians on the border lands of the south. The Indian tomahawk and scalping-knife exactly suited the plans of the wretch, Lord Germain, who had been some years earlier discharged from the English army for cowardice.

We will not pause to comment upon the extremely interesting chapter involved in Arnold's treason, except to say that it may be made a most suggestive and telling lesson. The whole life of "Benedict Arnold, the patriot and traitor," is full of moral teaching. It is noteworthy that Arnold, the cruel boy, became Arnold, the treacherous man. The part played by André in this gloomy transaction is pathetic, and can be made as thrilling as any of

Scott's novels. We especially commend the reading of Lossing's "Two Spies" for a good account of Hale and of André.

What to Teach: Paper Money; Weakness and Difficulties of Congress; Revolt of the American Troops in 1781.

I. REFERENCES.

Johnston, pp. 118, 119; Irving-Fiske, p. 371; Barnes, pp. 283, 306; Richardson, pp. 243, 267, 268; Ellis, II., pp. 138, 139, 179, 180; Bryant, IV., pp. 50-52; Scudder, pp. 202-205.

II. SPECIAL TOPICS.

Paper Money, Johnston, p. 89, Barnes, p, 283; Discontent in the American Army, Johnston, p. 90; Continental Congress Destitute of Power, Montgomery, pp. 185, 186.

III. OUTSIDE READINGS.

History: Congress of the Revolution, Greene's Historical View, pp. 67-135; The Army of the Revolution, Greene's Historical View, pp. 210-244, Fiske's Critical Period, pp. 50-133; Continental Paper Money, Lossing's Field Book of the Revolution, I., pp. 316–321, II., p. 630. Biography: Irving's Washington.

IV. SUGGESTIVE NOTES.

We have already referred to the reasons why England was able to do no more in the way of aggressive warfare after 1777. The United States was equally incapable, but for different reasons. In the first place, the country was

The

in point of wealth and population decidedly weak. military strength of Ohio to-day is quite equal to that of the United States in 1780. In the second place, jealousy and petty selfishness prevented any real union among the States. The Continental Congress rapidly became only a shadow of government. In course of time the different States heeded little the requisitions for money it made upon them. Moreover, it must be remembered that the people were very poor. The principal occupations were farming, fishing, ship-building, and commerce. The absence of the farmer in the army and the desolating hand of war greatly lessened the first, while the ubiquitous English cruiser practically ruined the three others. So when the States and the Continental Congress issued paper money, this rapidly depreciated in value.

At this point we may just as well give pupils more or less definite ideas on the subject of money. Here we see an illustration of one of those merely incidental lessons to be learned in the study of wars. Such lessons are numerous and are of greater practical value than much of the other knowledge that comes from the study of military details. The continental currency of the Revolution consisted merely of promises to pay. Like all promises they were valuable only in so far as people had confidence in the promiser. The rapid decline in this confidence. was registered in the rapid fall in value of these promises to pay. Soon they became worthless; and "not worth a continental" is still applied to things that have no real value.

ON THE SEA.

What to Teach: The American War Vessels; Privateers; Paul Jones and the American Navy; The Richard and the Serapis.

I. REFERENCES.

Anderson, pp. 187-189; Bryant, III., pp. 618–623; Gilman, III., pp. 43-49; Barnes, pp. 280–282; Richardson, pp. 246-250; Bryant, III., pp. 618–623.

II. SPECIAL TOPICS.

Privateers, Johnston, p. 92; John Paul Jones, Champlin's Cyclopædia of Persons and Places, pp. 434, 435; John Paul Jones, Smith's Famous Americans, pp. 151156.

III. OUTSIDE READINGS.

History: Privateering in the Revolution, Weeden's Economic and Social History of New England, pp. 769778; Brooks's American Sailor, pp. 118-129; Abbot's Blue Jackets of '76, pp. 83-154; Cyclopædia of American Biography, III., pp. 467, 468; Winsor's History of America, VI., pp. 563-589; War on the Ocean, Fiske's American Revolution, II., pp. 116-162; Naval Operations of the Revolution, Lossing's Field Book of the Revolution, II., pp. 637-646.

Biography: Abbot's Paul Jones.

Fiction: The Pilot, Cooper.