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with one another upon questions of mutual Right. These differences may arise, either by reason of a Nation refusing to perform a good office to another Nation, to the performance of which the latter considers itself to have a claim of Right; or by reason of a Nation suffering an ill office from another Nation, from which the former considers itself entitled of

Right to be exempt. "The differences," says Vattel',

"which arise between Nations or their rulers are on account either of contested rights or of injuries received. A Nation ought to maintain the rights which belong to it; on the other hand the care of its own safety and glory forbids it to submit to injury. But in fulfilling the duty which a Nation owes to itself, it must not forget its duties to other Nations." It is in the practical adjustment of these two principles, according to the circumstances of each individual case, that we discover the rule for appeasing the disputes which may arise between Nations upon questions of Right. A Nation cannot claim anything as of Right due to itself which would be injurious to another Nation; neither can it claim in redress for an injury, which it has undergone, anything which would be inconsistent with the Right of another Nation. Equality and reciprocity are fundamental conditions in measuring the remedies for international Wrong, equally as they are fundamental conditions in determining the Right, the violation of which constitutes international Wrong.

§ 2. The perfection of every political community consists in its aptitude to fulfil the ends of civil society; and one of the chief ends of civil society is to secure, by the cooperation of all the members of a political community, a greater degree of well-being to each individual than he could obtain by his own I Droit des Gens, L. II. c. 17. § 323.

Self-preser

unaided exertions. Accordingly, in the act of political association, by virtue of which a multitude of men constitute themselves into a State or Nation, each individual enters into an engagement with the body to promote the general welfare; and the State or Nation in return enters into an engagement with each member to facilitate for him the means of supplying his necessities, and to protect and defend him. It is manifest therefore that the maintenance of the political association itself is an essential condition for the fulfilment of these reciprocal engagements, and the State or Nation is thus under a primary obligation to preserve itself; in other words, Selfpreservation is a primary duty of National Life. This duty of Self-preservation on the part of a Nation Duty of implies, as a corollary, the duty of preserving each of its members. It owes this duty in the first place to itself, since the loss of one of its members impairs the integrity of the body, and at the same time weakens it. It owes this duty also to each of its members in particular, for the individuals, who compose a Nation, have united themselves together for their mutual defence and common advantage; and none of them can justly be deprived of this Union, and of the advantages which he expects to derive from it, whilst he fulfils on his side the conditions of it. The body of a Nation cannot abandon a province, or a town, or even a single individual member, unless compelled to it by necessity, or indispensably obliged to it by the strongest reasons founded on considerations of the public safety 2.

§ 3. The obligation of a Nation to preserve itself and to preserve all its members, is not limited to those matters only which affect its internal constitution, but extends to its external relations with other 2 Vattel, Droit des Gens, L. I. c. 2. § 17.

Nations; in other words, to those matters which regard the intercourse of itself as a political community, or of its members individually, with any other Nation as such, or with the several members thereof. The right of Self-preservation accordingly gives to a Nation a moral power of acting in regard to other Nations in such a manner, as may be requisite to prevent them from obstructing its preservation or its perfection. This Right is a perfect Right, since it is given to satisfy a natural and indispensable duty; and our Right may frequently fail to be respected, and its effects will be uncertain, unless we may use compulsion towards those who refuse to fulfil the corresponding obligation. A Nation has accordingly a right to resist any attempt on the part of another Nation to injure it, and in case that it has suffered an injury from another Nation, to exact complete reparation for it. At the same time it is bound to abstain from doing any injury to another Nation, and to give adequate satisfaction for any injury which it may have inflicted upon it. An individual citizen is at liberty to waive his right and to forgive an injury, without incurring any increased risk to his life or property, for he lives under the protection of the Civil Magistrate, and may invoke his aid against any ungrateful and malicious fellow-citizen, who may have been encouraged by his indulgence to renew the offence. But a Nation cannot appeal to any superior Power on earth, in case it should have forgiven an injury, which has been inflicted upon it by another Nation, and thereby have encouraged it to offend again. A more powerful Nation may indeed overlook an injury which it has received from a less powerful Nation, without any derogation to its future safety; but between Powers which are nearly 3 Vattel, L. II. c. 4. § 49.

tional Ac

equal, the submission on the part of one of such Powers to an injury, without insisting upon complete satisfaction from the other Power, is almost always attributed to cowardice or weakness, and seldom fails to subject the injured party to further wrong of a more atrocious character. A Nation is accordingly bound, in the presence of another Nation, to maintain its Right, and to seek satisfaction for wrong, under the penalty of forfeiting its character of an independent political body; for to acquiesce tamely in an injury which has been inflicted upon any of its members by another Nation, would be equivalent to the admission of its inability to secure to its members the enjoyment of their Right, without the con- Right of sent of the other Nation; in other words, it would be Internaa virtual acquiescence on its part in a state of de- tion. pendence upon the other Nation. A Nation has therefore a moral Right of Action against other Nations, which withhold from it its Right, or has inflicted injury upon it. But this Right of Action against another Nation is capable of being exercised either by an appeal to reason, or by a recourse to arms. But a recourse to arms, although it may ultimately assert and enforce substantial justice to be done by the Nation, which has been a wrong-doer, brings with it, as an indirect but necessary consequence, such a train of evils and calamities resulting to innocent individuals, that an appeal to reason should always be made in the first instance, unless there is evident peril to the safety of a Nation, if it does not have immediate recourse to arms.

Confer

§ 4. An appeal to Reason may be made in various ways. Amicable Conference is the first and most ob- Amicable vious mode; and it commends itself to Nations by two weighty considerations. Men will often concede to Reason what they feel bound to deny to Force; for, to

ence.

give way to argument savours of generosity, or at least does not necessarily imply any inferiority; whilst men for the sake of preventing war will allow of several things, to which they could not be compelled by force of arms. The object of Amicable Conference is to examine candidly the subject in dispute, with a view to do justice, so that the party, whose Right is found to be the more doubtful of the two, may voluntarily renounce it. To renounce a right after discussion does not necessarily imply a want of power to enforce it, which might encourage an enemy to make further encroachment; but, on the contrary, is consistent with a wish to do justice. There are even occasions, when it may be advisable for the Nation, which is found to have the clearer Right, to renounce it for the sake of preserving Peace and gaining a friend; for to renounce a right in this manner is not to abandon or neglect it, and in yielding up amicably what you are entitled to maintain by force, you conciliate an opponent. Amicable Conference will generally lead to an equitable adjustment of the conflicting pretensions of Nations; and where the subject in dispute is difficult to adjust by the standard Compro- of strict Right, it tends to facilitate a Compromise, which is for the most part a preferable alternative to war. As examples of Compromise, we may refer to the settlement of the boundary between the territory of the United States and the British possessions in North America. In the case of the North-east Boundary it had been found impracticable to ascertain a line which would answer the conditions of the previous treaty-engagements between the two Powers in the case of the North-west Boundary5

mise.

4

4 Treaty of Washington, 9 August, 1842. Martens, Nouveau Recueil Général, III. p. 456.

5 Treaty of Washington, 15 January, 1846. Ibid. IX. p. 27.

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