THIRD SESSION-FRIDAY, JULY 28, 1893.

This session met at 9.30 A.M., Dr. McCosh in the chair.

Dr. J. Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University, not being present, his thesis, "Self-Activity in Education," was read by George P. Brown, of Bloomington, Ill.

This subject was discussed by Dr. Harris; Dr. Ormond, of Princeton; Miss Crozier. of the State College of Mississippi; Dr. Boardman, of Tennessee; Mrs. Brightman, of Chicago; Dr. Laws, of Missouri; and Dr. Harris.

A thesis, "Wundt's Psychology of the Will," prepared by Professor E. B. Titchener, of Cornell University, was read by Professor Ormond, of Princeton.

Dr. McCosh did not comprehend the paper, and felt like making a rule that no paper should be presented except by the one who wrote it. Dr. Ormond explained the theories of the paper as he understood them. Dr. Boardman, of Tennessee, felt that there were ultimate truths which the paper seemed to deny. Dr. Hayes, of Hayes College, Maine, and Dr. Laws further discussed the subject.

Dr. McCosh remarked that in general the agreement between the participants in the discussions was greater than at first appeared. The discussions were in a reverent spirit. "We are gradually approaching a belief in reality, in realism." More attention had been paid to education at this than at any other meeting. He complimented Dr. Harris's labor, and moved a vote of thanks to Dr. Harris for his services in preparing for this meeting and for the cause of education in this country. Unanimously carried.

Professor Ormond moved also a vote of appreciation of, and thanks to, Dr. McCosh for his eminent services and advice. Carried unanimously by a rising vote. After which the session adjourned sine die.

A paper by Rev. Dr. Samuel W. Boardman, of Maryville College, Tennessee, on "Theo-centric Education," had been submitted, but time failed for its reading.

LIST OF PERSONS ACCEPTING THE OFFICE OF HONORARY VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE DEPARTMENT CONGRESS

RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

REALITY-WHAT PLACE IT SHOULD HOLD IN
PHILOSOPHY.

BY DR. JAMES McCOSH, EX-PRESIDENT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

THIS is an important question. I regard it as the most important in philosophy in the present day. Scanty systems have arisen from the oversight of it.

ence.

I.

In establishing my positions I remark that every one believes in realities. Every one believes in two kinds of realities. He believes in his own existHe believes, or rather knows, that he thinks and feels; that he is liable to grief and joy, to hope and fear. He believes and knows things without him; in that man or woman, in the various organs of his body, in that wall or house, as also in that tree before him, in the greenness of its foliage, in the hardness of its trunk, and in the smell and taste of its fruit. We can appeal to the proper tests in justifying reality. First, the objects are self-evident. We know ourselves by simply looking within, and objects around by simply looking without. We need no further evidence. But secondly, this is confirmed by the circumstance that this belief or knowledge is necessary; we cannot be made to believe or know otherwise. We cannot be made to believe, by any argument or by any reasoning, that these objects do not exist. But all the while we have a belief or conviction which abides with us. Then, thirdly, this belief or , knowledge is universal. Not only do I believe in these objects, but every man does the same. He is sure that he himself exists, and that certain objects around him exist. He carries this conviction with him wherever he goes. Philosophy which is an expression of our nature should do the

same.

II.

Reality cannot be established by syllogistic or mediate proof of any kind. No man can prove mediately his own existence, or the pains he feels in his own body, or the existence of that stone or plant which he sees and touches. To prove that there is life or mind, we must have life or mind in the premise. Without this, the alleged proof will evidently be illogical. For it is acknowledged on all hands that in order to a right con

clusion we must have the object or truth in the conclusion involved in the premise or premises.

The attempt to prove Reality has ever led to unmeasurable confusion and error. Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, propounded an argument, Cogito ergo sum. But if the ego be in the cogito the whole alleged argument for Reality is an evident assumption, for already we have the Reality there. If the ego be not in the cogito we have no proof whatever, as what we have in the conclusion is not in the premise.

WAY IN WHICH REALITY IS DISCOVERED.

Starting in this way with real objects, we prosecute farther investigation by induction. This is the method pursued by Reid and the Scottish school. It was derived originally from Francis Bacon, and had already reached many important points in the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton and others. The Scottish school perceived this, and were anxious to secure like results in the study of the human mind, using self-consciousness rather than the senses in the gathering of the facts. In this way they had been so far successful in the account which Reid and Stewart and others had given of the faculties of the mind. Not that they for one instant regarded this induction as the foundation of their philosophy, which had its foundation within itself in the principles of common sense (Reid) and fundamental laws of thought (Stewart). But they represented Induction as the means of discovering these laws. Thus they built up a philosophy resting on deeper principles, but discovered by the cautious and safe method of Induction.

We may consider more carefully the way in which Reality is discovered. Take this stone or this tree. I perceive them to be realities by the senses, especially of sight and the sense of touch, and I cannot be made to decide otherwise. I cannot prove it mediately or by syllogism; I have no premises to establish the point that this stone exists or this tree exists. The mind has cognitive powers by which it discerns these objects, that they exist. In the same way, by the inner sense or reflection, we discover within us at once certain things, such as hope and fear, joy and grief, exciting us.

By the same or farther cognitive powers we may come to know farther qualities of these objects of this stone, that it is hard; of this tree, that it grows rapidly. This knowledge may increase from day to day till the number of objects becomes beyond our calculation. When there is an addition or multiplication of these real objects there is no lessening or increasing of Reality, which continues the same.

Having Reality in the individual object-say in the stone or tree-we have Reality in the general notion, in stone or tree. Having Reality in the qualities of concrete objects, we have Reality in the abstract. Thus, Reality in the hardness of the stone implies Reality in its quality of hardness

Thus we have Reality in every form of it when we have Reality in the concrete individual.

Finding Reality in all these quarters, I think we are entitled to call the inquiry and the results which issue from it the philosophy of Realism, and to adopt it as the true philosophy.

III.

Reality is got not by reasoning, but by immediate inspection-by what is usually called Intuition. We have cognitive faculties for this purpose, especially the inward and outward senses. We know ourselves, and especially our various ideas, moods, sufferings, by self-consciousness. We know these extended things by the senses as cognitive, particularly by sight and touch. We need no mediate proof. In regard to these things, proffered probation would be felt as an incumbrance and would turn out to be invalid.

We have here primary truth which does not need support, but which may give support to other truth reared upon it. Knowing objects to be real, we may draw other objects from them which are also real, by argument-say by mathematics, by ordinary science, by common observation.

There may be times when we are not sure whether the object is a reality or a phantom, whether that whiteness seen in the darkness is a ghost or a sheet put out to be dried. We are to settle the question by an examination of the appearance, using, if need be, all the senses.

It is to be understood that when we have the real we can also have things, derived from it logically, also real. Thus, having the individual oak as real, we have oaks in general as also real. The reality in the singular goes up into the general.

There are some who maintain that Realism must not only establish the reality of objects, but must show what the reality consists in. Now, I am willing to admit in establishing reality we must know somewhat of the nature of the reality. It is thus that we can separate it from other things; only thus we can think or speak of it. Still it is not by psychological but by the Real sciences that we must determine the real nature of the object. Mental science must know somewhat of the nature of water before it can declare it to be a reality. But it is not psychology but chemistry that must settle what this reality is, that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen. It is astronomy and not philosophy that must show us what is the relation of the planets one to another.

It is to be understood that while the mind has the Real by the cognitive powers, it may also have the Ideal by the imagination, and the two not inconsistent one with the other. It may form a figure of ugliness or beauty to which there is no corresponding fact. With these we may be amused, or we may be exalted above ourselves and above the earth. These fancies will present themselves spontaneously, or we call them up by an