With regard to the suggestion that the Russian Government might have justified the exercise of sovereignty over the Pacific Ocean as a close sea, because it claims territory both on its American and Asiatic shores, it may suffice to say that the distance from shore to shore on this sea, in latitude 51° north, is not less than 90° of longitude, or 4,000 miles.

The Russian representative replied to this note, endeavoring to prove that the territorial rights of Russia on the northwest coast of America were not confined to the limits of the concession granted to the Russian American Company in 1799, and arguing that the great extent of the Pacific Ocean at the fifty-first degree of latitude did not invalidate the right which Russia might have to consider that part of the ocean as closed. But he added that further discussion of this point was unnecessary, as the Imperial Government had not thought fit to take advantage of that right.

The correspondence then dropped for a time, to be resumed in the following spring. But it is perfectly clear from the above that the privileges granted to the Russian American Company in 1799, whatever effect that may have had as regards other Russian subjects, did not operate to exclude American vessels from any part of the coast, and that the attempt to exclude them in 1821 was at once resisted. Further, that the Russian Government had no idea of any distinction between Behring's Sea and the Pacific Ocean, which latter they considered as reaching southward from Behring's Straits. Nor throughout the whole of the subsequent correspondence is there any reference whatever on either side to any distinctive name for Behring's Sea, or any intimation that it could be considered otherwise than as forming an integral part of the Pacific Ocean,

I now come to the dispatch from Mr. Adams to Mr. Middleton of the 22d of July, 1823, to which reference has before been made, and which it will be necessary to quote somewhat at length. After authorizing Mr. Middleton to enter upon a negotiation with the Russian ministers concerning the differences which had arisen from the ukase of the 4th (16th) September, 1821, Mr. Adams continues:

From the tenor of the ukase, the pretensions of the Imperial Government extend to an exclusive territorial jurisdiction from the forty-fifth degree of north latitude, on the Asiatic coast, to the latitude of 51° north on the western coast of the American continent; and they assume the right of interdicting the navigation and the fishery of all other nations to the extent of 100 miles from the whole of that coast. The United States can admit no part of these claims. Their right of navigation and of fishing is perfect, and has been in constant exercise from the earliest times, after the peace of 1783, throughout the whole extent of the Southern Ocean, subject only to the ordinary exceptions and exclusions of the territorial jurisdictions, which, so far as Russian rights are concerned, are confined to certain islands north of the fifty-fifth degree of latitude, and have no existence on the continent of America.

Mr. Blaine has argued at great length to show that when Mr. Adams used these clear and forcible expressions he did not mean what he seemed to say; that when he stated that the United States "could admit no part of these claims," he meant that they admitted all that part of them which related to the coast north of the Aleutian Islands; that when he spoke of the Southern Ocean, he meant to except Behring's Sea; and that when he contended that the ordinary exceptions and exclusions of the territorial jurisdictions had no existence, so far as Russian rights were concered, on the continent of America, he used the latter term not in a geographical but in a "territorial" sense, and tacitly excepted, by a very singular petitio principii, the Russian possessions. In order to carry out this theory, it is necessary for him also to assume that the negotiators in the course of the discussions made indiscriminate use of the term "north west coast of America," with a variety

of signiùcation which he admits to be "confusing, and, at certain points, apparently contradictory and irreconcilable."

The reputation of the American statesmen and diplomatists of that day for caution and precision affords of itself strong argument against such a view, and even if this had been otherwise, so forced a construction would require very strong evidence to confirm it. But a glance at the rest of the dispatch and at the other papers will show that the more simple interpretation of the words is the correct one. For Mr. Adams goes on to say:

The correspondence between M. Poletica and this Department contained no discussion of the principles or of the facts upon which he attempted the justification of the imperial ukase. This was purposely avoided on our part, under the expectation that the Imperial Government could not fail, upon a review of the measure, to revoke it altogether. It did, however, excite much public animadverson in this country, as the ukase itself had already done in England. I inclose herewith the North American Review for October, 1822, No. 37, which contains an article (page 370) written by a person fully master of the subject; and for the view of it taken in England I refer you to the fifty-second number of the Quarterly Review, the article upon Lieutenant Kotzebue's voyages. From the article in the North American Review it will be seen that the rights of discovery, of occupancy, and of uncontested possession alleged by M. Poletica are all without foundation in fact.

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On reference to the last-mentioned article, it will be found that the writer states that:

A trade to the northwestern coast of America and the free navigation of the waters that wash its shores have been enjoyed as a common right by subjects of the United States and of several European powers without interruption for nearly forty years. We are by no means prepared to believe or admit that all this has been on sufferance merely, and that the rights of commerce and navigation in that region have been vested in Russia alone.

Further on he puts the question in the following manner (the italics are his own):

It is not, we apprehend, whether Russia has any settlements that give her territorial claims on the continent of America. This we do not deny. But it is whether the location of those settlements and the discoveries of their navigators are such as they are represented to be; whether they entitled her to the exclusive possession of the whole territory north of 51° and to sovereignty over the Pacific Ocean beyond that parallel.

These passages sufficiently illustrate Mr. Adams's meaning, if any evidence be required that he used plain language in its ordinary sense. Clearly he meant to deny that the Russian settlements or discoveries gave Russia any claim as of right to exclude the navigation or fishery of other nations from any part of the seas on the coast of America, and that her rights in this respect were limited to the territorial waters of certain islands of which she was in permanent and complete occupation. Having distinctly laid down this proposition as regards the rights of the case, Mr. Adams went on to state what the United States were ready to agree to as a matter of conventional arrangement. He said:

With regard to the territorial claim separate from the right of traffic with the natives and from any system of colonial exclusions, we are willing to agree to the boundary line within which the Emperor, Paul, had granted exclusive privileges to the Russian-American Company, that is to say, latitude 55°.

If the Russian Government apprehend serious inconvenience from the illicit traffic of foreigners with their settlements on the northwest coast, it may be effectually guarded against by stipulations similar to those a draft of which is herewith subjoined, and to which you are authorized, on the part of the United States, to agree.

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The draft convention was as follows:

DRAFT OF TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.

ARTICLE I. In order to strengthen the bonds of friendship, and to preserve in future a perfect harmony and good understanding between the contracting parties, it is

agreed that their respective citizens and subjects shall not be disturbed or molested, either in navigating or in carrying on their fisheries in the Pacific Ocean or in the South Seas, or in landing on the coasts of those seas, in places not already occupied, for the purpose of carrying on their commerce with the natives of the country, subject, nevertheless, to the restrictions and provisions specified in the two following articles.

ART. II. To the end that the navigation and fishery of the citizens and subjects of the contracting parties, respectively, in the Pacific Ocean or in the South Seas may not be made a pretext for illicit trade with their respective settlements, it is agreed that the citizens of the United States shall not land on any part of the coast actually occupied by Russian settlements, unless by permission of the governor or commander thereof, and that Russian subjects shall, in like manner, be interdicted from landing without permission at any settlement of the United States on the said northwest

coast.

ART. III. It is agreed that no settlement shall be made hereafter on the northwest coast of America by citizens of the United States, or under their authority, north, nor by Russian subjects, or under the authority of Russia, south, of the 55th degree of north latitude.

In an explanatory dispatch to Mr. Rush, the American minister in London, same date, Mr. Adams says:

The right of carrying on trade with the natives throughout the north west coast they (the United States) can not renounce. With the Russian settlements at Kodiak, or at New Archangel, they may fairly claim the advantage of a free trade, having so long enjoyed it unmolested, and because it has been and would continue to be as advantageous at least to those settlements as to them. But they will not contest the right of Russia to prohibit the traffic, as strictly confined to the Russian settlement itself, and not extending to the original natives of the coast.

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It is difficult to conceive how the term "northwest coast of America,” used here and elsewhere, can be interpreted otherwise than as applying to the northwest coast of America generally, or how it can be seriously contended that it was meant to denote only the more westerly portion, excluding the more northwesterly part, because by becoming a Russian possession this latter had ceased to belong to the American continent.

Mr. Blaine states that when Mr. Middleton declared that Russia had no right of exclusion on the coasts of America between the fiftieth and sixtieth degrees of north latitude, nor in the seas which washed those coasts, he intended to make a distinction between Behring's Sea and the Pacific Ocean. But upon reference to a map it will be seen that the sixtieth degree of north latitude strikes straight across Behring's Sea, leaving by far the larger and more important part of it to the south, so that I confess it appears to me that by no conceivable construction of his words can Mr. Middleton be supposed to have excepted that sea from those which he declared to be free.

With regard to the construction which Mr. Blaine puts upon the treaty between the United States and Russia of the 17th April, 1824, I will only say that it is, as far as I am aware, an entirely novel one, that there is no trace of its having been known to the various publicists who have given an account of the controversy in treaties on international law, and that it is contrary, as I shall show, to that which the British negotiators placed on the treaty when they adopted the first and second articles for insertion in the British treaty of the 28th February, 1825. I must further dissent from his interpretation of Article VII of the latter treaty. That article gives to the vessels of the two powers "liberty to frequent all the inland seas, gulfs, havens, and creeks on the coast mentioned in Article III for the purpose of fishing and of trading with the natives." The expression "coast mentioned in Article III" can only refer to the first words of the article: "The line of demarcation between the possessions of the high contracting parties upon the coast of the continent and the island of America to the north west shall be drawn,"

etc. That is to say, it included all the possessions of the two powers on the northwest coast of America. For there would have been no sense whatever in stipulating that Russian vessels should have freedom of access to the small portion of coast which, by a later part of the article, is to belong to Russia. And as bearing on this point it will be noticed that Atrticle VI, which has a more restricted bearing, speaks only of "the subjects of His Britannic Majesty" and of "the line of coast described in Article III."

The stipulations of the treaty were formally renewed by articles inserted in the general treaties of commerce between Great Britain and Russia of 1843 and 1859. But Mr. Blaine states that

The rights of the Russian-American Company which, under both ukases, included the sovereignty over the sea to the extent of 100 miles from the shores, were reserved by special clause in a separate and special article signed after the principal articles of the treaty had been concluded and signed.

Upon this I have to observe, in the first place, that the ukase of 1799 did not contain any mention whatever of sovereignty over the sea; secondly, that the context of the separate article is such as altogether to preclude the interpretation that it was meant to recognize the objectionable claim contained in the ukase of 1821. I will quote the article at length:

SEPARATE ARTICLE II.

It is understood in like manner that the exceptions, immunities, and privileges hereinafter mentioned shall not be considered as at variance with the principle of reciprocity which forms the basis of the treaty of this date, that is to say:

1. The exemption from navigation dues during the first three years which is enjoyed by vessels built in Russia and belonging to Russian subjects.

2. The exemptions of the like nature granted in the Russian ports of the Black Sea, the sea of Azof, and the Danube to such Turkish vessels arriving from ports of the Ottoman Empire situated on the Black Sea as do not exceed 80 lasts burden.

3. The permission granted to the inhabitants of the coast of the Government of Archangel to import duty free, or on payment of moderate duties, into ports of the said government dried or salted fish, as likewise certain kinds of furs, and to export therefrom, in the same manner, corn, rope and cordage, pitch, and raveusduck. 4. The privilege of the Russian-American Company.

5. The privilege of the steam navigation companies of Lubeck and Havre; lastly, 6. The immunities granted in Russia to certain English companies, called “yacht clubs."

To suppose that under the simple words "the privilege of the Russian-American Company," placed in connection with the privilege of French and German steam navigation companies and the immunities of yacht clubs, it was intended to acknowledge a claim of jurisdiction against which Her Majesty's Government had formally protested as contrary to international law, and which it had avowedly been one of the main objects of the treaty of 1825 to extinguish, is a suggestion too improbable to require any lengthened discussion.

But Her Majesty's Government did not of course agree to the article without knowing what was the exact nature of the privileges thus excepted from reciprocity. They had received from the Russian ambassador, in December 1842, an explanatory memorandum on this subject, of which the following is the portion relating to the Russian-American Company:

IV.

La Compagnie Russe-Américaine a le privilège d'expédier francs de droits : de Cronstadt autour du monde et d'Ochotsk dans les Colonies Russes, les produits Russes ainsi que les marchandises étrangères dont les droits ont déjà été prélevés; de même d'importer au retour de ces Colonies des cargaisons de pelleteries et d'autres

produits de ces Colonies, sans payer aucun droit si d'après les lois générales il n'est pas établi d'impôt particulier intérieur sur les marchandises de pelleterie.

Observation.-D'après le Tarif en vigueur, l'importation des fourrures dans les ports de St.-Pétersboug et d'Archangel, de production Russe et sur des vaisseaux Russes, est admise sans droits.

It is surely incredible that if the privilege of the Russian-American Company did comprise a right of excluding vessels from approaching within 100 miles of the shore it should not even have been alluded to in this explanation.

Nor is it possible to agree in Mr. Blaine's view that the exclusion of foreign vessels for a distance of 100 miles from the coast remained in force pending the negotiations and in so far as it was not modified by the conventions. A claim of jurisdiction over the open sea, which is not in accordance with the recognized principles of international law or usage, may of course be asserted by force, but can not be said to have any legal validity as against the vessels of other countries, except in so far as it is positively admitted by conventional agreements with those countries.

I do not suppose that it is necessary that I should argue at length upon so elementary a point as that a claim to prohibit the vessels of other nations from approaching within a distance of 100 miles from the coast is contrary to modern international usage. Mr. Adams and Mr. Canning clearly thought in 1823 that the matter was beyond doubt or discussion.

The rule which was recognized at that time, and which has been generally admitted both by publicists and governments, limits the jurisdiction of a country in the open sea to a distance of 3 miles from its coasts, this having been considered to be the range of a cannon shot when the principle was adopted.

Wheaton, who may be regarded as a contemporary authority, equally respected in Europe and America, says:

The maritime territory of every State extends to the ports, harbors, bays, mouths of rivers, and adjacent parts of the sea inclosed by headlands belonging to the same State. The general usage of nations superadds to this extent of territorial jurisdiction a distance of a marine league, or as far as a cannon shot will reach from the shore along all the coasts of the State.

And again:

The rule of law on this subject is terræ dominium finitur ubi finitur armorum vis; and since the introduction of fire-arms that distance has usually been recognized to be

about 3 miles from the shore.

Chancellor Kent, who is inclined to advocate a more extended limit, still admits that

According to the current of modern authority, the general territorial jurisdiction extends into the sea as far as cannon-shot will reach, and no farther; and this is generally calculated to be a marine league.

Calvo, one of the most recent text writers, makes a corresponding statement:

Les limites juridictionnelles d'un État embrassent non seulement son territoire, mais encore les eaux qui le traversent ou l'entourent, les ports, les baies, les golfes, les embouchures des fleuves et les mers enclavées dans son territoire. L'usage général des nations permet également aux États d'exercer leur juridiction sur la zone maritime jusq'uà 3 milles marins ou à la portée de cannon de leurs côtes.

But I need scarcely appeal to any other authority than that of the United States Government itself.

In a note to the Spanish minister, dated the 16th December, 1862,