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supported there at public expense is a prisoner, and cannot gain a voting residence in the election district in which the prison is situated, even under an illegal commitment. "The Tombs is not a place of residence. It is not constructed or maintained for that purpose. It is a place of confinement for all except the keeper and his family, and a person cannot, under the guise of a commitment, or even without any commitment, go there as a prisoner, having a right to be there only as a prisoner, and gain a residence there." People v. Cady (1894) 143 N. Y. 100, 25 L. R. A. 399, 37 N. E. 673

§ 4. [Registration of voters.]-Laws shall be made for ascertaining, by proper proofs, the citizens who shall be entitled to the right of suffrage hereby established, and for the registration of voters; which registration shall be completed at least ten days before each election. Such registration shall not be required for town and village elections except by express provision of law. In cities and villages having five thousand inhabitants or more, according to the last preceding state enumeration of inhabitants, voters shall be registered upon personal application only; but voters not residing in such cities or villages shall not be required to apply in person for registration at the first meeting of the officers having charge of the registry of

voters.

[Const. 1821, art. 2, § 3; 1846, art. 2, § 4]

"Registration is the method of proof prescribed for ascertaining the electors who are qualified to cast votes, and the registers are the lists of such electors. It is a part of the machinery of elections and is a reasonable regulation, which conduces to their orderly conduct and fairness. It is one safeguard against frauds." People ex rel. Stapleton v. Bell (1890) 119 N. Y. 175, 23 N. E. 533.

"The election laws are designed to secure a fair expression by the electors of their choice of public officers. It is of paramount importance, under our system of government, that unqualified persons shall be excluded from the suffrage, and that elections shall

be conducted in a way which shall secure public confidence that the results are truly and honestly declared. It is eminently proper that inspectors and boards of registry should act under the sanction of an official oath, and that they should comply with the forms prescribed by statute in conducting elections. . . . The statute does not create the right to vote. It exists by force of the Constitution," and cannot be defeated "because election officers failed to qualify or to certify the register, it not being shown that the result was changed by the omission." People ex rel. Frost v. Wilson (1875) 62 N. Y. 186, 193, 194, reversing 3 Hun, 437, where it is said that "the right of suffrage is not conferred by the Constitution. It is recognized as an existing right, and it either declares the qualifications that the voter must possess in order to entitle him to exercise the right, or it authorizes the legislature to provide for ascertaining who are entitled to vote." If the court intended to suggest that there is an inherent right of suffrage, the suggestion is not sustained by our constitutional history.

§ 5. [Manner of voting.]—All elections by the citizens, except for such town officers as may by law be directed to be otherwise chosen, shall be by ballot, or by such other method as may be prescribed by law, provided that secrecy in voting shall be preserved.

[Const. 1777, art. 6; 1821, art. 2, § 4; 1846, art. 2, § 5.]

It is competent for the legislature to authorize the election of town supervisors, either by ballot, by ayes and noes, or by a show of hands. People ex rel. Clancy v. Westchester County (1893) 139 N. Y. 524, 34 N. E. 1106.

In People ex rel. Klein v. McDonald (1896) 52 N. Y. Supp. 898, Justice Andrews suggests that the proviso at the end of this section does not apply to voting by ballot, but to other means added by the amendment of 1894; that the voting by ballot implies secrecy, and that the proviso was unnecessary as applied to this manner of voting; that § 5 must be construed in connection with § 1, which guarantees to every qualified person the right to vote, and that a provision of the election law which authorizes an illiterate person to be aided by another in the act of voting must, of necessity, be sustained, because otherwise such voter might be disfranchised.

§ 6. [Bi-partisan election boards.]-All laws creating, regulating, or affecting boards or officers charged with the duty of registering voters, or of distributing ballots at the polls to voters, or of receiving, recording, or counting votes at elections, shall secure equal representation of the two political parties which, at the general election next preceding that for which such boards or officers are to serve, cast the highest and the next highest number of votes. All such boards and officers shall be appointed or elected in such manner, and upon the nomination of such representatives of said parties, as the legislature may direct. Existing laws on this subject shall continue until the legislature shall otherwise provide. This section shall not apply to town meetings, or to village elections.

[New.]

A sketch of election boards, including the development of the bi-partisan idea, will be found in the chapter on the Fourth Constitution, 1894, in connection with the adoption of this section.

'ARTICLE III.

[THE LEGISLATURE.]

§ 1. [Legislative power.]-The legislative power of this state shall be vested in the senate and assembly.

[Const. 1777, art. 2; 1821, art. 1, § 1; 1846, art. 3, § 1.]

It has been pointed out in the notes to the amendments of 1874 that the Commission of 1872 recommended the insertion of the word "an" before assembly in this section, and that this change was approved by the legislatures of 1873 and 1874, but that it was omitted in the

engrossed copy of the amendments. The change was intended to make the section more precise in form. The Convention of 1894 sought to accomplish the same result by changing "a" to "the" before the word "senate."

In previous volumes a sketch has been given of the colonial legislative system, from which it appears that during the first half of the colonial legislative period the governor was a constituent member of the legislature, and often sat with the legislative council during its deliberations, and that, while he was afterwards, by royal order, excluded from such deliberations, he was, nevertheless, deemed a part of the legislative system, and legislative power was said to be vested in the governor, the council, and the assembly. The governor's present relation to legislation is defined in article 4, and particularly in § 9, which prescribes his functions in relation to bills submitted to him by the legislature. While not expressly stated in this section, legislative power is now, as it was under the colonial system, vested in the governor as well as in the legislature, and he is a part of the legislative system, but with the difference that the legislature only can originate legislation, while the governor's power is limited to the approval or rejection of bills; which power, during the thirty day period, is absolute and final.

LEGISLATIVE POWER.

Every statute is an exercise of legislative power; in this manner the people, speaking through their representatives, declare the law of the state which, directly or indirectly, shall control and regulate the property, interests, and conduct of the people, so far as such control and regulation may be a legitimate subject of legal enactment. Of the more than fifty thousand statutes which have been enacted during the history of the state the larger part have been accepted without question, and their validity

has not been challenged. They relate to ordinary affairs and are conceded to be within the proper scope of legislative action. Many statutes, however, have been assailed on the ground that in their enactment the legislature exceeded its constitutional authority, and that such statutes were therefore unconstitutional and void. While the legislative power of the state is vested in the senate and assembly, it is a delegated power, and must be exercised within the limitations imposed either by the state or the Federal Constitution. Many subjects which might be deemed of general interest and beneficial to the state or some part of it, and unobjectionable as a matter of policy, have, nevertheless, been withdrawn from legislative consideration, and are to be disposed of, if at all, by the people themselves, or by agencies other than the legislature. So the first question to which the legislature must address itself in considering any proposed legislation is whether it is within the constitutional power of that body. Ordinarily, and in the large majority of cases, this question needs little, if any, consideration, for the reason, as already suggested, that the great mass of legislation is unquestionably a valid exercise of legislative power.

The first Constitution contained few limitations on the power of the legislature, but subsequent Constitutions have imposed important restrictions on legislative action, and have, in in some cases, reserved power to the people themselves, and in others have committed these subjects to subordinate local agencies in the political subdivisions of the state. state. Limitations on legislative power have also been imposed by the Federal Constitution, which has deprived the states of any authority to enact laws on specified classes of subjects, including laws impairing the obligation of contracts, affecting vested rights, denying equal protection

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