quently Amended.'" The title of the original act as amended and all proceedings taken in substantial compliance with that act are confirmed. This provision was not germane to the title, and was void. Rogers v. Union R. Co. (1894) 10 Misc. 57, 30 N. Y. Supp. 855.

1901, chap. 200, "to Amend the Charter of the City of Rochester, Relative to Expenses Incident to Improvements," and also chap. 719, "to Amend Chapter 14 of the Laws of 1880, Entitled 'An Act to Further Amend Chapter 143 of the Laws of 1861, Entitled "An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Several Acts in Relation to the Charter of the City of Rochester," and to Consolidate Therewith the Several Acts in Relation to the Charter of said city,' Relative to Expenses Incident to Improvements." By the act the legislature "sought to legalize every general tax or local assessment upon any property, real or personal, in the city of Rochester." The subject is not germane to the title. Rochester v. Bloss (1902) 77 App. Div. 28, 79 N. Y. Supp. 236.

1902, chap. 127, "to Amend Chapter 261 of the Laws of 1885, Entitled 'An Act in Relation to the Management of the Albany Penitentiary,' Relative to the Salary of the Keeper of Said Penitentiary." The act, among other things authorized the penitentiary commission to discharge the superintendent and place the custody of the penitentiary in the hands of the sheriff of Albany county, and the commission is further "empowered, whenever, in its discretion, it is for the best interests of the county of Albany, to discontinue and close said penitentiary, and abandon its use as a prison, and to sell the same and all the lands and appurtenances connected therewith, in the name of the county of Albany." These were new subjects, and not germane to the title. Corscadden v. Haswell (1904) 177 N. Y. 499, 69 N. E. 1114.

1904, chap. 629, "to Amend Chapter Three Hundred and Eightynine of the Laws of Nineteen Hundred and Three, Entitled 'An Act in Relation to the City of Troy, the Government of Said City, and to Create a Municipal Improvements Commission, and to Define its Powers and Duties,' and to Enlarge the Powers and Duties of Said Commission, and to Provide for Additions and Improvements to Prospect Park and to the Waterworks of the City of Troy under the Supervision of Said Commission, and to Authorize the Issuing of Bonds for Such Additions and Improvements, and to Amend Section Twenty-four of Chapter Five Hundred and Seventy-six of the Laws of Eighteen Hundred and Ninety-three, Entitled 'An Act Relative to the Waterworks Department of the City of Troy,

and to Provide for an Increased Supply of Water in the Said City,' as Amended by Chapter Three Hundred and Seventy of the Laws of Nineteen Hundred, Relative to the Issue of Bonds for the Extension of the Waterworks and an Increased Supply of Water for the City of Troy." The act, among other things, changed the personnel of the municipal improvements commission of Troy by adding to its membership the mayor and corporation counsel. This purpose was not suggested by the title, and the act was therefore invalid. Cahill v. Hogan (1905) 180 N. Y. 304, 73 N. E. 39.

§ 17. [Existing laws not applicable by reference.]— No act shall be passed which shall provide that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be made or deemed a part of said act, or which shall enact that any existing law, or part thereof, shall be applicable, except by inserting it in such act.

[Am. 1874.]

The instructions issued to Governor Tryon relating to the enactment of laws, which are cited in the note to the last section, contained the following provision, paragraph 12:

"And that no act whatever be suspended, altered, continued, revived, or repealed by general words, but that the title and date of such act as suspended, altered, continued, revived, or repealed, be particularly mentioned and expressed in the enacting part."

The similarity between this provision and the foregoing section is apparent, yet more than a century passed, 1771-1874, before the enactment of laws by general reference was prohibited by the Constitution.

A provision on this subject was proposed by the Convention of 1867 in the following form: "No law shall be revived, altered, or amended by reference to its title only, but the act revived, or the section or sections thereof as altered or amended, shall be re-enacted and published

at length." The subject was taken up again by the Commission of 1872, which reported the section in its present form. The courts have not had frequent occasion to construe this provision, but, so far as I have observed, statutes which have been challenged as invalid under it have all been sustained, as will appear from the following brief summary. Judging from the large number of statutes which included references to other statutes as the basis of jurisdiction, or as prescribing the procedure, which have not been questioned, and also from the remarks found in several judicial opinions, the provision does not now seem to have much practical significance, and apparently it is not now considered a serious restraint on legislative power, especially as to the form of legislation, or the manner in which the legislative will shall be declared. One judge (People ex rel. Everson v. Lorillard [1892] 135 N. Y. 285, 31 N. E. 1011) intimates that the provision is of "doubtful utility," and it seems clear from the general tenor of the decisions that the courts think the state could get on very well without this provision. One distinct reform, however, should be noted which was accomplished by it; namely, the prevention of a revival and continuance of repealed statutes by mere suggestion in a later law. This method of legislation is pointed out in Blauvelt v. Nyack (1876) 9 Hun, 153, where the court say that prior to the adoption of this section, the legislature, by a mere reference, had power to revive a repealed statute. The statutes which have been construed in the cases cited in this note have, for convenience, been arranged in chronological order.

1875, chap. 91, "Empowering the Commissioners Appointed to Investigate the Affairs of the Canals of the State, in Pursuance of a Joint Resolution of the Senate and Assembly of 1875, to Compel the Attendance of Witnesses, and Fixing the Compensation of Such Commissioners." The act authorized the commission to issue an

attachment for contempt, and provided that the "like proceedings shall thereupon be had as if such commission was a court of record, and such witness had been duly subpoenaed to attend before it." The act was sustained, the court observing that the constitutional provision "should receive a strict construction," and if the act is not strictly within the mischief sought to be provided against by the Constitution, it should be held as not within the inhibition. People v. Learned (1875) 5 Hun, 626.

1875, chap. 369, providing for reassessments for local improvements in Buffalo. It applied the procedure prescribed by the charter. The act was sustained. This section of the Constitution "should only be applied when, in a subsequent statute, another act is referred to, not to amend it, but to give effect to the provisions of the new. In other words, the new act must, by its express terms, provide that an existing law shall be made or deemed a part of it.” Wells v. Buffalo (1878) 14 Hun, 438, (1880) 80 N. Y. 254.

1875, chap. 400, dividing the town of Fishkill and erecting a new town from a part thereof. All laws applicable to the existing town of Fishkill were to apply to the town of Fishkill as continued by the act, except as otherwise therein indicated. This simply preserved such laws, and if it was necessary thus specifically to continue them in force, which may be doubted, the legislature had power to continue them by such a reference. People ex rel. Stevens v. Hayt (1876) 7 Hun, 39, reversed on questions relating to a writ of mandamus in (1876) 66 N. Y. 606, but without considering the constitutional question.

1875, chap. 595. The act confirms to the corporation powers granted under previous statutes, without specifying such powers, privileges, and franchises. The act was therefore void. Patten v. New York Elev. R. Co. (1876) 3 Abb. N. C. 306, appeal dismissed in (1876) 67 N. Y. 484. Ninth Ave. Elev. R. Co. v. New York Elev. R. Co. (1877) 3 Abb. N. C. 347.

1876, chap. 435, "to Amend Chapter 210 of the Laws of 1847, Entitled 'An Act to Provide for the Incorporation of Companies to Construct Plank Roads, and of Companies to Construct Turnpike Roads,' Passed May 7, 1847," did not violate this provision. It referred to a prior statute for rates of toll, but did not expressly apply it. The court say that this constitutional provision should not be extended beyond its letter. Hathaway v. Tuttle (1881) 12 N. Y. Week. Dig. 240.

1876, chap. 445, in relation to a part of Western avenue in Albany. Assessments for the local improvement were to be made by pro

ceedings prescribed by former statutes relating to the city, which were referred to in the act. This act was sustained. The court say that "it is not necessary, in order to avoid a conflict with this article of the Constitution, to re-enact general laws whenever it is necessary to resort to them to carry into effect a special statute." People ex rel. Washington Park v. Banks (1876) 67 N. Y. 568; Hurlburt v. Banks (1876) 52 How. Pr. 197.

1880, chap. 344, the Buffalo municipal court. The act applied the procedure prescribed by general statutes for justices' courts. This provision was sustained, but it was held that the act of 1889, chap. 505, providing a different method of selecting jurors in justices' courts, did not apply to the municipal court. Bergman v. Wolff (1890) 33 N. Y. S. R. 499, 11 N. Y. Supp. 591, Buff. Sup. Ct. 1880, chap. 377, "in Relation to the Government of the City of Brooklyn." The act was complete in itself, and not obnoxious to this provision of the Constitution. People ex rel. McLaughlin v. Partridge (1884) 13 Abb. N. C. 410.

1882, chap. 259, "to Provide Additional Ferry Slips and Facilities in New York City." The lessees of specified ferries were authorized to acquire certain property by the right of eminent domain under the procedure prescribed by the railroad law. This application of a prior statute by a reference was sustained in Re Union Ferry Co. (1885) 98 N. Y. 139.

1884, chap. 546, closing Liberty street, Schenectady, for the purpose of erecting a railroad station. Damages were to be ascertained in a manner provided by the city charter in cases of property taken for a public improvement. It did not make the provision of the charter a part of this act, but left the law in relation to damages as it existed when the new act was passed. Weinckie v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (1891) 39 N. Y. S. R. 584, 15 N. Y. Supp. 689, affirmed in (1892) 133 N. Y. 656, 31 N. E. 625.

1885, chap. 499, the electrical subways act. It imposed on the commissioners the duty of enforcing the act of 1884, chap. 534, relating to telegraph and electric light companies, which was declared to be "amended and made to conform in all respects to the provisions of this act." The court say it is obvious that the Constitution "does not apply to an act purporting to amend existing laws, for in such a case no intelligent legislation could be had at all without a knowledge of the law intended to be amended." People ex rel. New York Electric Lines Co. v. Squire (1888) 107 N. Y. 593, I Am. St. Rep. 893, 14 N. E. 820.

1890, chap. 249, the Harlem river bridge.

Compensation for