The rights of the state were not affected by the act, and it did not appropriate public property for a local purpose.

The liquor tax law of 1896, chap. 112, did not require a two-thirds vote. The provision requiring the payment of two thirds of the proceeds of the liquor tax to localities was not an appropriation of public money. It was a continuation of the policy which had prevailed since the organization of the state to give to municipalities for local purposes the proceeds of excise licenses. By this act no money was drawn from the state treasury for local purposes. "The public moneys referred to in article 3, § 20, are the public moneys

of the state, as contradistinguished from public revenues levied for local purposes by towns, cities, and villages under state authority, or moneys which, by a long course of legislation, as in the case of excise moneys, have been treated as standing in the same situation." People ex rel. Einsfeld v. Murray (1896) 149 N. Y. 367, 32 L. R. A. 344, 44 N. E. 146.

§ 21. [Appropriation bills ]-No money shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this state, or any of its funds, or any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law; nor unless such payment be made within two years next after the passage of such appropriation act; and every such law making a new appropriation, or continuing or reviving an appropriation, shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated, and the object to which it is to be applied; and it shall not be sufficient for such law to refer to any other law to fix such sum. [Const. 1846, art. 7, § 8.]

This section was a part of the financial reforms included in the Constitution of 1846.

An appropriation need not state the precise cost of the work to be done. A statement of the maximum amount for a specific object is sufficient under this section. Hurlburt v. Banks (1876) 52 How. Pr. 196.

Money collected by tax from railroad companies under the acts of 1869, chap. 907, and 1871, chap. 283, in municipalities which had is

sued railroad aid bonds, which was to be paid to the county treasurer and used by him for the redemption of such bonds, did not belong to the state, nor to any fund under its management. Clark v. Sheldon (1889) 106 N. Y. 104, 12 N. E. 341.

Money paid into the state treasury pursuant to § 2747 of the Code of Civil Procedure (legacies payable to unknown persons) is not the money of the state or money belonging to any of its funds or any of the funds under its management, within the meaning of this section, and such money may be drawn from the treasury in the manner provided by the Code, without an appropriation by the legislature. People ex rel. Evans v. Chapin (1886) 101 N. Y. 682.

Money deposited with the state treasurer under 8 197 of the tax law as a prerequisite to proceedings by certiorari to review the comptroller's action in relation to a corporation tax cannot be paid out except by an appropriation. Re L. E. Waterman Co. (1901) 33 Misc. 569, 68 N. Y. Supp. 892.

§ 22. [Appropriation bills not to embrace other subjects.]-No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the annual appropriation or supply bill, unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation in the bill; and any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation.

[New.]

A sketch of this provision, which was proposed by the Convention of 1894, will be found in the chapter on that Convention.

§ 23. [Commission bills excepted from certain sections.]-Sections seventeen and eighteen of this article shall not apply to any bill, or the amendments to any bill, which shall be reported to the legislature by commissioners who have been appointed pursuant to law to revise the

statutes.

[Am. 1874.]

In the chapter on the Commission of 1872 I have noted the origin of this section, and the reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution. The court of appeals in People v. Petrea (1883) 92 N. Y. 128, had occasion to consider this provision, and it is there said that "it is a part of the legislative history of the state that, prior to the adoption of the constitutional amendments of 1874, commissioners to revise the statutes had been appointed by the legislature, who had, from time to time, made reports of their proceedings to that body, and when the constitutional amendments were adopted they had not completed their labors, but were still engaged in the work of the revision." The plain object of this section "was to exempt from the operation of § 18 private or local bills which had been or should be reported by the commissioners. But, with the exception of bills originating with the commissioners, and reported by them to the legislature, the prohibition of § 18 is absolute." In the absence of proof to the contrary it will be presumed, in support of the constitutionality of an act, that it originated in a bill reported by commissioners.

§ 24. [Tax law to state amount and object of tax.]— Every law which imposes, continues, or revives a tax shall distinctly state the tax and the object to which it is to be applied, and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such tax or object.

[Const. 1846, art. 7, § 13.]

This was also one of the tax reform provisions proposed by the Convention of 1846.

A local assessment is not a tax within the meaning of this section. Re Ford (1872) 6 Lans. 92; People ex rel. New York & H. R. Co. v. Havemeyer (1874) 4 Thomp. & C. 365; Guest v. Brooklyn

(1876) 8 Hun, 97, affirmed in (1877) 69 N. Y. 506; Jones v. Chamberlain (1888) 109 N. Y. 100, 16 N. E. 72.

The legislature has power to levy such tax for the general fund as it determines to be necessary, and though it fails to appropriate a part of the money which it may be supposed will be thereby raised, such failure does not make the law imposing the tax void. Re Atty. Gen. (1890) 58 Hun, 218, 12 N. Y. Supp. 754

An act which limits an expenditure to a specified sum, and authorizes taxation to that amount, sufficiently states the tax under this section. Hurlburt v. Banks (1876) 52 How. Pr. 196.

Where the act states the rate of tax, and directs the payment of the proceeds into the state treasury to the credit of the general fund, it is a sufficient statement of the object of the tax. Such moneys can be drawn from the treasury only by specific appropriations, but the appropriations need not be stated in the tax law. People ex rel. Burrows v. Orange County (1858) 17 N. Y. 235.

The acts of 1869, chap. 262, and 1870, chap. 340, relating to a road in Yonkers and East Chester, sufficiently stated the tax and the object of it, and were valid. People ex rel. McLean v. Flagg (1871) 46 N. Y. 401.

The acts of 1869, chap. 907, and 1871, chap. 283, providing for the application of railroad taxes in certain municipalities to the redemption of railroad aid bonds, "simply specify what may be done with a tax which has been legally imposed," and do not violate this constitutional provision. Clark v. Sheldon (1887) 106 N. Y. 104, 12 N. E. 341.

In 1872 the legislature passed an act, chap. 734, imposing a tax of three and a half mills, "or so much thereof as may be necessary" to provide for the payment of the canal and general fund deficiencies directed to be paid by the act (chap. 700 of the Laws of 1872). "This is not a specific and distinct statement of the tax to be levied. It is simply a statement of the maximum tax . . . leaving it to the discretion of the administrative officers of the state to levy such tax as they shall find necessary up to the limit named." The legislature cannot thus delegate the power of taxation. "They must determine the amount necessary and adequate, and declare the amount to be levied absolutely." The law states neither the object nor the amount of the tax. It is also invalid because it assumes to fix the amount of the tax by reference to another statute. People ex rel. Hopkins v. Kings County (1873) 52 N. Y. 556.

A statute which directs commissioners in charge of a street improvement to determine the amount of taxation therefor is invalid

under this provision. The legislature cannot delegate to commissioners the power to state a tax. The act did state the object of the tax, but not the tax itself. Hanlon v. Westchester County (1870) 57 Barb. 383.

The act of 1875, chap. 60, amending the act of 1865, relating to payments by foreign insurance companies, imposed a license fee, and not a tax, and therefore was not within the prohibition of this section. The tax covered by the constitutional provision is one general in its provisions and coextensive with the state. People v. Fire Asso. (1883) 92 N. Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 380, also Exempt Firemen's Benev. Fund v. Roome (1883) 93 N. Y. 313, 45 Am. Rep. 217, construing the act of 1879, chap. 89, and other statutes requiring foreign insurance companies doing business in the state to contribute a percentage of premiums for certain local purposes.

The acts of 1879, chap. 382, 1881, chap. 402, 1883, chap. 516, prescribing a special method for collecting taxes in certain counties, do not impose, continue, and revive a tax, and are not within the prohibition of this section. People v. Ulster County (1885) 36 Hun, 491.

The provision of the corporation tax law of 1880, chap. 542, making the taxes applicable to the payment of the ordinary and current expenses of the state, sufficiently states the object of the tax. People v. National F. Ins. Co. (1882) 27 Hun, 188; People v. Home Ins. Co. (1883) 92 N. Y. 328, affirmed in (1889) 134 U. S. 594, 33 L. ed. 1025, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593.

This section does not apply to the collateral inheritance tax law of 1885, chap. 483. "In terms it applies to every tax which the legislature can impose, and is not confined to a property tax. It is not, even by its terms, confined to a general tax embracing the whole state; but the language, literally construed, is broad enough to embrace every local tax imposed for local purposes. Taxes may be imposed upon a great variety of objects. They may be direct or indirect, special or general, and they may be imposed in the shape of excise and licenses upon hawkers, peddlers, auctioneers, insurance agents, liquor dealers, and others. All the contributions for the support of the government, enforced from individuals in the various ways mentioned, are, properly speaking, taxes. Notwithstanding the general language of the section referred to, we do not think it was intended to apply to every tax which the legislature could impose. .. The object of the constitutional provision was to convey information to the members of the legislature and to the people, and it should have a practical construction with a view