claimed their adherence to the vital principle of our institutions which clothes a constitutional majority wth the power to decide public questions and control the action of our representative bodies. Temporary prostration of the legislative power by the secession of a majority was an event which could hardly fail to produce a deep impression upon the public mind. A proceeding of this character had never before occurred since the formation of a republican government in this state."

In People ex rel. Carter v. Rice (1892) 135 N. Y. 473, 16 L. R. A. 836, 31 N. E. 921, the court sustained the apportionment act of 1892, which was passed at an extraordinary session of the legislature. This subject has been considered in a previous note. The decision on this point has little interest now except historically, in view of the constitutional change made in 1894, requiring an apportionment to be made at a regular session.

3. Messages and recommendations to the legislature.— I have pointed out in the first volume the custom which prevailed during the colonial period, and was continued under the first Constitution, in relation to formal communications by the governor to the legislature. According to this custom the governor personally met the legislature at the opening of each session and read a speech similar to the speech from the throne in the English Parliament, in which he presented a statement of public affairs, including such recommendations as seemed to him pertinent. This custom was changed by the second Constitution, and, beginning with the legislature of 1823, the Constitution required the governor to communicate to the legislature by message. Special messages were frequently sent to the legislature under the first Constitution, but the formal communication at the opening of a session was made by the governor in person, in the presence of both houses. The duty here imposed upon the governor is imperative,

and the authority implied in it is one of the highest attributes of his office. His position at the head of affairs enables him to obtain information relating to existing conditions, not readily available to members of the legislature. The annual message, therefore, becomes an important document, frequently containing a summary of the history of the state during the year, from the point of view of the executive office. The speeches, messages, and other communications by the governor to the legislature during our colonial and state history present, in an orderly series, the origin and development of every important condition of public affairs, and almost every aspect of social, educational, political, and commercial changes which have been suggested or accomplished during this long period. A history of the state could easily be written from these speeches and messages, especially in connection with the legislation which has so often resulted from the governors' recommendations.

4. Transaction of public business.-The clause requiring the governor "to transact all necessary business with the officers of government, civil and military," was added by the Convention while the first Constitution was under consideration, and it has not since been changed. It is general in terms and comprehensive in scope, and is appropriate to the chief executive, with whom all other officers, either state or local, may have occasion to transact business. It meant more under the first Constitution than it means now, for, as already pointed out, the governor was then more distinctively than now the executive head of the state, and possessed powers relating to the appointment of officers and their supervision which have not been continued under subsequent Constitutions.

5. Expedite public measures.-The clause requiring the governor to "expedite all such measures as may be resolved upon by the legislature," which was also included

in the first Constitution, was a distinct recognition of the governor's executive authority. The legislature is to make the laws and the governor is to execute them, and to use all the means placed at his command to effectuate the legislative purpose. This does not make him subordinate to the legislature, for his influence has already been felt in the enactment of the laws which he is required to enforce, and, except in rare instances, where bills have been passed over his veto, the laws which he is to execute have already received his assent. He therefore occupies not a subordinate but a co-ordinate position in the government, being the means by which the legislative power, of which he is also a part, finds expression in an actual enforcement of the statute.

6. "Take care that the laws are faithfully executed."This is a corollary to the two preceding clauses, and gives the governor general supervision of all officers, state or local, who may have any part in the administration of the law. Such important changes have been made since the first Constitution, which included this provision, by which changes large independent powers have been conferred on other officers, with a corresponding limitation of the governor's powers, that it is not always easy to make a practical application of this injunction. As pointed out by Governor Hoffman, whose observations have been quoted in the note to § 1, many officers are now outside the scope of the governor's jurisdiction and supervision, and whatever he may do to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed" must often be done by admonition or suggestion rather than by any action resulting from the possession of power to see that a given statute is enforced, or that a particular officer does his duty.

7. Compensation. This clause was added by the amendments of 1874, which were adopted on the recommendation of the Commission of 1872. Constitutional

conventions had already considered the subject of the governor's compensation, and they appreciated the importance of placing it beyond legislative control. The first Constitution contained no provision on this subject. The second and third Constitutions required the governor's compensation to be fixed by law, but it could not be increased or diminished during his term. The proposed Constitution of 1867 contained substantially the same provision, with the addition that the compensation could not be changed after the governor's election, even before the beginning of his term. In the chapter on the Commission of 1872, I have given a sketch of its action in adopting the provision fixing in the Constitution itself the compensation to be received by the governor and lieutenant governor.

§ 5. [Pardons, reprieves, and commutations.]—The governor shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such conditions, and with such restrictions and limitations, as he may think proper, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons. Upon conviction for treason, he shall have power to suspend the execution of the sentence until the case shall be reported to the legislature at its next meeting, when the legislature shall either pardon or commute the sentence, direct the execution of the sentence, or grant a further reprieve. He shall annually communicate to the legislature each case of reprieve, commutation, or pardon granted, stating the name of the convict, the crime for which he was convicted, the sentence and its date, and the date of the commutation, pardon, or reprieve.

[Const. 1777, art. 18; 1821, art. 3, § 5; 1846, art. 4, § 5.]

Under the first Constitution the governor had no power to pardon in cases of treason and murder, which cases were within the jurisdiction of the legislature. There are several early statutes in which the legislature exercised the pardoning power in murder cases. The Constitution of 1821 omitted cases of murder, but included impeachments. The power to grant commutations was added by the Constitution of 1846. The governor's pardoning power has been the subject of frequent consideration in constitutional conventions and commissions and in the legislature. A reference to these discussions and suggestions will be found in the index.

Conditions.-The first and second Constitutions did not expressly authorize the governor to impose conditions on granting a pardon. The power to impose conditions was considered and sustained by Judge Edmonds in People v. Potter (1846) 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 47, where a pardon was granted on condition that the person pardoned should, on or before a day named, "depart from and out of the United States, and never return to the same," and that if he violated the condition he should again be subject to arrest and imprisonment on the original sentence. "The word 'pardon' includes a remission of the offense, or of the penalties, forfeitures, or sentences growing out of it, and may be of a part or the whole of these things." The condition attached to the pardon is, in effect, a contract between the sovereign and the prisoner, that, on being released from the offense and its consequences, the prisoner will withdraw himself from the United States. By the act "Concerning Pardons," the legislature, in 1794, expressly authorized the governor to grant pardons "upon such conditions, and with such restrictions, and under such limitations as he may think proper." This statutory authority was continued by the revisions of 1801, 1813, and 1828. Judge Edmonds thought that by the common law the governor had an inherent right to grant conditional pardons, and that the statute was only a legislative expression of the same authority. The Potter Case was decided in March, 1846. The constitutional convention met on the 1st of June following, and on the 17th the committee on the executive department reported a section on the pardoning power, containing a provision authorizing the governor to impose conditions on granting a